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0.1 Why a Play? – and Why One that Waits for an Occasion? 
Why study a text again – Arthur Miller’s The Crucible from 1952 – of which it 
has been said that it ‘has been widely read (one could say overread) as a 
commentary on McCarthyism’?1 My reason for studying it is not to give it a 
new interpretation. It is to reconsider its relevance, a relevance that goes beyond 
the play merely ‘warning us’: against mass hysteria, for instance, or 
totalitarianism, manipulation, fanaticism. I do not believe people really need 
such warnings, nor do I believe that the strength of the play lies in the fact that it 
is a warning. I want to study the play in its relation to truth, not just one truth, 
but forms of truth, including even what one could call clairvoyance. With 
respect to this, the play stands in stark opposition to the way in which theatre 
has been identified, for millennia, with falsehood, illusion and deceit. One Latin 
term for a certain kind of ‘actor’ (a mime-player, in fact) is telling in this 
context: hypocrita. In essence, the reason for the fact that theatre has been 
identified with falsehood so often is that theatre embodies the breach in 
representation so strikingly: the breach between mask and reality, between 
character and actor, between representation and the so-called real. Theatre is a 
world of appearances, of masks, of the artificial and, as a result, the status of an 
underlying reality becomes difficult to assess. At the same time, however, 
theatre has also at times been linked to truth and veracity. This study considers 
the possibility of theatre as a truth practice in terms of an active response to 
political lies, fabrications, frame-ups and falsities.  
The truth practice I will focus on relates to this one particular play: 
Miller’s The Crucible, written in 1952 and performed for the first time in 1953. 
My question with regard to it is fourfold. The first, fairly basic yet rather 
complex, question is: Why did Arthur Miller choose a theatre play to respond to 
the politics of McCarthyism in the 1950s; could the same result have been 
achieved with a novel, a poem or an essay? The second question is how the way 
in which history is represented in the play, both directly and indirectly, 
functioned, functions and may function dramatically to actualize history (and I 
will come back to the term ‘actualization’ as opposed to ‘making’). In relation 
to both questions, a third question asks how this all relates to different kinds of 
truth. These three questions bring me to my fourth and perhaps most central 
                                                          
1 Erin Graff Zivin, Figurative Inquisitions: Conversion, Torture and Truth in the Luso Hispanic 
Atlantic (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2014), p. 63. 
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question: how can we see the play as one that waits for an occasion to become 
truly active? 
As for the latter question, the answer is related to a different reading of a 
well-known generic term: occasional poetry. Despite the fact that it is a well-
known genre, there are no studies, to my knowledge, of this form of poetry that 
take it seriously as a genre. This could make us forget how much of what we 
now consider to be pieces of world literature were made ‘for the occasion’. I 
suppose most classical Greek authors would be more than astonished to learn 
that their pieces would be performed worldwide, two and a half thousand years 
later. This would remain so up until the 18th century, one could argue. Ovid’s 
boast that he would make a work that would last throughout history is a lonely, 
almost Romantic voice in the crowd of authors that had no other aim than to win 
a festival, to write something that would please their Maecenas, or an audience. 
My argument will be that The Crucible is an occasional play-in-reverse. For 
one, and most basically, it was written for the occasion of McCarthyism. Since 
then it got, in part, a quasi-universal meaning, just as any Shakespearean play 
would have. This is to say, that it was taken up in the repertoire of all sorts of 
companies, worldwide. As such, however, the play has lost, in a pivotal sense, 
the occasion for which it was written and to which it was a remarkable and 
courageous response. It was written in times in which a politically motivated 
atmosphere of fear made it impossible to seek the truth. In working counter to 
this atmosphere and in its aim to seek the truth, The Crucible was a veritable 
truth practice. It wanted to speak the truth in direct response to a power that 
could have destroyed both the piece and its author. It is such an occasion that 
the play is waiting for to become active again in a basic sense.  
As for the first of the questions posed, my contention will be, in the 
context of The Crucible’s requiring a truth practice, that the play could not 
equally well have been a novel, a poem, an essay, or any other genre. All other 
genres miss something that is intrinsic to the theatre, and to drama, namely that 
it requires people to act physically, to play something again, to do something 
familiar anew. This may seem trivial. Yet it connects to something that Bertolt 
Brecht considered to be drama’s major didactic force: that it asked people to 
enact something instead of reading something, or looking at it. With regard to 
this issue, the play will bring me to the heart of an issue that is both specific, in 
the sense that it is related to the period of McCarthyism, and that is more 
general, as a trait of American culture of the past three centuries. The play 
studies the production of fear in that it is made possible by a structuring 
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Manichaean principle. When president Ronald Reagan held his evil empire 
speech on 8 March 1983, this proved to be a prefiguration of president George 
Bush’s ‘axis of evil’ in his State of the Union Address on 29 January 2002. The 
play’s subject begs the question of how the play relates to a seemingly persistent 
Manichean element or aspect of American culture. The issue at stake, then, is 
whether this culture works by means of the persistent recurrence of a painful 
and problematic dynamic and whether this is inevitable. In this respect, my 
question of whether The Crucible had to be a play concerns a play’s abilities to 
both show and re-enact a certain cultural dynamic, repeating and confirming it 
but also offering the possibility of change. It touches upon a play’s ability, that 
is, to repeat things in the sense of working them through, almost like a therapy, 
or in the sense of acting them out again, as a wager on the appearance of 
something new, perhaps even in order to change the dynamic at play.  
In the light of the latter, Miller’s text is, in a somewhat twisted sense, an 
example of what Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak has called ‘critical intimacy.’2 The 
play works with and on a cultural dynamic that is European, Western in nature, 
but also specific to the United States of America. In this perspective, it takes a 
critical stance to this dynamic while being intimate with it at the same time. As 
a result of this critical intimacy, the play cannot lead to a solution. The cultural 
dynamic at stake, the one that is both intimately familiar in the text and critically 
judged by it, works on the basis of an opposition between good and evil, 
between God and devil. It is a dynamic that, as will be argued, cannot truly be 
mastered. It needs to be enacted, physically, in the present, in close proximity, 
and it needs to be judged as from a distance. Herein lies one of the reasons why 
The Crucible had to be a play. 
There are other reasons why The Crucible had to be a play. One is a 
matter of the didactic powers of modern theatre, a power that was the key 
characteristic of art for centuries and even millennia but that has become 
problematic since the 19th century, when for instance Edgar Allan Poe called 
didactic literature the ‘worst of heresies’. Another reason why The Crucible had 
to be a play is to do with the intrinsic relation between politics and theatre. With 
respect to the former, in a sense, this study places itself in the tradition of 
Brechtian theatre: a form of theatre that was aimed at unveiling ideological 
illusions and falsity by showing audiences the real conditions under which they 
                                                          
2 Diana Brydon, ‘Cross-talk, Postcolonial Pedagogy, and Transnational Literacy’, in Home-Work: 
Postcolonialism, Pedagogy, and Canadian Literature, ed. Cynthia Conchita Sugars (Ottawa: 
University of Ottawa Press, 2004), p. 62. 
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lived. In other words this study does not restrict itself to the relation between the 
stage production of a play, with its spectators implied, as a matter of (mere) 
entertainment. Nor is it focused on a play’s Aristotelian function of evoking the 
audience’s feelings of pity, fear and catharsis. Rather, in my study, just like in 
Brecht’s epic theatre, the play’s aim is to appeal to the spectators’ reason and to 
ultimately make them come to grips with the political reality in terms of action.3 
This is made possible by the playwright’s technique of ‘alienation’, which 
requires spectators to maintain an emotional distance from the characters in the 
play in order to engage in a critical evaluation of dominant theatrical and social 
practices.4 Brecht famously called it Verfremdungseffekt (alienation effect or 
distancing effect) and he encouraged it for the sake of rational activism in the 
audience, in a wilful negation of an attitude of emotional arousal or passivity.5  
To this end, in epic theatre, narrative commentary accompanies the 
dramatic plot and action. As Brecht mentions: 
 
The stage began to narrate. The narrator no longer vanished with 
the fourth wall. Not only did the background make its own 
comment on stage happenings through large screens which evoked 
other events occurring at the same time in other places, 
documenting or contradicting statements by characters through 
quotations projected onto a screen, lending tangible, concrete 
statistics to abstract discussions, providing facts and figures for 
happenings which were plastic but unclear in their meaning.6 
 
The quote may help, first of all, to define the object of my study. As indicated, I 
will not focus on specific performances. I will be focusing instead on what 
propels the performance: the authorized text. If there is theatre at play here, it is 
an internal theatre, one that connects individuals to collectives. In The Crucible 
Miller added narrative parts, which appear to introduce the characters but which 
also, if only because of their sheer length, disrupt the dramatic plot. As a result, 
the text also displays characteristics of the epic theatre. The narrative parts do 
                                                          
3 Bertolt Brecht, ‘The Epic Theatre and its Difficulties’, in Brecht on Theatre (New York: Hill 
and Wang, 1964), p. 23. 
4 Delia Pollock, ‘The Play as Novel: Reappropriating Brecht’s Drums in the Night’, Quarterly 
Journal of Speech 74.3 (1988), p. 296. 
5 W. A. J. Steer, ‘Brecht’s Epic Theatre: Theory and Practice’, The Modern Language Review 
63.3 (1968), p. 639. 




not turn this into a narrative but work dramatically, hand in hand with the plot to 
both engage the readers and to switch between generic modes that make it 
impossible for the reader to merely experience the play. As a result, the 
narrative parts help to comment on the history of events, to explain them, and 
encourage the reader or participant to reach a judgment as to their true status. 
Considering the political potential of the epic theatre, the narrative commentary 
in this play instructs the audiences in a didactic way to judge and assess the 
things that are represented, with the ultimate aim of making them ready for 
political action. Finally, in terms of a possible performance, the play’s 
‘background’ does not so much operate formally and theatrically as Brecht 
described it, but the text works on the basis of what can be called an alienating 
background. Although formally speaking the play is set against the background 
of the 17th century, it only works because this historical setting gets yet another 
background. The context of the 1950s does not simply form the ‘natural’, 
historical context of the play. It becomes an alienating one in relation to the 
historical reality of the 17th century.  
Alienation, or Verfremdung, was not a formal exercise. It was aimed at 
judgment. Consequently, in this text, as in Brechtian theatre, a transition is 
staged from theatre to tribunal and from spectator to judge.7 Unlike the classical 
Greek tragedies or the many tragedies that were produced in Europe and the 
West in later times, the epic nature of this play is also evident in that its 
protagonists are common people, whose wills and passions do not constitute the 
motivating force behind the dramatic action. Rather, they are all subjected to the 
manifold forces in the outer world in their immediate political, social and 
economic environment. Hence it is an open dramatic form in which any 
protagonist’s individuality is not the focus of all the action.8  
Yet the confrontation between the different historical backgrounds also 
works on the basis of the fact that both are historically realistic and accurate, 
and this may also serve to offer possibilities of identification. The play is thus 
not entirely Brechtian. It is concerned with truth even, as we will see, in other 
ways than suggested by Brecht. My approach will not be specifically Brechtian 
either, therefore. The reason for this is that I will be focusing on a play that 
cannot actively produce truth but that became active, and has to become active, 
in a historically speaking timely way, this is to say: in response to particular 
                                                          
7 Yasco Horsman, Theaters of Justice: Judging, Staging, and Working Through in Arendt, Brecht, 
and Delbo (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), pp. 92-93. 
8 Steer, p. 638.  
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historical circumstances: what I called an occasional play-in-reverse. When I 
consider the play a matter of truth practice, this is not so much in the sense that 
it unveils false ideologies to reveal the true conditions under which people live. 
The play is more a truth practice in that it stimulates actors, individually or 
collectively, to work through a complex dynamic in which they have to do 
justice to all the parts. Seen in this light, the play as a whole is a truth practice in 
the sense in which Michel Foucault used the classical Greek notion of parrhesia 
i.e. speaking freely and openly: a certain way of expressing everything without 
fear of consequences. Foucault seems encouraged by this Nietzschean question: 
‘What really is it in us that wants ‘the truth’…why not rather untruth?’9 He 
defines parrhesia as ‘telling the truth without concealment, reserve, empty 
manner of speech, or rhetorical ornament which might encode or hide it’. 
‘Telling all’ is then: telling the truth without hiding any part of it, without hiding 
it behind anything.’10 Parrhesia in his view is a political notion that has been in 
use since antiquity to influence relations of power and the interplay between the 
subject and the truth.11 This free-spokenness is fraught with risk, as it requires 
the addressee or the interlocutor to agree to listen to the hurtful truth of the 
parrhesiast (parrhesiastes) in a parrhesiatic ‘game’. It is thus also a dialogic, 
dramatic, questioning process in which the counterpart may respond with 
violent means. Hence it requires the courage to speak the truth despite the risk 
of losing one’s life, as when it not only offends the other but also forces this 
more powerful other to annihilate the one who spoke the truth.  
Foucault studied the practice of speaking the truth in antiquity. What 
distinguishes, in essence, the parrhesiast from the prophet, sage or technician 
(teacher) is his courage to speak the truth without fear. He states: 
 
We can say then very schematically, that the parrhesiast is not the 
prophet who speaks the truth when he reveals fate enigmatically in 
the name of someone else. The parrhesiast is not a sage who, when 
he wants to and against the background of his silence, tells of being 
and nature (phusis) in the name of wisdom. The parrhesiast is not 
the professor or teacher, the expert who speaks of tekhne in the 
                                                          
9 Matthew Sharpe, ‘A Question of Two Truths? Remarks on Parrhesia and the “Political-
Philosophical” Difference’, Parrhesia 2 (2007), p. 89. 
10 Michel Foucault, The Courage of Truth (the Government of Self and Others II): Lectures at the 
Collège De France, 1983-1984, ed. by Frédéric Gros, trans. by Graham Burchell (Houndmills, 
Basingstoke, Hampshire, UK / New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), p. 10. 
11 Foucault, The Courage of Truth, p. 8. 
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name of a tradition. So he does not speak of fate, being, or tekhne. 
Rather, inasmuch as he takes the risk of provoking war with others, 
rather than solidifying the traditional bond, like the teacher, by 
[speaking] in his own name and perfectly clearly, [unlike the] 
prophet who speaks in the name of someone else, [inasmuch as] 
finally [he tells] the truth of what is in the singular form of 
individuals and situations, and not the truth of being and the nature 
of things, the parrhesiast brings into play the true discourse of what 
the Greeks called ethos.12  
 
Foucault contends, then, that prophecy, sagacity or wisdom, teaching and 
parrhesia are four different modes of veridiction. They require different figures 
for their expression, they call for different modes of speech and they belong to 
different domains defined by the concepts fate, being, tekhne and ethos.13 
Parrhesia in ancient Greece grew out of political culture as a democratic 
practice that served as a leveller, as Kerry Burch defined it, between the 
powerful hierarchies of the superiors and the common people.14 Socrates’ 
courage in addressing power is a parrhesiastic practice that has rational-
democratic or philosophic underpinnings that sustain the principle of ‘care of 
the self.’ This courage to speak the truth is embedded in democratic principles 
and is different from the prevalent cultural prestige of valour and heroic 
aristocratic manliness in ancient Greece. As concerns The Crucible, I do not 
consider Miller as a prophet, for he does not speak in somebody else’s name; or 
as a teacher, for he is not solidifying a tradition; or as a sage, for he does not 
appeal to superior wisdom. He is, indeed, a parrhesiast.  
As for its potential to speak the truth, The Crucible is one of Miller’s most 
famous plays. It has become a classic since the early fifties, especially in 
American literature.15 Compared to, for instance, Miller’s Death of a Salesman 
(1949), The Crucible has certainly seen numerous performances, although not as 
many as Death of a Salesman, which has been the object of innumerable 
productions inside and outside the United States, and was the recurrent topic of 
television versions and cinema. The Crucible has, to my knowledge, been less 
                                                          
12 Foucault, The Courage of Truth, p. 25. 
13 Foucault, The Courage of Truth, p. 25. 
14 Kerry Burch, ‘Parrhesia as a Principle of Democratic Pedagogy’, Philosophical Studies in 
Education 40 (2009), pp. 72-73. 
15 Susan C. W. Abbotson, introduction, Masterpieces of 20th-Century American Drama 
(Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2005), p. 9. 
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frequently produced, especially outside of the States. One significant exception 
is the French-Eastern Germany film version from 1957, based on a scenario by 
Jean-Paul Sartre.16 Still, this version also hints at why The Crucible has not 
known as many productions, at least outside of the United States, since the time 
of its writing and performance. The reason may be that The Crucible is so 
unquestionably linked to a historically distinct American period: the late forties 
and early fifties period of McCarthyism. It was McCarthy’s Communist-hunt in 
the States, in short McCarthyism, which appears to define and frame the play. 
This is also what Sartre’s movie clearly responds to. The film not only 
benefitted from cooperation between French and, at the time, communist East 
Germany industries, but it also took a stance in the battle between capitalist and 
communist parties, in favour of communism. 
Much like George Orwell’s Animal Farm, Miller’s The Crucible appears 
to be historically ‘anchored,’ perhaps even ‘frozen’ as an allegory that reflects 
specifically on its own times. According to Graff Zivin, as we saw earlier, the 
play ‘has been widely read (one could say overread) as a commentary on 
McCarthyism’.17 It may therefore seem to have lost its ability to speak more 
universally, or rather, more singularly or particularly in many different 
circumstances. As if to prove the point, one internet site about the film version 
of The Crucible that was made in 1996 has it that ‘Despite the obvious political 
criticisms contained within the play, most critics felt that The Crucible was ‘a 
self contained play about a terrible period in American history’. Consequently 
the 1996 film version was considered to be a failure because it was out of touch 
with the period of the nineties.18 Nevertheless, the Broadway version of 2002 
appeared to be very much in sync with the times, as the responses suggested.19 
This leads me to postulate that this is a play that has been waiting, had to be and 
will be, for the right historical circumstances in order to be able to become truly 
active again, as a truth practice. 
The latter fact helps me to specify one of the elements that the answer to 
my initial questions must contain. In my reading of and dealing with the play, I 
found that it is concerned with truth, or different forms of truth. As the plural 
suggests, these are not absolute or objective truths, let alone universal ones, nor 
                                                          
16 In French: Les Sorcières de Salem; in German: Die Hexen von Salem or Hexenjagd, 1957; 
Christopher Bigsby, ‘The Crucible’, in Bloom’s Modern Critical Interpretations: The Crucible, 
ed. by Harold Bloom (New York: Infobase Publishing, 2008), p. 192. 
17 Graff Zivin, p. 63. 
18 ‘The Crucible by Arthur Miller’ 
<http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/salem/sal_cru.htm> [accessed 21 February 2014]. 
19 Elaine Wiggins, ‘The Crucible Still Burns’, Northwest Theater Review 10 (2004), p. 35. 
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is there one ‘deep’ truth in it, in a historical hermeneutical sense, as if the play 
captured the deeper truth of McCarthyism. The play enacts a specific historical, 
culturally and politically charged truth-practice that is not so much revealed 
through theatre as it is made possible, aesthetically and politically, by theatre. 
As such, the play does not so much embody the classical nineteenth-century 
‘true mirror’ that is held up to society.20 This is to say: it does not reflect truth. It 
is through theatrical enactment and dramatization that truths can be established, 
which is something altogether different. There is an intriguing passage, in this 
context, in Hannah Arendt’s The Human Condition in which she states that 
theatre is ‘the political art par excellence, for only there is the political sphere of 
human life transposed into art’.21 Why this may be so is a question that this 
thesis seeks to answer. Arendt conceives of politics as a stage, or a space of 
appearance, on which the agent’s self is truly disclosed through what she calls 
‘fragile’ forms of speech and action in the context of public debate.22 Theatre in 
her view is the sublime art form for the representation of every action and 
speech that constitute the political. She maintains that: 
 
…the specific revelatory quality of action and speech, the implicit 
manifestation of the agent and speaker, is so indissolubly tied to the 
living flux of acting and speaking that it can be represented and 
‘reified’ only through a kind of repetition, the imitation or mimesis, 
which according to Aristotle prevails in all arts but is actually 
appropriate only to the drama, whose very name (from the Greek 
verb dran, ‘to act’) indicates that playacting actually is an imitation 
of acting. But the imitative element lies not only in the art of the 
actor, but, as Aristotle rightly claims, in the making or writing of 
the play, at least to the extent that the drama comes fully to life 
only when it is enacted in the theatre.23  
 
So, Arendt argues that both the content and the meaning of political action and 
speech can have various forms of reification in art works, which transform them 
                                                          
20 A paradigmatic case would be Clayton Hamilton’s ‘The Magic Mirror: Naturalism and Truth in 
the Theatre’, in The Theory of the Theatre: And Other Principles of Dramatic (New York: Henry 
Holt, 1910), pp. 184-87. 
21 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, 2nd edn (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1958), p. 188. 
22 Richard Halpern, ‘Theatre and Democratic Thought: Arendt to Rancière’, Critical Inquiry 37.3 
(Spring 2011), p. 548. 
23 Arendt, p. 187. 
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and condense them. With respect to this, drama as an art form is politically the 
most powerful medium to enact politics as it is a repetition of action (the most 
basic definition of mimesis), which, according to Arendt, is by definition 
political. Politics in Arendt’s view is a matter of things being acted out, 
publicly, theatrically and dramatically. In this context, and despite the fact that 
politics is nowadays perhaps too often considered as the art of government, I 
will consider it in terms of its ‘moments’ in what follows. No politician can do 
whatever he or she likes at any given moment. The moment has to be there, 
ready to be ‘taken’ or used. My contention is that The Crucible is political in the 
sense that it cannot be used at any given time. It needs an occasion; a moment.  
I aim to trace, in part, the historical and cultural agency through time of 
one particular work of art, then: Miller’s The Crucible. As such this study is 
distinctly different from previous studies that have traced the historical and 
cultural manifestations of a single work of art. A paradigmatic example would 
be George Steiner’s Antigone, in which Steiner sketched the meanings given to 
this play by Sophocles in different historical contexts and the ways in which the 
play was reworked time and again.24 Other studies about, for instance, plays by 
Shakespeare have followed a similar pattern. My aim for this study is different. 
As history has proven, Antigone was performed time and again in many 
different circumstances, just as Hamlet for instance was performed all over the 
world, in both the most innocent and charged of circumstances, on innumerable 
high school stages but also in prisons and labour camps.25 My contention will be 
that The Crucible is not that flexible. It has to act, or can only act in response to 
specific circumstances. These circumstances form, in a sense, the necessary 
counterpart of the play’s possibility to act. They form the occasion that the play 
is waiting for to be truly operative, or better, that the play is waiting for in order 
to become a veritable truth practice.  
 
0.2 Theatre versus Poetic Fabrication 
So many things have already been written about the play that it would be a 
daunting task to come up with new interpretations. As said, this is not my major 
point of concern. Rather, I will use existing interpretations to examine the play 
for a more or less systematic exploration of theatre’s possibilities to work 
                                                          
24 See George Steiner, Antigones: How the Antigone Legend has Endured in Western Literature, 
Art and Thought (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984).  
25 For one prison-variant of Hamlet, see PrisonperformingArts, ‘Prison Performing Arts─Hamlet’ 
Youtube. You Tube. June 5, 2007. Web. < http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eCk38bDbot0> 
[accessed 18 August 2014] 
15 
 
through a specific historical, political, and cultural dynamic that may manifest 
itself in different historical circumstances but that nevertheless also needs a 
specific historical circumstance, the primary characteristic of which is 
producing fear. This is to say that I will be looking at the way in which this play 
can offer us a stage on which to operate truthfully in response to fear. The play 
can show us, in this context, how fear is produced and how a play is never a 
simple means to find truth. Instead the play is an experiment, in that it needs a 
process, a development in time, to establish truth. Moreover, it helps us to 
establish a truth by analyzing a cultural pattern while at the same time, through 
forms of dramatization, helping us to find alternatives for it. There are of course 
many more aspects to theatre (and some of them will be addressed in what 
follows). This is why I said that I will be working ‘more or less’ systematically. 
I will systematically look at the ways in which this play, as a theatrical piece, 
attempts to practice truth.  
This may seem to be in line with the oft quoted words of director Peter 
Brook: ‘In everyday life, “if” is a fiction, in the theatre “if” is an experiment. In 
everyday life, “if” is an evasion, in the theatre “if” is the truth.’26 However, my 
study will not simply accept the contention of the second sentence since the fact 
that Miller chose to write an allegory was a (politically speaking: wise) matter 
of evasion. The contention in the first sentence is more to the point. When I say 
that the answer to my initial question will concern truth(s), I mean that it will 
deal with the question in terms of performativity, both in the sense of 
performance and of the speech act meaning of performativity. An experiment 
has to be carried out, it has to be done, time and again, to see what comes out of 
it. The outcome, moreover, since such is the nature of an experiment, is not 
defined beforehand and cannot be defined beforehand. Likewise, a truth practice 
is not a straight road towards finding the truth. A truth practice is a brave 
experiment to create a situation in which the core issue is the definition of the 
truth. 
In terms of experiment, the play has proven its powers while at the same 
time appearing to be waiting for different times. I will be looking at the way in 
which The Crucible has been making history with regard to the American past, 
with regard to the period in the United States in which it was written and in 
which it intervened, and in relation to a future into which the play projects itself 
(which might be our current present). I will therefore seek to explore 
                                                          
26 Peter Brook, The Empty Space (London: MacGibbon & Kee, 1968). 
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systematically the play’s agential force.27 This concerns its potential to actualize 
history, and by using the term ‘actualize’ I want to emphasize that it does not 
‘make’ history. I agree with Arendt that history cannot be made, like an object 
that is make-able. Actions actualize history. In addition I will not be looking at 
historical contexts in which the play was received differently or performed 
differently. Instead, I will be looking at the way in which the play partakes in a 
cultural dynamic with a certain historical persistency, while criticizing that 
cultural dynamic. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, I will be looking at the 
way in which the play seeks to educate the audience in the sense of eliciting a 
truth-practice, in response to politically invested strategies that are aimed at 
subjecting people by means of fear, or productions of illusionary fears. By this I 
do not mean to imply that these fears are not real and therefore less deep. 
Illusionary fears can be very real, they can be deeply felt, and they can 
physically and psychologically alter people. Their source may be illusionary 
nevertheless.  
The fact that one can speak of a play’s performance in terms of a 
‘production’ is telling. We will see that there are different forms of play and 
production involved in The Crucible, and they relate to the play’s dealing with 
past, present and future. On the face of it, The Crucible deals with an historical 
event from the seventeenth century in order to reflect on things that happened in 
the 1950s. In my reading, however, the play does actually reflect on what, from 
the perspective of its own time, should be called the future. In all three cases – 
past, present and future – the play demands to be produced in response to other 
productions which are all, in some sense, concerned with theatrical performance 
without being truly theatre plays. The most accurate term to describe this 
dynamic is Hannah Arendt’s definition of the political type of poièsis that, in 
her reading, was considered to be at the heart of sovereign power.28 In that 
context poièsis meant ‘strategic fabrication’. This should be distinguished from 
the often pejoratively used notion of manipulation. Rhetorically speaking there 
                                                          
27 ‘Agential force’ in first instance might seem to refer here to Karan Barad’s theory of agential 
realism, according to which the world is made up of phenomena, which amount to an ‘ontological 
inseparability of intra-acting agencies.’ However, I would like to point out that agential force, 
well beyond the domain of aesthetics, has been intrinsic to art ever since it came into existence. 
28 Allan Parsons, ‘What is it that we “do”, when we perform an action?’ in Praxis and Poiesis 
(May 2013). 
.<https://sites.google.com/site/praxisandtechne/Home/architecture/performativity/poiesis-and-
praxis> [accessed 27 February 2014]. See also Keith Breen, ‘Law Beyond Command? - An 
Evaluation of Arendt's Understanding of Law’, in Hannah Arendt and the Law, ed. by Marco 
Goldoni and Christopher McCorkindale (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012), pp. 35-54. 
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is no escaping the skilful handling of material. Even the most honourable 
speaker, whether or not ‘honourable’ is being used ironically here, will have to 
deal skilfully with the material. We must draw a distinction, however, between 
this manipulation and the strategic fabrication that does not show or unveil the 
truth but that wilfully and strategically hides or distorts it. Something is being 
played out in terms of a political production, and as we will see, these 
productions serve another kind of production, namely the socio-political 
production of fear.  
One theme of this study, indeed, addresses how fear is produced as a 
result of ‘work’, a term that is used to differentiate it from action, which Arendt 
refers to as political. Whether we take the example of the Salem process, of the 
McCarthyism of the 1950s, or the more recent so-called war on terror, fear is 
produced in the sense that it is made. Again, this is far from saying that the fear 
that is produced is not real in all these different circumstances. Politically 
speaking, fear can only work when it is experienced as real. The question is 
whether it was the result of a generally and simultaneously felt fear caused by a 
manifest, real threat, or whether it was, at least partly, produced as such or, in 
Arendt’s words, fabricated. With respect to this it is important to emphasize that 
this is not a psychological study. Yet fear is one of the dominant themes 
addressed by this play. I will not be looking at how fear works psychologically, 
however, but at how it was produced, fabricated and performed. Here as well 
the theatrical approach is crucial. Joseph McCarthy’s hearings, as mediatized 
trials, worked as an orchestrated spectacle with an unmistakable theatrical 
aspect to them and triggered real fears.29  
However, my focus does not concern the anxieties, in terms of an 
American psyche (if such a thing exists), of Americans living in the 
seventeenth, twentieth or twenty-first century. I will be looking at the ways in 
which fears are elicited, at how people’s anxieties are tapped into and how fears 
are used politically. This is to say that I am considering fear in terms of a 
politics of fear. Hannah Arendt’s theatre metaphor in politics is vital to explain 
the similarity and difference between stage actors and their spectators and 
political actors in the public realm, or between spectacle and theatre. An 
audience consisting of spectators watches actors acting on the stage and 
observes them, interprets them during their repeated performances and the 
spectators construct different narratives of the dramatic action in their 
                                                          
29 Nicole Rogers, The Play of Law: Comparing Performances in Law and Theatre’, Queensland 
University of Technology Law and Justice Journal  8 (2008), p. 429.  
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memories. The Crucible is a political intervention in the sense that it tries to 
explain how fear is produced from the political stage by political actors for the 
consumption of spectators who reciprocate it by succumbing to it. By contrast 
political actors need a public arena to reciprocate their words and actions, they 
work with an audience that is equally part of the action.30 It is important to note 
in this respect that politics is distinctly different here from what Chantal Mouffe 
calls the political.31 Whereas politics concerns the practical everyday execution 
of power, including manipulating things, the political concerns the choice 
between incompatible worlds. In the contemporary world, this political choice, 
according to Mouffe, is significantly suppressed by the hegemony of liberalism, 
which negates the ineradicable character of antagonism in human society.32 In 
both uses it is important to trace how fear is used and to unveil its tactics 
because it will determine the type of world we choose to live in or, more 
fundamentally, our ability or power to choose. As for this ability, fear will also 
determine the scope of possible choices. 
The consequences for the actualization of history are considerable. The 
production of fear serves the political goal of directing history in one specific 
direction instead of another one. In the context of The Crucible, I am therefore 
interested, to a certain extent, in the role of art in an historical context, and more 
in general with its historical agency. I must emphasise, however, that this study 
is not historical in a restricted sense. I will indeed focus on the specific historical 
means of production of fear of the 1950s and the specific fabrications that were 
used at the time. Yet I will also focus on the ways in which the play works with 
more general, culturally persistent forms of fear, and how they are shown and 
analysed in the play. The work of art, in other words, is centre stage. History 
returns here because the play as such does not find itself outside the cultural 
dynamic that I hinted at, and as a consequence it cannot reflect on it from the 
outside. The play is part of it, has to be part of it, toying artificially with a 
persistent societal problem. 
On the face of it, Miller performs a well-known literary trick. At a time of 
considerable forms of censorship, which were sometimes almost inescapable, 
Miller chooses a story from the past that allows him to speak allegorically about 
the present. All totalitarian systems or those with strong censorship have 
prompted this form of art. As we will see in chapters 3 and 4, the allegorical 
                                                          
30 Leora Y. Bilsky, ‘When Actor and Spectator Meet in the Courtroom: Reflections on Hannah 
Arendt's Concept of Judgment’, History and Memory 8.2 (1996), pp. 140-1. 
31 Chantal Mouffe, On the Political (New York: Routledge, 2005), pp. 8-10. 
32 Mouffe, p. 10. 
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frame should not be applied too easily, as Erin Graff Zivin argued, following an 
argument developed by Idelber Avelar in Untimely Present. For Graff Zivin, the 
following in Avelar’s analysis is crucial:  
 
…not because in order to escape censorship writers have to craft 
‘allegorical’ ways of saying things that they would otherwise be 
able to express ‘directly’ […] but because the petrified images of 
ruins, in their immanence, bear the only possibility of narrating the 
defeat.33  
 
As Graff Zivin rightly argues in response, the truth may be that both modes of 
allegory are operative: the one that functions by means of veiling things and the 
one that in the end ruins the coherence of meaning. I will make use of these in 
chapters 3 and 4, respectively.34 Moreover, what makes Miller’s piece so 
special, in the context of allegory, is that the event from the past is not 
altogether ‘other’ as the allo- in allegory suggests. The events from the past 
border on the events in the present, metonymically, thematically and culturally. 
Miller is not just taking an event from the past that is, metaphorically, 
convenient enough for dealing with the present. As Jonathan Culler suggests, all 
powerful metaphors may depend on metonymy.35 The metonymy at play here is 
a cultural one. It relates to a persistent, recurring cultural dynamic that can be 
traced to seventeenth-century Salem, to the 1950s and to the first decade of the 
twenty-first century. I should emphasise that such persistence is not a natural 
given, as if it were a matter of essence. How could it be, since it concerns an 
intrinsically politically charged, cultural matter that as such is partly made and 
partly actualized? 
In the three periods that I will be considering fear is produced in different 
ways, with different interests involved and different worlds to choose from. In 
chapters 1 and 2 we will see that fear is produced by religious powers in a 
society that is considered to be traditional from an Enlightenment stance. The 
belief in witches and witchcraft is widespread. Historically speaking, this is pre-
Enlightenment, with events taking place shortly before the turn of the eighteenth 
century. Therefore the play is able to introduce characters that announce the 
                                                          
33 Idelber Avelar, The Untimely Present: Post-Dictatorial Latin American Fiction and the Task of 
Mourning (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999), p. 69. 
34 Graff Zivin, p. 62. 
35 Jonathan D. Culler, Preface, The Pursuit of Signs: Semiotics, Literature, Deconstruction (New 
York: Cornell University Press, 2002), pp. xx-xxi. 
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Enlightenment stance against witches and witchcraft. The battle between a more 
scientific and traditional worldview (and world) is a matter of urgency in the 
play, as it was in the historical reality. Fear is aroused, in this context, in a 
town’s community that is best studied from an anthropological point of view. It 
concerns a small scale community, where everyone knows everyone else, in a 
predominantly rural society. A politics of fear is clearly used by religious 
parties. The political choice is one between a world ruled by superstition and a 
world ruled by knowledge and practical wisdom. 
This image changes radically once we consider the play in the context of 
the 1950s. Here we have a large-scale society that to a certain extent sees itself 
as a party pitted against another in the global battle for dominance. This battle is 
not just a matter of politics, however, it is an economic matter with strong moral 
overtones. Democracy is opposed to totalitarianism, capitalism to communism, 
free market to state control, freedom to subjection. The dangers and fears 
involved concern the infiltration of society by elements from the so-called evil 
enemy. Since fears are not spread or fuelled by hearsay and pamphlets in this 
case, but by massive modern media such as radio, newspapers, cinema and 
television, an anthropological approach might still be useful but would also fall 
short in terms of scope and in terms of media. Guy Debord only published his 
The Society of the Spectacle in 1967 but the previous decade had provided him 
with extensive evidence, especially in the States, of what he described a decade 
later. The American audience was bombarded, almost relentlessly, with images 
and texts that served to produce fear. Politicians that may or may not have had 
clear religious convictions used the politics of fear. The political choice was one 
between worlds that were first and foremost morally incompatible, as well as 
economically, politically and aesthetically.  
Things change again when we read the play in the context of the first 
decade of the 21st century. The so-called ‘war on terror’ ostensibly started after 
2001, but its tactics and goals were already in place in the 1980s and 1990s 
under both the Bush Sr administration and the Clinton administration. Still, its 
dynamics clearly changed after 9/11. Another antagonism arose that was defined 
by some as a clash between civilizations.36 It was more complicated than that, 
however, since these civilizations were not divided by any kind of iron curtains. 
Civilizations mingled, with all Western societies having become de facto 
multicultural. It has been said that the clash of civilizations was a battle between 
                                                          




secular and Islamic religious societies. The irony was that the so-called secular 
society of the US was deeply religious, whereas in ‘secular’ Europe some called 
for a return to religious, so-called Judeo-Christian roots. Another irony was that 
so-called Islamic religious parties wanted political change whereas some secular 
societies gave more and more space to orthodox or radical religions. The battle 
was thus being waged both on the outside and the inside, taking place both here 
and there, in a globalized system that has been defined as a network society and 
a society of control. Almost all parties involved used a politics of fear, and the 
political choice was not simply between one world or another, but between 
many worlds, all of them different.  
Nevertheless The Crucible forms a connecting point or node by simply 
connecting elements between these radically different periods. As a play, in this 
respect, it works distinctly differently from, say, a Shakespeare play. Any 
Shakespeare play might allow us to compare different periods in time in relation 
to different enactments or productions of that one play. Such a play functions 
differently, that is, in different historical context. My contention will be that The 
Crucible needs a specific context because it is aimed at one. It can function as a 
guiding thread or a guiding line because it deals not just with some sort of 
cultural persistency but with a specific cultural pattern and it responds to 
specific forms of recognizable political tactics and strategies: fabrications. The 
play can be seen to act on the level of representation in a battle for truth. In one 
sense, this battle is defined within the parameters of the Enlightenment as a 
battle against superstition and deficient or false representations. In another 
sense, however, the truth at stake is one threatened by political or ideological 
fabrication. In the trials organised by McCarthy and his men, or by the HUAC, 
people were being ‘framed’. The media, through photographs, newsreels and 
articles framed them, but they were also framed in the sense of being cheated, as 
they were brought into the wrong context as a result of twisted words and 
manipulated proof. The role of art in this context is not to show truth without 
representation but to use representation in order to unveil, to unmask and to 
relieve people from the burden of falsity.37 
The artistic framework can be distinguished from the political setup. The 
ever circumstantial politics of fear is investigated by the play for the purpose of 
a political truth. This is not the truth of politicians ‘speaking the truth.’ 
Fundamentally in a representative democracy the so-called ‘breach of 
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representation’ as Frank Ankersmit calls it, implies that politicians cannot tell 
the truth directly, as it is.38 This truth is political in the sense that it concerns the 
truth of incompatible worlds, the truth of this variety, and the fact that we have a 
true choice between them. The production of fear is always aimed at making 
this truly political choice impossible. The Crucible does not simply open up that 
choice. As a work of art it cannot be simple. Yet in representing the different 
parties that stand for incompatible and antagonistic worlds and by giving them a 
voice, the play can become a truth practice in the sense of an enactment, not of 
any particular politics, but of the battle between parties that all strive to see a 
world become reality. This is what makes the play political in the sense of 
Mouffe’s ‘the political,’ which she defines in relation to politics:  
 
By ‘the political’ I mean the dimension of antagonism, which I take 
to be constitutive of human societies, while by ‘politics’ I mean the 
set of practices, and institutions through which an order is created 
organizing human coexistence in the context of conflictuality 
provided by the political.39 
 
 The Crucible contains this antagonistic dimension that constitutes the political 
as defined by Chantal Mouffe and this antagonism leads to conflict as the play 
unfolds. This political battle is ultimately waged with a view to realizing the 
truth that each party strives for. Through the representation of different 
characters with different political motives the play acts as a truth practice much 
like Bertolt Brecht’s epic theatre in which the actors’ work is seen as a didactic 
commentary for the benefit of theatre’s social function. The ultimate goal of this 
practice is to invite the audience to constructively judge and criticize the 
represented scene. Therefore drama serves a pedagogical function by instructing 
its audiences. Miller seems to engage his readers and audiences by maintaining 
an emotional distance between them and the main action in the play, in order to 
foreground the play’s theatrical aspects and underscore the socio-political 
message of drama. 
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0.3 Heterogeneous Voices, Individual Responsibility 
Considering the play’s potential and action through time might easily lead one 
to conclude that the play has a universal message, one that could be qualified as 
‘deeply human.’ Engaging in a (familiar) scholarly argument about the meaning 
of words that elude an exact definition is unnecessary. If by universal we mean 
that the play is applicable to or meaningful in different cultures and for many 
people, this is an understandable description. If, however, universal is defined in 
a philosophically underpinned and radical way, I would argue against calling the 
play the carrier of a universal message. The simple reason is that the play takes 
a stance, it takes sides and picks an enemy without, however, rejecting this 
enemy beforehand. 
We need to be more precise. The play introduces us to specific characters. 
This is where universality could come back with a vengeance, as these 
characters could be the carriers of a universal message since, as Žižek argues, 
there is no universality without particularity.40 Yet I would like to make a 
distinction between particularity and singularity for clarity’s purpose. Whereas 
the singular relates to the universal, the particular relates to the general or, by 
implication, to the generic. Thus the play depicts a particular situation that is 
easily recognizable as a specimen of a general condition. In terms of singularity, 
this holds for certain performances, or a single performance, in one place, for a 
specific audience, at a specific moment. Both are the topic of this study. I deal 
with the text of the play as the starting point for many performances and, as 
such, it concentrates on a particular situation that is generally applicable. Yet in 
terms of the play’s potential, I will argue that it is unlike many other plays. It 
needs a political moment to become active. 
Defining the play’s message as universal has detrimental and, scholarly 
speaking, untenable consequences. It has often been argued that the very idea of 
universal rights relies on one particular approach which, historically speaking, 
has been defined as European or Western. I do not have strong reservations 
about this as there is no reason why an idea from a particular source could not 
have universal implications, or universal value. The pressing question is 
whether these ideas really are European or Western, or whether they are claimed 
to be. Just as the modern form of democracy has more than one forerunner, 
likewise freedom of expression, universal equality or the right to be able to live 
unharmed have also been explained through the prism of different cultures. The 
problem, however, remains that the label ‘universal’ is used where empirically, 
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historically, culturally, politically, socially, in short generally, it is not 
applicable. It is as human to exploit as it is human to fight against exploitation. 
McCarthy is as human as Arthur Miller. The desire (or right) to bear arms is as 
human as the call for peace. In terms of the play’s characters: they are all 
particular human beings. To call only one of them the carrier of a universal 
message is ignoring the fact that the play’s particularity points to a general 
condition of disaccord, of struggle, of abuse of power and so forth. This is why 
the play is a truth practice that questions the reader or the audience which side 
they dare or want to choose, and what kind of human being they want to 
become, or risk to be. In this regard, the play is distinctly heterogeneous and, as 
a consequence, it is resolutely and tellingly theatrical and dramatic.  
The etymological meaning of the Greek word for actor – hypokritès - is 
‘he who answers.’41 The underlying idea of the actor is that a speaker becomes 
split in two. Therefore, response is at the heart of theatre. In the case of someone 
telling a story, the narrator can produce many voices as a result of which there is 
always a hierarchy involved: the speaker has to give the floor to the other 
speaker embedded in him or her. The idea of theatre is that all voices and all 
actors are equal on the level of the language situation, which consequently can 
be defined as dramatic in two ways. If we consider drama as the element of 
action in theatre, the dynamic of independent voices operating on an equal level 
drives the plot forward. This dynamic of independent voices will involve 
conflict, tension and confrontations that unite or confront the audience. In terms 
of the play, it is not merely the characters appearing on stage (theatrically), 
speaking to one another (both dramatically and theatrically) and acting 
(dramatically), it is also the play itself that operates theatrically and dramatically 
in relation to the reader and the audience by asking: what will you say in 
response, what will you do? 
In this perspective, the play is both individual and collective in terms of 
scope. This is why I can both accept and criticize the idea that the play is about 
individual responsibility. Many individuals were taking a stance against the 
forces of McCarthyism. Many of them were crushed. It seems that Miller did 
not make this oppression his main theme. Neither was he promoting an heroic 
individual who could singlehandedly withstand the forces of evil and come out 
of the conflict victoriously. He depicted an entire force field. Politically 
speaking, the play addresses the audience (be it the reader or the viewer) both as 
                                                          




a collective of individuals and as an individual that is indexically related to a 
collective. They will all have to make an ethical decision since they are being 
called upon by the play. The idea of theatre makes it equally possible for people 
to take the side of either Proctor or Danforth. This is why the play does not 
present a universal story of an heroic individual conquering the powerful forces 
of totalitarianism. The play is distinctly and intrinsically political in that it 
divides the audience into opposing sides. Even those who define Proctor as the 
true hero of this story may belong to radically opposed parties. 
This leads to the question, of course, of how I will deal with the play as 
both a member of the audience and a scholar studying it. Cultural analysis, as I 
see it and use it, can partly be considered as a form of cultural studies. If my 
analysis is also a form of cultural history it concerns the issues of historical 
continuity and contingency. There is no law that requires history to develop in 
only one way, and cultures are never fixed and stable through time. They do 
resist change, however, and provide people with forms of stability. Institutional 
organizations are put in place to guarantee such stability. Nevertheless, people 
can change culture as much as culture can change them. In chapter 5 and the 
conclusion this dynamic will be the central point of concern when I re-assess the 
culture theory put forward by Geert Hofstede. For Hofstede the emphasis lies on 
the persistency of and in culture. This is a theory with considerable explanatory 
power. It helps us to understand how cultures can stay the same. It does not help 
us to understand, however, how cultures may change, sometimes radically. For 
this, I will turn to Judith Butler in my conclusion.  
 
0.4 A Play Waiting for the Occasion: Theatre as Truth Practice in Relation 
to History 
In terms of organizing my argument, the book is structured on the basis of 
fundamental generic forms that are pivotal for the play’s socio-cultural and 
political meaning and, consequently, action. These forms are: narrative, theatre 
and drama. The play represents and uses a history in the form of a narrative: the 
story, or rather one of the stories, of what happened in Salem. It is also a 
theatrical play, and as such it was instrumental in acting against a certain form 
of political spectacle in its own times. Thirdly the text is not prophetic per se, 
but it speaks to the future, it has spoken to the future, both in terms of what it 
saw as a repetitive issue, or a pattern, and in terms of an attempt to find an 
opening to something new. As such, the play is dramatic, both in the sense that 
it prescribes, as a script, what must happen, but also much like a scenario that 
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needs to be enacted, in that it generates enactments that are each time new, or 
that may open up to something new. 
In chapter 1 I focus on the way in which the play deals with history in 
terms of representation, with narrative as its dominant form. The Crucible is 
ostensibly a play but it is based on the author’s historical research that led him 
to shape his own historical narrative of the events. I will make a distinction in 
this respect between narrative and plot. The plot of the play will be of 
importance in chapter 5 and the conclusion, since it concerns the way in which a 
play, in terms of action, is geared towards its completion, and in that sense 
towards a future. The narrative, however, concerns the reconstruction of past 
actions and events in terms of their logico-chronological ordering. With respect 
to this my terminology is clearly derived from narratology where each narrative 
text is characterized by three aspects: text, story and history.42 The text, in this 
case, is a play but it is intersected by important narrative sections that bring 
coherence to the text as a story and that may serve to reconstruct the history that 
underpins it. I am not considering the issue of history’s representation as a 
formal exercise. The play does not merely amount to using a history from the 
past anecdotally, as if it could help make ‘a good story.’ The play claims to 
present a truth that calls in question another truth and, theatrically speaking, the 
narrative serves to set the stage for this contest. This setting the stage relates to 
narrative’s intrinsic requirement of selection. The theme itself of the Salem 
witch-hunt was a matter of selection, one that Miller struggled with as his 
autobiography shows. Once he had selected it there was the problem of how the 
Salem history could be used to set the stage for a confrontation with 
McCarthyism.43 The narrative functioned as a means to do this. 
Moreover, as an historical piece or narrative, the play makes a claim of 
truth, which is important in a context of political framing. The question of 
course is, in an historical context, what kind of truth is at stake. In order to 
assess this I will first explain how the play relates to recent debates on 
historiography. Whereas the writing of history has been described by and large 
as a form of hermeneutics, the eighties of the 20th century saw a debate on the 
specifically narrative nature of the historical report. Some saw this as an attack 
on the ability of the historiographers to represent historical truth and Ankersmit 
in particular was accused of being postmodernist and therefore a proponent of 
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the presumably postmodern maxim of ‘anything goes’.44 Still, if we read the 
work of Hayden White or Frank Ankersmit today, it is definitely marked by the 
main demands in the domain of history writing, in that their work is concerned 
by the principle of historical truth. The point they made was that there is no 
escaping the generic form, or the use of structuring tropes that make us see the 
past in a certain light. That said, it may be obvious that there is no such thing as 
‘the,’ that is the one and only historical truth. Yet the play’s claim of an 
historical truth is part of its rhetorical power. 
Nevertheless, I will also read the play, in chapter 2, as a postmodern work 
of art. This is to say that I do not contend that the play actually is postmodern, 
certainly not in the political context of the fifties, but that I consider its 
postmodern potential. Again, this is not a formal matter. Postmodern works of 
art have been considered for their political potential in the works of such 
important theorists as Linda Hutcheon and Brian McHale. Instead of claiming to 
write a proper story about what happened historically, postmodern works of art, 
and especially literature, have been the battlefields where the contest for a 
historical truth was fought. My study relates to the work of Michel Foucault, 
who was pivotal in considering historical truth as what is ideologically made. 
His work is also crucial when considering a culture’s organization and persistent 
force through time, and even more so in relation to a period in which the parties 
claiming to be fighting for the truth proved to be experts in falsity, blackmail 
and framing. 
Reading the play in a postmodern way will help me to consider it as a 
parody or as an allegory. The latter will be central to chapter 4, where history in 
the making is the issue, in its contemporary situation. Chapter 2 looks at the 
making of history with regard to the past, although this will always be in the 
context of a present. As a work of art that embodies the past in the present, The 
Crucible can also be read in what has been called by Mieke Bal, following 
Spivak, a ‘preposterous reading’. Such a reading reverses the time scales. 
Historically the Salem trials happened first (in 1692), and the play followed, in 
fact more than two and a half centuries later. Yet most readers and the general 
public only became familiar with the trials of Salem through the play. The 
                                                          
44 See for instance Frank R. Ankersmit, ‘Historical Representation’, History and Theory 27.3 
(1988), pp. 205-28; Frank R. Ankersmit, ‘Historiography and Postmodernism’, History and 
Theory 28.2 (1989), pp. 137-53; Perez Zagorin, ‘Historiography and Postmodernism: 
Reconsiderations’, History and Theory 29.3 (1990), pp. 263-74; Frank R. Ankersmit, 
‘[Historiography and Postmodernism: Reconsiderations]: Reply to Professor Zagorin’, History 
and Theory 29.3 (1990), pp. 275-96; John H. Zammito, ‘Ankersmit's Postmodernist 
Historiography: The Hyperbole of “Opacity”’, History and Theory 37.3 (1998), pp. 330-46. 
28 
 
rhetorical effect can be ‘preposterous’ or ‘scandalous’, including in the sense of 
being brought into an anachronistic situation. Here again I contend that such a 
preposterous operation has defined the play’s rhetorical and political power, by 
showing McCarthyism as a preposterous strategy that also reversed the time 
scales, by reading all sorts of actions that happened in the past in the light of a 
present.  
In chapters 3 and 4 I will focus on the specifically theatrical and 
allegorical nature of the play. Whereas a narrative is organized in terms of 
historicity, a theatre play is aimed at a performance that always takes place in a 
present, and in terms of presence. In chapter 3 I will show that the play is 
wilfully and purposefully a theatrical response to the operations of McCarthy 
and his men. Although the accused were brought into a situation with theatrical 
elements and aspects that have an important role in any legal setting such as a 
court, the theatricality of the situation was ruled, or rather framed, by the 
generic form of the spectacle. My analysis will radicalize the notion of frame, 
which has been used in the field of the humanities, especially in a semiotic sense 
but also as a replacement for the often-used term of ‘context’.45 In Miller’s case, 
however, the meanings and uses of frame are more condensed. Firstly, there was 
McCarthy’s seemingly unassailable frame of an American democracy defending 
itself against communist totalitarianism. In the context of this Manichaean 
frame, framing was the major strategy followed by McCarthy. Miller, for one, 
was framed. In response, Miller put his own point forward, the distance point – 
a point that organizes perspective – of a theatrical play. He used this in The 
Crucible to theatrically unhinge the machinations of McCarthyism. His play was 
a theatrical intervention in an ideological force field that served to puncture 
what I will call the veil of its spectacle. The puncturing power resided in a 
particular use of allegory. 
In chapter 4 I will expand my reading of the play as a distinct form of 
allegory. Basing myself on a reading by Ernesto Laclau of Paul de Man’s 
work,46 I will consider the power of allegory with respect to the actualization of 
history. This power depends on two tropes: metaphor and metonymy. Metaphor 
in this case concerns the sustained metaphorical relation between McCarthyism 
and the Salem witch-hunt. Two different chunks of history, with their own 
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dynamic of signifiers and signified, are brought together by the play, forcing us 
to find what motivates the comparison. As Laclau explains, the metaphorical 
comparison by means of allegory implies an attempt to bring different histories 
under the heading of one power. The Crucible is an upfront political 
confrontation, claiming its own powers of control. At the same time, however, 
the two periods are not simply different just as two separate worlds can be 
different. The periods are also bordering on one another in space and time 
because of the culture that connects them. Culturally speaking, especially in 
relation to its fascination with Manichaeism, the opposition of good and evil, the 
two histories relate in terms of contiguity. Here metonymy is at stake, which 
Laclau considers in terms of hegemony. In this light, the play is both a 
confrontation in a battle for power, but it also suggests that there may be another 
way of organizing culture. Or, in other words, that there might conceivably be 
another organization of the world. 
Both the metaphorical and metonymic power of The Crucible as an 
allegory will be explained further in chapter 5 and the conclusion, in relation to 
the play’s future, which is our present. Here, the question arises what its power 
may be for the present, since, in a sense The Crucible can be seen as an 
historically framed play, again much like George Orwell’s Animal Farm. It is 
indeed difficult to read the play without reference to McCarthyism, which is 
why Zivin suggested that the play has been over-read. However, I will argue 
that, dramatically speaking, the play embodies a form of cultural analysis in our 
present: the first decade of the twenty-first century. I will consider the play as a 
cultural scenario, one that presents a story that needs to be enacted or done (the 
etymological root of drama: dran means to do) or that functions as the basis of 
what needs to be worked out. The scenario is the opposite, in this respect, of the 
historical narrative. It is a dramatic form that produces history, and the question 
is what kind of history: one that repeats a familiar pattern or one that allows a 
new opening? To answer this question, I will expound my view on the notion of 
persistency in culture, and whether I consider this to be an inescapable 
persistency. The issue is whether the play in effect participates in making a 
culture persist, as a script and consequently a prescribed plot, or whether it may 
help open up history, or a culture’s trajectory. In chapter 5 therefore I will give 
due consideration to the fact that the play is not just considering the Manichean 
structure from the outside. It engages in it, and it can only do so effectively if it 
forces the readers to enact it by going through it. In this sense the play can be 
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said to contribute dramatically to the cultural persistency whilst critiquing both 
the Manichean structure and its persistency at the same time.  
In the conclusion I will read the play as a scenario rather than a script, or 
rather as a cultural scenario. Here Judith Butler will help me to study a scenario 
for its performative powers, both in terms of enactment and in terms of 
performativity, as in speech act theory. In Butler’s reading, a scenario can be 
seen as the embodiment of iterability and of a culture’s force to repeat itself and 
persist in the future. Yet, as Butler argues, every repetition and every 
performative act may actually produce a new context and a new meaning. The 
familiar story may get another meaning, as in the basic meaning of allegory: to 
give the story another (allos) meaning. With the possibility of such an other 




A Truthful Account: the Events of the Salem Trials in a Literary Work of 
Art 
 
Arthur Miller’s The Crucible is, in first instance, a literary reconstruction of a 
historical event: the Salem trials that took place in the village of Salem in Essex 
County, New England (today Danver, Massachusetts) in 1692. As Miller 
explains in his autobiography Timebends (1987) and as is clear from his 
introduction to the play, he not only carried out scholarly research in preparation 
of writing the play, he also reflected explicitly on how he had used the historical 
material to reconstruct a story. The central issue in this chapter and the next is 
the position taken by the play with regard to writing history – historiography – 
and to the question: what is historical truth? How does the play relate to the 
issues of representing history and historical truth?  
To answer these questions I will, in this chapter, give an extensive 
overview of the historical debates about witchcraft in order to situate Miller’s 
position on this topic. In the next chapter I will position Miller’s work within 
more general debates about historiography, and the historian’s possibilities of 
rendering a historical ‘truth’. 
 
1.1 Salem: Aspects of the Case 
In 1692 in Salem Village, which is slightly to the west of Salem Town, several 
girls in the household of the minister Samuel Parris became ‘afflicted’ and 
started suffering from fits and bad vision. An initial debate among the adults 
was followed by an examination by the local physician, William Griggs, about 
the cause of the seizures, who concluded that the girls were ‘possessed by the 
Devil’ and thus that the cause of their afflictions was ‘unnatural’. Both the girls 
and their parents became convinced that they were ‘bewitched’ by ‘the Evil 
Hand’ or malign witchcraft.47 They sought help from Reverend John Hale of 
Beverly, a renowned expert in demonology in those days. The girls accused 
other townspeople of tormenting them with spectral forms – i.e. that ghosts of 
other townspeople made them fall in convulsions and screams without obvious 
cause and at times afflicted and pinched their bodies.48 In this context Hale 
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vitiated the doubts about the superstitious elements in the outbreak upon 
confirming: ‘Now let me instruct you. We cannot look to superstition in this. 
The Devil is precise; the marks of his presence are definite as stone’. 49 Soon 
more people, especially women, became afflicted, and accusations spread in 
Salem village. Girls were also invited to the neighbouring Andover region to 
reveal the witches hidden there. They accused 49 people before local legal 
instances stopped issuing new warrants. In June, the governor of Massachusetts 
Bay Colony, Sir William Phips, set up a special court of ‘Oyer and Terminer’ 
(to ‘hear and determine’) to try the witches.50 Over 150 people were accused but 
the majority were spared because they confessed, repented or accused others to 
avoid capital punishment.51 In the end, nineteen people were hanged for the 
crime of witchcraft (thirteen women and six men), two more died in jail, and 
Giles Corey was pressed to death for showing a recalcitrant attitude towards the 
prosecutions. Two dogs were also hanged on suspicion of being devils. On 29 
October, in the face of increasing scepticism, governor Phips suspended the 
court. Upon reconvening, the court acquitted all remaining suspects due to 
criticism of the fairness of the trials.52 
Scholarly interest in this historical episode has been immense. A study of 
James Arnt Aune distinguishes seven different types of interpretation of the 
historical event, each on the basis of a different methodological approach to 
history.53 There are psychological/psychoanalytical, sociological, medical, 
religious, anthropological, feminist and political explanations of what happened. 
This variety of approaches is due to the complex nature of the phenomenon of 
European and American witchcraft. According to Thomas A. Fudge: ‘witchcraft 
historiography considers numerous topics including, but not limited to, history, 
anthropology, magic, popular superstitions, religion, theology, law, psychology, 
sexuality, gender, sociology, medicine, politics, language, popular beliefs, 
folklore studies, and popular culture’.54 Yet, as Isaac Reed observes, the various 
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approaches to witchcraft can be divided into two main strands.55 The first strand 
focuses on the systematic elements and structural factors in its explanation of 
the phenomenon, e.g. when witchcraft is understood in terms of large-scale 
economic and political developments. The second strand offers detailed 
descriptions of particular lives, communities and regions, and understands 
witchcraft in relation to social development of various communities. Since the 
1970s, as Reed points out, under the influence of social history these two strands 
have been brought together, which led to the rise of what could be called the 
interdisciplinary field of ‘witchcraft studies’.56 Witchcraft studies is a subfield 
within social history which came up during the late 1960s, and which regarded 
witchcraft as a social and anthropological aspect of the given societies, 
including town study, patterns of property ownership and methods of litigation. 
Religious explanations surfaced immediately after the end of the trials, in 
which diabolical malevolence was blamed for wreaking havoc in the 
communitarian Puritan culture of religious conservatism and official piety. 
Chadwick Hansen argues that the witch hysteria was an historical reality in 
seventeenth-century Puritan social consciousness and he discovered that there 
were actually practising witches in Salem.57 In his review of Hansen’s work, 
Max Savelle explains that Hansen’s main premise was that ‘the Salem society 
believed in witchcraft and for a society that believes in witchcraft, witchcraft is 
terribly real’ (a contention in line with what I touched upon in my introduction, 
namely that fabricated fears are not unreal).58 However, real beliefs and fears 
did not necessarily mean that witches were real. In this respect, it was the 
disjunction between the theological and the magical conceptions of witchcraft, 
that, according to Richard Godbeer, undermined the legal process.59 Godbeer 
suggested that the Salem witch hysteria was a manifestation of the community’s 
predisposition to project the blame of their personal sufferings upon external 
causes. The relationship between witchcraft, magic and Puritanism in Salem 
made it convenient for several parties to suspect outside forces to have caused 
havoc in the northern colonies during the last quarter of the seventeenth century. 
The church and the patriarchal elite became very cautious as soon as they 
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suspected a community’s interest in Wicca and neo-pagan superstitious beliefs, 
such as displayed, according to the church, by some cunning people or 
‘pubescent girls’. Rossell Hope Robbins echoed this view in the twentieth 
century when he stated that the so-called vicious girls ‘knew exactly what they 
were doing. Their acts during 1692 imply a state of utter delinquency, causing 
death without rhyme or reason, for sport’.60 
Paul Boyer and Stephen Nissenbaum’s ground-breaking work Salem 
Possessed offers a sociological explanation of the Salem episode, emphasizing 
the merchant-farmer conflict between Salem Town and Salem village amongst 
the Putnam and the Porter families of New England.61 Their analysis is based on 
local tax records for 1691, the preceding year, which reveal an important 
difference between the payments by the pro-Parris factions and the anti-Parris 
factions. On the basis of these findings, they assert that the Salem witch-hunts 
were caused by the advancement of early capitalism. Boyer and Nissenbaum 
observed that the east side of Salem village was inhabited by wealthy and 
affluent Porter families who possessed various holdings and had access to Salem 
Town and its port. On the west side of the village, on the other hand, the Putnam 
family, whose main vocation for decades had been agriculture, saw a gradual 
dwindling away of their agricultural farm lands because of the Puritan 
inheritance system. The inheritance system was patriarchal and land was divided 
equally among sons. Taking the tax records as evidence, Boyer and Nissenbaum 
observe that the Putnam and the Porter families found themselves on opposing 
sides at town meetings, regarding petitions and other institutional and liturgical 
matters. They view the trials as a pathological effect of the trends in the pre-
capitalist economic reconfiguration of the locality and the success or failure of 
the respective families.  
The economic competition explanation was rivalled by the theory that 
witch-hunting was the brainchild of the ecclesiastical and the legal elite who 
sought to strengthen their hold on church power. Richard Weisman’s work on 
Salem is of particular relevance in this context. Weisman argues that relatively 
few cases of witchcraft convictions and executions in Salem prior to 1692 were 
the result of local accusations from the village. In Salem, they were firmly dealt 
with by the suspicious legal elite as they were perceived as movements for 
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social justice. Hence there was resistance from a legal system that was opposed 
to radical demands and focused more on maintaining the status quo and the 
traditional community unity sanctioned by Puritan theodicy. Since the early 
days when the pilgrims landed in New England, their form of government had 
been established as a strict legalistic theology which was aimed at controlling 
the community through contractual relation between the individual and God via 
covenants.62 Weisman opines, then, that Salem was a case in which the judiciary 
went on an official offensive for the purpose of communal regeneration. This 
official offensive also signified the conservative power elite’s attempt to contain 
diminishing ministerial prosperity and regain ministerial religious and social 
control.63 
Also taking a view from a legal angle, David C. Brown argues that the 
1692 trials in Essex County were a consequence of the clash between two legal 
cultures, i.e. the English common law and the indigenous laws of 
Massachusetts. English common law partially replaced colonial criminal 
procedure law in Massachusetts during the early months of 1692. This was done 
in accordance with the 1691 charter, enacted in May 1692, which ensured that 
provincial laws were not in breach of English common law. According to 
Brown, this drove a wedge in the colony and led to a legal crisis which lasted 
until October 1692, when the Massachusetts General court reasserted the 
supremacy of the provincial laws. Prior to the 1692 trials, the first hints of a 
clash between the two legal systems were evident under the Dominion of New 
England between 1686 and 1689, when the Andros regime anglicised the 
colonial legal system in criminal and legal cases. The colonial legal system was 
restored to its pre-1686 set up after the overthrow of the Dominion government 
and it operated as such until the province charter was introduced in May 1692. 
Brown observes that the judges in the Oyer and Terminer court employed 
English legal techniques to establish the guilt of the accused, which included 
spectral evidence and the search for witch marks on suspects. The court 
overlooked the colonial legal convention of the two-witness rule that was 
applied in previous cases.64 This may have been necessitated by the legitimacy 
deficit faced by the colonial government, because shortly after 1684, and shortly 
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before his death, King Charles II revoked its original charter of 1629, which 
legitimated the colonial right of self-government for more than fifty years. A 
new Anglican governor was installed who was later overthrown and a new 
charter was eventually enacted.65 As a result of the inclusion of Quakers and 
Anglicans, an inclusion that formed an unprecedented step towards inclusive 
and participatory politics, the custodians of the newly introduced secular order 
seriously questioned its theological legitimacy. Weisman observes that this 
presented the background for breaking the clerical precedence and permitting 
spectral evidence in the court hearings. It also accounts, according to Richard 
Latner, for the carrying over of the accusations and the trials beyond the town of 
Salem to Andover and for the role played by the new governor in finally 
bringing the trials to a halt.66 
The psychological or psychoanalytical explanations of the Salem trials 
suggest that the afflicted girls suffered from hysteria, caused by the Puritan 
culture of social repression. Marion L Starkey explains the nature of the hold 
this hysteria had on the girls and the ministers: ‘The magistrates could not be 
blamed for their credulity; belief in witchcraft was almost an article of faith. 
They were not to be blamed for their failure to understand the nature of hysteria; 
in their day no one did’.67 In a similar vein, Chadwick Hansen argued that the 
general population of Massachusetts had reached a state of excitement, that he 
claimed was inaccurately called ‘mass hysteria’. However, he believed that it 
was the popular fear of witchcraft rather than the preaching of the clergy that 
was at the root of this spell of collective psychic excitement. According to 
Hansen, the clergy were opposed to the way in which the events at Salem were 
being dealt with, especially the proceedings of the special court. For this same 
reason, Hansen says that it is impossible to understand and estimate the nature 
of all aspects of the Salem events without recognizing the power and hold of 
witchcraft on a society that genuinely believed in it.68 
Anthropological explanations of the Salem episode are based upon cross-
cultural studies of witchcraft beliefs and practices amongst people from other 
continents such as Asia and Africa. They tend to argue that the effects of 
witchcraft are caused by the belief in witchcraft itself. As Robert Detweiler 
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shows, these anthropological theories can be divided into three general models 
that argue that: ‘(a) witchcraft serves as a way to explain life’s misfortunes 
hence it is socially functional (b) witchcraft operates as a form of social control; 
and (c) witchcraft functions as a release of social tension’.69 In an 
anthropological study of witchcraft, it is fundamental to admit that witchcraft 
beliefs are to be rationalized as an integral part of any ‘possessed’ society and 
that they assume the worth of a palpable reality for its people, just as much as 
empirically tested notions have in our contemporary world. Simply put, it 
becomes almost ‘natural’ for the afflicted people to resort to these beliefs to 
explain the misfortunes of life. Witchcraft may thus be a very convenient 
agency to blame when the conventional ways of dealing with misfortune fail, for 
example when one is hit by lightning, hurricanes, epidemics, sterility, sickly 
livestock, miscarriages, famine, or draught. Hence, in providing partial relief 
and emotional solace to the sufferer by putting the blame upon the supernatural, 
societies maintain a relative stability.  
The medical explanations of the trials relate the incidents to the spread of 
ergotism or encephalitis in the area.70 However, these explanations have largely 
been discredited lately in the social science analyses of the events, on the 
grounds that a singular thrust on the clinical nature of the problem is tantamount 
to a too reductive estimate of a broad problem in a community that was hostage 
to social, political, religious and economic forces. 
Given the extraordinary number of women being accused and prosecuted 
in the European witch-hunts but also in Salem, the feminist explanations remain 
of vital importance, elaborating why women were the prime suspects. Carol 
Karlson explains that women’s executions were triggered by the prevalence of 
traditional misogyny in the Western world. As Carlson argues, the New England 
society was no exception and deemed women’s trespasses as challenges to God, 
as attempts to subvert the order of Creation and also as challenges to prescribed 
gender arrangements. Based upon the normative distinctions for different social 
groups on the basis of their class, gender and race, women in New England were 
granted and prescribed certain forms of behaviour.71 As Clarke Garrett observes, 
the Puritan home was a precarious territory for the exercise of feminine power 
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and a venue for the constitution of interpersonal relations with men from outside 
the hierarchies of village authority. In such a social space, single, poor, 
marginalized, older, post-menopause and widowed women had an especially 
tenuous existence and they became rather easy suspects as possessed witches.72 
Elizabeth Reis observes that in Puritan New England, which was a patriarchal 
society, women’s bodies were represented as vulnerable, unsatisfied, yearning, 
physically fragile and sexually tempting, and their feminine souls were believed 
to be a convenient target for the Devil’s advances. In contrast, men, being 
audacious and physically strong, were likely to repel Devil’s temptations.73 In 
Salem society, a certain deferential paternalism prevailed, which immediately 
sanctioned any transgression by women from the community’s accepted norms. 
The religious jargon clearly contained a sexist prejudice against women as a 
social group. Men were generally amongst those who wielded power whereas 
most of the men who were accused were either husbands, family members of 
the suspected witches or had poor social standing. Many women were 
implicated by other women too on account of their personal rivalries and 
jealousies arising out of day-to-day interactions in their close-knit Puritan 
culture. Hence there was clearly a strong gender pattern in the Salem 
prosecutions. 
The gender politics in Salem makes more sense, however, when analysed 
in combination with the broader politics of the real political interests which 
underpinned the Salem Trials. Mary Beth Norton famously put this explanation 
forward. She evaluated correspondences and journals during the late 1680s and 
early 1690s and found that the dominant concern of the Essex County residents 
during this time was the Second Indian War or the so-called King William’s 
War (1688-97).74 She studied the events in 1692 Salem as an attempt by the 
ruling elite to further control things politically at home in order to protect the 
colonial government and the society at large against the heathen Indians and the 
Catholic French at the north-eastern frontier. They would blame the devil and its 
deputies (that is to say, the witches) at home for working as accomplices of the 
French and the Indians to weaken their government.75 As Philip Gould also 
observes, when disenfranchised young girls like Elizabeth Parris, Abigail 
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Williams, Samuel Parris’s Caribbean slave Tituba and John Proctor’s maid 
Mary Warren temporarily wielded power to accuse men, fellow women and 
influential families in control of the village, the political elite shuddered at their 
ability to shape the broader political course of the events. The trials’ formal end 
upon the accusation against governor Phips’ wife testifies to the political nature 
of the whole witch-hunting episode in Salem.76  
None of the above analyses can claim to give access to the truth per se 
although they all deal with aspects of the historical truth, some of which may 
seem more plausible than others or may have more explanatory power. Miller, 
in writing his play, might have been interested in all kinds of arguments that 
could explain the Salem witch trials or that could shed some light on what 
happened, historically speaking. The question, however, is whether he was 
mainly interested in an historical explanation. He was certainly not interested in 
doing justice to all the aspects mentioned above. Perhaps the thing that captured 
his attention the most was the element of political fabrication.  
 
1.2 Witchcraft and Fabrication 
A recurring question in the historical studies of the Salem case is how it relates 
to the history of witchcraft in Europe. In Europe, the spell of witchcraft occurred 
in the early modern period between 1480-1750 and it spanned a period of three 
centuries, which also witnessed such epic political events as the Reformation 
and the Thirty Years’ War from 1618 to 1648. In Europe, much of the 
prosecution of witches took place in a sixty-year period between 1570 and 
1630.77 The North American episodes, which obviously include the Salem trials 
of 1692, are historically close to this period, yet slightly later. Nevertheless, 
David D. Hall asserts that ‘belated though it was, witchcraft and witch-hunting 
in New England had the same structure as witchcraft in England and, taking due 
account of certain differences, as witchcraft on the Continent’.78 Hall argues that 
despite being geographically apart, there was a cultural affinity between the 
witchcraft phenomenon in New England with continental European and English 
witch-hunts in the early modern era. 
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When the interpretation of an earlier generation of historians, such as 
Joseph Hansen, H. Trevor-Roper and Henry C. Lea, who understood the fear of 
witchcraft as a violent expression of an inquisitorial fanaticism of the Christian 
Church, was proven to be insufficient to explain the true nature of the incidents 
this was a turning point in the historiography of European witchcraft. The 
historians just mentioned saw the witchcraft phenomenon as an anomaly and an 
irrational, psychopathological episode in human history.79 In contrast, the so-
called functionalist interpretation of witchcraft took witchcraft seriously as a 
historical phenomenon which, as such, had a function. The historians Alan 
Macfarlane and Keith Thomas carried out two paradigmatic studies, and made 
an anthropological study of European witchcraft in their respective works, 
Witchcraft in Tudor and Stuart England (1970) and Religion and the Decline of 
Magic (1971). In their view, witchcraft was endemic and arose from the very 
roots of the respective societies, as a form of social interaction in the close-knit 
communities to meet certain social needs. The vengefulness of villagers or of 
cunning traders looking for a profit led to accusations and to a manipulation of 
the guilt of those who had angered their counterparts in deals and bargains. 
Hence social strain provided an excuse for resorting to accusations of diabolism 
and sorcery. It made people deal with both beneficent and maleficent magic in 
society.80 According to Keith Thomas, it was one of the means of making sense 
out of misfortune, for which there was no other obvious cause readily available. 
Thomas linked the increase in witchcraft cases to the Protestant Reformation, 
which, he contends, had discredited most of the counter-magic that the villagers 
had previously employed to protect themselves against maleficium, which 
related to the occult means of doing evil or harm.81 Alan Macfarlane concurs 
with Thomas when he mentions that the Catholic Church in England prior to the 
Reformation provided the religious template that, through its rituals and a 
dramatization of the expulsion of evil and communal propitiation, in a sense 
comforted people with a sort of a social solace and solution to their misfortunes. 
Macfarlane argues that, as a result of the Reformation, the communal 
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misfortunes that continued to infect society had been dealt with through a 
religious and ritual framework, a framework that was now destroyed. This 
would account for the witchcraft crisis erupting from within that society.82 
More important in Thomas’ reading, however, was the social strain 
resulting from the onset of a market economy. The traditional village economy, 
which had sustained an ethic of charity to one’s neighbours and protection of the 
poor through the old manorial system of poor people’s relief, was now being 
eroded by trends such as land hunger, commercialization, price hikes, 
agricultural specialization and growing towns. According to Thomas, in this era 
of change and rapid flux in Tudor and Stuart England, the old conflict resolution 
mechanisms of the manorial courts and the village guilds had disappeared, 
leaving society to disintegrate and confront itself, especially when it reached 
breaking point. The Reformation, the economic liberalization, the disappearance 
of old norms of charity, friendship and sharing were the triggers for the increase 
in litigation and trials in that period.83  
When compared to what we know from the continental witch 
prosecutions, the English witches were relatively poor, belonging to the lower 
social classes, and during the trials the authorities weighed convincing and 
unconvincing evidence to establish their conviction. Thomas and Macfarlane 
found that the machinery of enforcement in the executive ceased to function 
long before accusations disappeared. The European witch-hunts were markedly 
different in different countries, as Nachman Ben-Yahuda observes, just as 
Scottish trials differed from the British and resembled more the continental 
European trials. He observes that the most severe European witch-hunts 
occurred in Germany, France and Switzerland.84 In all these different cases, 
however, the functionalist approach would hold that witchcraft itself had a 
certain function that did not depend so much on whether people truly believed in 
witches. Instead accusations of witchcraft were, in a sense, fabrications with a 
social function.  
One of the critics of Religion and the Decline of Magic is Norman Cohn, 
who feels that Thomas has not really explained the historical appearance of 
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witchcraft as an issue of societal concern.85 Cohn points out that maleficium, the 
use of magic to cause damage, antedates the witch-hunts of the early modern 
period. He says: ‘It is clear that many of the forms of maleficium that figure in 
the witch-trials of the fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth centuries had been 
familiar for many centuries before’. Because of the prevalence of this concept of 
maleficium in Europe since the Middle Ages, Cohn finds it an unconvincing 
excuse for the mass witch-hunts at that time in European history. He asserts that 
the concept of maleficium was transformed into an ideology and was deemed by 
the Church to be a rival heretical and pagan practice to uproot the religious 
foundations of society. The religious elites therefore genuinely believed that the 
witches were engaged in an organized conspiracy against the Church. Cohn 
explains: ‘Like almost all of their contemporaries, the Fathers accepted without 
question that magic worked, that it really could produce miracles – but these 
were pernicious miracles, evil devices by which the demons tricked human 
beings into opposing God.’86 Cohn consequently claims that the peasant 
community had always succumbed to supernatural explanations and practices in 
the past without any official church sanction. Yet from the fifteenth century 
onwards, the church elite readily offered official sanction and patronage to 
accusations based on the concept of maleficium. This is why Cohn states: 
‘peasant fears could now find expression in formal accusations. As the 
authorities became more concerned with new concepts of witchcraft, so they 
became more willing to lend an ear to popular complaints about maleficium’.87 
Therefore, the popular peasant beliefs were given an official importance and in 
most cases the judges prosecuted the witches with the intention to rescue 
Christendom from an assault by Wicca and other pre-Christian pagan creeds.  
I do not feel that I am in a position to decide whether Cohn’s critique of 
Thomas and, by implication, Macfarlane, is correct. In relation to Miller’s The 
Crucible, there is a more interesting point that can be derived from the tension 
between the functionalist approach and Cohn’s criticism. Either people were 
clearly fabricating accusations of witchcraft or they strongly believed that there 
was a genuine attack going on. The latter did not mean there was no fabrication 
involved, the former did not mean that fabrications could not produce, or affect, 
forms of belief that were distinctly real. In fact the tension between the two 
options is evidence for the pernicious nature of fabrication, which is either that 
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one tends to forget that it is fabricated or that one may underestimate the reality 
of feelings that can be produced by fabrication. In both cases criticism becomes 
extremely difficult. This, I think, is what Miller faced in his own time and one 
of the reasons why the Salem witchcraft case was such a tempting analogy. 
 
1.3 A Truthful Account 
How then does Miller’s text position itself with regard to these various 
interpretations of the historical events that took place at Salem? Does his text 
offer another interpretation that could be placed next to earlier interpretations? 
Or does The Crucible aim at an altogether different type of ‘truth’? These 
questions are implicitly or explicitly dealt with in a short ‘Note on the Historical 
Accuracy of this Play’ that precedes the play, in which Miller explicitly states 
that ‘This play is not history in the sense in which the word is used by the 
academic historian’.88 Miller continues to spell out the differences by pointing 
out that dramatic purposes and poetic licence granted him the opportunity to 
fuse historical counterparts of the dramatic personae into one or more figures 
and alter their age and roles in history to suit the artistic flair of the piece. Yet, 
he also highlights what he calls the ‘accuracy’ of the play. This suggests that the 
truth-value of this representation depends partly on historical accuracy but is not 
confined to the question of what really happened in Salem. The first element is 
made explicit when Miller says that ‘The fate of each character is exactly that of 
his historical model’. The term ‘exactly’ is repeated a little later when Miller 
states that some of the characters played a role in history that was ‘exactly the 
same’. This raises the question what ‘exact’ similarity Miller hints at. That there 
may be more to it than just historical accuracy is indicated elsewhere, at a much 
later date, in an interview in 1980 in which Miller explained: ‘There are lines of 
force – economic, political, mythic memories, genetic imprints – many more, 
and where they intersect in a human situation in which man must make choice – 
is drama’.89 Here it may be clear that the drama that interests Miller is both 
historical and singular but also more general, as a meeting point of 
transhistorical ‘lines of force’. Apparently his account has to answer to a set of 
requirements that is both historical, and concerns a specific and charged 
situation, and does justice to these more general lines of force.  
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Some of its critics thought The Crucible too specific, though, and 
considered it to be a propagandist play aimed at hitting an isolated political 
phenomenon too hard, or too simplistically, through allegory.90 Miller defended 
himself against these objections with a similar mixture of historical specificity 
or accuracy and generality by saying that he was writing a play based upon 
immutable historical facts. After seeing the role of the prosecutors in the trial 
records, he was convinced that ‘there are people dedicated to evil in the world; 
that without their perverse example we should not know the good. Evil is not a 
mistake but a fact in life’.91 He further emphasizes that there are certain types of 
situation that are typically human, which are intermittently repeated in different 
societies and social arrangements. In 1980 this was defined even more concisely 
when Miller stated there are some types of people who seem to reproduce their 
own kind through millennia. Miller proceeded to argue that the continuity of 
certain types of character and social situations in history must retain our interest 
in a book, a play or a poem that is based upon a subject from an entirely 
different age. This would define their historical relevance.92 
Historical specificity and more general lines of force that transcend 
historical situations might seem to hint at historical continuity. Yet the play is 
aimed at its contemporary present while ostensibly dealing with a historical 
episode and thus alludes to anachronism, as a mismatch between two times (on 
which more in chapter 2). The play deals with history but it also unhinges a 
period in history to address its own times, and is produced in the present with its 
own cultural and political ground realities. In general, the chronological distance 
between the production of the play and its subject matter is revealing with 
respect to the way in which history affects a culture in any present. According to 
Frans-Willem Korsten, anachronism opens up another interesting potential as 
that which can never be contained in one domain alone. He writes that:  
 
Things, ideas and texts travel through time and are taken up 
differently in different times. In a fundamental sense, any historical 
artefact that functions in some kind of present can be seen as an 
example of anachronism. The complexity here is not so much a 
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matter of language or representation, but is primarily an issue of 
how we can connect to, or experience history, or deal with history 
in terms of actuality.93 
 
When brought to life, an historical artefact like The Crucible is therefore 
anachronistic per se, but in this case the anachronism shifts to a meta-level in 
the sense that its subject is a three-hundred year old incident that is represented 
in a theatrical mode by a playwright in the middle of the twentieth century to 
address the present. The play presents history as a matter of actuality. For Miller 
and his contemporaries the issue was how this disconnection in history operated 
to forge a link within history as something that actually had occurred and was 
true, and was now occurring again.  
With respect to the truth of historical accounts, historical narratives may 
suffer from what Ankersmit called historism, with emplotted texts full of facts 
and records, and historians presenting them as if they had actually experienced 
them. In this context, they disregard at times the anachronism that separates 
history from the present in which it is being written. What, indeed, distinguishes 
Miller’s play from the historical works about Salem is its regard for past, 
present and future. It would have been just another play dealing with history, 
describing history in order to understand history if its subject were merely past. 
As it is, the play is a work of art that is anachronistic by virtue of its dealing 
with history in its present and future present. Perhaps paradoxically, historical 
accuracy is nevertheless key for this anachronistic operation. 
After examining the trial records and the historical data of the Salem 
episode, Arthur Miller constructed the plot of his play. His aim to work on a 
truthful account clearly emerges from the narrative texts that Miller inserted 
between the sketch of the stage-setting – ‘a small upper bedroom’ – and the 
actual dialogues in Act 1, and then at the moment that the different characters, 
for instance the Reverend John Hale, appear for the first time.94 The first 
account sketches the historical background of the Act to come: 
 
But the people of Salem in 1692 were not quite the dedicated folk 
that arrived on the Mayflower. A vast differentiation had taken 
place, and in their own time a revolution had unseated the royal 
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government and substituted a junta, which was at this moment in 
power. The times, to their eyes must have been out of joint, and to 
the common folk must have seemed as insoluble and complicated 
as do ours today. It is not hard to see how many could easily have 
been led to believe that the time of confusion had been brought 
upon them by deep and darkling forces. No hint of such speculation 
appears on the court record, but social disorder in any age breeds 
such mystical suspicions, and when, as in Salem, wonders are 
brought forth from below the social surface, it is too much to expect 
people to hold back very long from laying on the victims with all 
the force of their frustration.95 
 
Clearly, the accuracy of Miller’s account was concerned with not just facts and 
figures from the surface. Miller refers to the Glorious Revolution of 1688 in 
England, which marked the formal end of absolute monarchy there. As a build-
up to the moments of tension in Salem society, Miller observes that the 
Salemites of 1692 were significantly more secure than the first Puritans who had 
known hard times in Massachusetts and Virginia. They were less dedicated 
religiously compared to the previous generation who had sailed to American 
shores aboard the Mayflower and landed in New England to preserve their 
Puritanical faith. They established an ‘autocracy by consent’, designed to 
perpetuate and preserve the ideology and safeguard community unity as a source 
of their power against human and demonic rival elements such as the French 
colonialists and the Indians in the wild north-eastern parts of the county. In the 
case of Salem, however, autocracy turned into theocracy, and the desire to keep 
the community together turned into repression by, in Miller’s words, a ‘junta’.96 
As may be clear from this, Miller set his play against a socio-historical 
background. When listing the many factors which possibly and logically led to 
the rift in the seemingly placid Salem society, Miller opines that 1692 was the 
watershed year for the conflict to take place. The situation was in no way 
unusual, however, nor was it simple. Arthur Miller ponders on the truthfulness 
or historical accuracy of his account in the introduction to his Collected Plays. 
He concludes that it was the truthfulness of his account that had also troubled 
the audience: 
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I believe that the very moral awareness of the play and its 
characters – which are historically correct – was repulsive to the 
audience. For a variety of reasons I think that the Anglo-Saxon 
audience cannot believe the reality of characters who live by 
principles and know very much about their own characters and 
situations, and who say what they know. Our drama, for this among 
other reasons, is condemned, so to speak, to the emotions of 
subjectivism, which as they approach knowledge and self-
awareness, become less and less actual and real to us. In retrospect 
I think that my course in The Crucible should have been toward 
greater self-awareness and not, as my critics have implied, toward 
an enlarged and more pervasive subjectivism. The realistic form 
and style of the play would then have had to give way. What new 
form might have evolved I cannot now say, but certainly the 
passion of knowing is as powerful as the passion of feeling alone, 
and the writing of the play broached the question of that new form 
for me.97  
 
Arthur Miller reflects on the critical response of a contemporary audience, 
which found a morally self-conscious society too unrealistic a subject to be 
framed within a dramatically attractive fold, and which would have preferred a 
presentation that would have facilitated identification. Miller objects to this and 
emphasizes once more the importance of ‘the realistic form and style of the 
play’. He adds: ‘But we do do Hamlet, we do do Macbeth, we do a number of 
more mediocre plays as well; but the ones that last are the ones that we 
recognize most immediately in terms of the details of real human behavior in a 
specific situation’.98 The paramount goal of the literary artist in Miller’s opinion 
is to draw a portrait of the characters and the situations, which leads to greater 
self-awareness of the individual characters who in the end emerge as more real 
and true to life. Miller seems dedicated to a theatre of ‘heightened 
consciousness’ which encourages a passion for knowing instead of merely a 
passion for feeling, however appealing this may be to the emotive side of the 
viewers and the readers.  
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The public and social ability of drama to make people know led Miller to 
write The Crucible as a response to political forces that were only too willing to 
rewrite history. As Tom Driver puts it the element of knowledge is key, here: 
‘Drama is akin to the other inventions of man in that it ought to help us to know 
more, and not merely to spend our feelings’.99 The desire to know and explore 
the truth of the historical episode in Salem with a passion that was as important 
as the passion the work out the individual characters, led Miller to invest his 
skills in producing this new form of dramatic writing with an enigmatic 
historical episode as its subject, addressed at his own times - and that implied an 
address to the future, as we will see. As for this future, the play is distinctly not, 
in my reading, ‘a prescient warning against tyranny’ that can reverberate ‘with 
fresh power in each culture and generation’, as the back flap of the most recent 
edition has it. Instead I would argue that there is an historical specificity and 
accuracy involved, a truthfulness in Miller’s account underpinning The 
Crucible, that makes the play difficult to translate. It is not universally 
applicable or mouldable. In terms of truth practice the play kindles a desire to 
know what happened, and seeks to give an account that is as truthful as possible. 
This is posited as both a precondition of the play and as its aim. Without this 
historiographical desire, the play could not have had such a powerful impact. Or 
it would have lost its historical and political relevance. 
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Showing It as It is Through (Postmodern) Parody: History’s Spectrality 
and Anachronism  
 
In this chapter I will read The Crucible in relation to the past as a postmodern 
play. This may seem strange since Miller is not known as a postmodernist 
author. Moreover, in the light of the previous chapter, it may even seem 
inconsistent, since historiography’s desire for truth was a paramount target of 
criticism in postmodern works of art. Still, there are reasons to consider this 
work as a postmodern play. One concerns the specific modes in which it deals 
with history, another the way in which theatre intermingles with narrative. 
Miller himself inserted important explanatory narrative parts in the authorized 
edition of the play, as we have already seen, such as the following, in which he 
describes one of the main characters: 
 
Mr. Hale is nearing forty, a tight skinned, eager-eyed intellectual. 
This is a beloved errand for him; on being called here to ascertain 
witchcraft he felt the pride of the specialist whose unique 
knowledge has at last been publicly called for. Like almost all men 
of learning, he spent a good deal of his time pondering the invisible 
world, especially since he had himself encountered a witch in his 
parish not long before. That woman, however, turned into a mere 
pest under his searching scrutiny, and the child she had allegedly 
been afflicting recovered her normal behavior after Hale had given 
her his kindness and a few days of rest in his own house. However, 
that experience never raised a doubt in his mind as to the reality of 
the underworld or the existence of the Lucifer’s many-faced 
lieutenants.100 
 
One could read this quote as the narrative underpinning of what is supposed to 
be a dramatic person or character. Reverend John Hale himself is given a 
history, with details (‘tight skinned’) that can work to produce the effect of the 
real, as Barthes defined it.101 Such information comes in handy and might even 
be necessary for actors, directors and readers alike. In fact, more modern plays 
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contain such passages. Narrative, in that case, would not be substantial to the 
plot itself. Yet there are more narrative underpinnings, as we have seen. As I 
argued in chapter 1, the entire play is underpinned by a historical narrative, or, 
depending on the scale of focus, several ones. In the first instance there is no 
need to devote particular attention to this intermingling of dramatic text and 
narrative, apart from the fact that narratives, because of their logico-
chronological orderings, are suitable vehicles for the writing of history.  
However this is complicated by a passage a little further on in the text of 
the play. In his description of the Reverend John Hale, Miller contrasts the 
historical times of Salem with the hunt for Communists in the 1950s, when he 
states that there may be an analogy between the two: 
 
The analogy, however seems to falter when one considers that, 
while there were no witches then, there are communists and 
capitalists now, and in each camp there is certain proof that spies of 
each side are at work undermining the other. But this is a snobbish 
objection and not at all warranted by the facts. I have no doubt that 
people were communing with, and even worshipping, the Devil in 
Salem, and if the whole truth could be known in this case, as it is in 
others, we should discover a regular and conventionalized 
propitiation of the dark spirit.102 
 
Several points require our attention here. First of all, there is Miller’s conviction 
that ‘the whole truth couldbe known’. At the same time he adds the revealing 
‘if,’ which implies that not all of the historical truth can be known. As for the 
analogy between the Salem-period and the McCarthy-period, Miller tellingly 
does not suggest an uninterrupted history between the two but an analogy, 
which is not so much narrative in nature as scenic. One historical period is seen 
in the light of, or seen through, the other, or the two are mirroring each other 
whilst it remains unclear all along which is the dominant one. If we combine the 
two passages, narrative intermingles with scene, and historical truth with 
analogy. Apparently, drama and narrative – or to be more precise: historical 
narrative – are both relevant when studying The Crucible in relation to past and 
present, as are ‘facts’ or, for that matter ‘the whole truth’. At the same time it 
seems as if the two periods concerned are pitted against each other by a 
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mirroring analogy that ‘seems to falter’, whereas the ‘seems’ suggests that the 
analogy does not falter at all. 
Whether or not historical truths can be known, the dynamic of facts and 
their narrative representations and of the powers interested in them, or the way 
in which histories may be set in a mise en scene as if mirroring one another, 
these were all issues of the highest relevance to postmodern authors. I want to 
test in this chapter what a postmodern reading of The Crucible will bring us, or 
even whether the play may, in a sense, be a postmodern work. This is not a 
formal issue. It relates to the political power underlying this text and our dealing 
with it. Therefore, in this chapter, I want to consider the play as a fictional and 
dramatic play with narrative.  
Linda Hutcheon defined the importance of fiction as narrative for 
postmodernist writing as follows: 
 
All of these issues – subjectivity, intertextuality, reference, 
ideology – underlie the problematized relations between history and 
fiction in post-modernism. But many theorists today have pointed 
to narrative as the one concern that envelops all of these, for the 
process of narrativization has come to be seen as a central form of 
human comprehension, of imposition of meaning, and formal 
coherence on the chaos of events (H. White 1981, 795; Jameson 
1981a, 13; Mink 1978, 132). Narrative is what translates knowing 
into telling (H. White 1980, 5), and it is precisely this translation 
that obsesses postmodern fiction. The conventions of narrative in 
both historiography and novels, then, are not constraints, but 
enabling conditions of possibility of sense-making (W. Martin 
1986). Their disruption or challenging is bound to upset such basic 
structuring notions as causality and logic - as happens with Oskar’s 
drumming in The Tin Drum: narrative conventions are both 
installed and subverted. The refusal to integrate fragments (in 
novels like The White Hotel) is a refusal of the closure and telos 
which narrative usually demands (see Kermode 1966, 1967).103 
 
Hutcheon makes clear at the outset that narrative is the preferred medium for the 
emplotment of disparate fragments, both in fictional and historical discourse. On 
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the positive side, narrative makes cohesion possible. On the negative side, it 
works against truth, almost paradoxically, because it enforces cohesion and 
consistency on what in historical truth is a collection of fragments.  
Hayden White emphasizes the point of narrative’s power to bring 
cohesion to fragmented historical material. To him, postmodernists in 
architecture, the arts, literature, cinema and philosophy tend to view the past as 
vast, inchoate, fragmented, decontextualized, synchronic congeries of forms, 
media, genres, and ideas that can be treated as objects of truth.104 White writes:  
 
For the postmodernists, the past, irredeemably absent and 
accessible only by way of spoors, fragments and traces – is the 
place of memory, reverie and fantasy, and therefore of poetic 
inspiration, rather than a space of past human actions that can be 
recovered and represented more or less accurately as it really was 
(as it is for scientifically oriented, modern professional historians). 
Postmodernists are much more interested in the meanings which, 
by means more or less artistic can be produced by reflection on 
pastness than they are in truth understood as a finite set of true 
statements about discrete periods of history attested by a 
documentary record. There are few postmodernist histories because 
postmodernists reject what professional historians would recognize 
as scientific historiography.105 
 
Perhaps White is slightly too romantic, here, shifting from the scientific study of 
the past to the realm of ‘reverie, and fantasy,’ and on this last point he may even 
be contradicting himself. The contradiction consists in the fact that on the one 
hand scientific historiography needs to be rejected. But how can we distinguish 
or even notice reveries and fantasies if not in connection to some sort of 
scientific, historical accuracy? Seen from this angle, if The Crucible had only 
been that, a simple memory or reverie or fantasy, or merely a matter of ‘poetic 
inspiration’, it could not have had such a considerable political force because it 
could have been rejected, in the context of charged political realities, as 
precisely that: fantasy. There is no doubt that White’s and Ankersmit’s 
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opponents would be those scientific historians who stick to a view of the past in 
terms of representing past events in ‘truth,’ which, according to White and 
Ankersmit, would never amount to much more than linguistically captured 
narratives. Yet The Crucible is a play. This provokes the question once more 
how this generic form relates to the problems outlined above. 
Narrative’s power to provide cohesion and thereby twist the very 
fragmented nature of what it makes coherent, picks up on what Hutcheon ended 
with: narrative’s tendency towards closure (on which more later). Historical 
reality in itself is not closed as such, and cannot be closed. Both in history and 
fiction, moreover, narrative is the medium, which translates knowledge into 
telling and illustration. Narrative works epistemologically in the sense that it 
translates archival evidences and references into coherent pieces of writing. This 
has been problematized in postmodern fiction, as White rightly points out, and 
postmodern authors are most fascinated by the translation of ‘knowing into 
telling’ according to Hutcheon (who is following White’s major work, here, 
from 1973, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century 
Europe).  
Contrary to modernist assumptions regarding historical inquiry, as for 
example Lynn Fendler argues, postmodern historiography is based on those 
approaches that eschew modernist assumptions about history which include 
essentialism, grand narratives, notions of progress and emancipation, 
objectivity, truth, realism, teleology, coherence, universality, determinism, 
etc.106 In White’s view this clearly does not mean that postmodernists are not 
interested in the past, history and its interpretation, or by historical truth for that 
matter. On the contrary, many postmodernists believe that a specifically 
postmodernist idea of ‘history’ provides a history to those who have been 
deprived of one. However, such a postmodernist form of reading history has 
little in common with what has been posited as the basis for modern, scientific 
historical research. In fact, as White maintains, it has closer ties to pre-modern 
conceptions of history understood as a reserve of examples to be drawn on for 
practical (political, pedagogical, ideological) purposes and as a discourse rather 
than a discipline.107 This is where The Crucible borders on postmodern 
literature. It clearly uses the past as a reserve of examples and its purpose is 
indeed practical, although not just practical. For The Crucible truth does not 
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matter per se, in an essentialist or objective sense, it matters in relation to an 
opponent who was an expert in falsification, fabrication and fake accusations.  
In relation to postmodernism’s fascination with narrative, the question is 
how this problematic may relate to a play that is distinctly not ‘telling’ but 
‘showing’. However, is drama not the quintessentially suitable genre for both 
‘installing and subverting’ narrative conventions; and can it not be characterized 
by its demand to be performed time and again and thus to ‘refuse closure’? Or, 
to put this yet differently, is Hutcheon not talking, in a sense, about a 
theatricalization of history in postmodern fiction? By this I mean that 
postmodern authors are interested in unveiling the way in which telling may 
have the seemingly natural effect of showing, or that they will seek to dramatize 
the choices implied in telling a story in a particular way. Where and how can 
Miller be said to be postmodern in this complex of issues and generic 
possibilities? 
 
2.1 Spectral Illusion: Doing Justice to the Facts between Telling and 
Showing 
In the study of history, as was explained in chapter 1, the Salem trials have been 
recorded and narrated from various viewpoints. No single narrative can claim a 
monopoly on the truth and reality of the historical episode because, 
unavoidably, they are interpretations of the available data of evidences. As 
White argues, the issue of the relation between truth and reality in history is 
particularly evident in the difference between historiography and realist 
historical fiction. The writing of history deals with the representation of truth 
inherent in some part of reality in the past, whereas fiction has the prerogative to 
enter the domain of the possible without neglecting the truth while representing 
reality in its totality. White reflects on this relation as follows: 
 
A simply true account of the world based on what the documentary 
record permits one to talk about what happened in it at particular 
times, and places can provide knowledge of only a very small 
portion of what ‘reality’ consists of. However, the rest of the real, 
after we have said what we can assert to be true about it, would not 
be everything and anything we could imagine about it. The real 
would consist of everything that can be truthfully said about its 
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actuality plus everything that can be truthfully said about what it 
could possibly be.108 
 
White’s argument is at the same time extremely simple and complex. It is 
simple because any historical reality is vast. To describe historical reality in its 
entirety is simply impossible. The claim to truth can therefore only concern a 
small portion, a portion that the history writer will claim to be ‘real’. That leaves 
a substantial amount of material, which is not a matter of concern in the 
historiographical imagination. White maintains, in this context, that disciplinary 
history focuses on the search for truth that belongs to the historical reality. Yet 
this ‘real’ can only be symbolized and can never be represented as a whole. This 
is why, according to White, the positivist trend in history to embark upon a 
search for the truth at the expense of anything that can be imagined about the 
‘real’ in terms of probability, has reduced history to a lower status than modern 
scientific disciplines. Modern sciences aspire to grasp the ‘real’ while validating 
true hypotheses and many historians since the nineteenth century have strived to 
do the same. Thus disciplinary history has granted truth a benchmark value, 
represented by historians through their writings, which in turn are based on 
evidence-based proof.  
However, the mere truth value is not enough to conclude that historical 
writing is able to completely represent a historical reality. That is why a realistic 
representation of the past, in terms of fiction, should consist of anything that can 
be truthfully said about it but also anything that can be faithfully imagined as a 
historical possibility. White refers, here, to the inclusion of artistic means in the 
representation of historical reality that enable any such representation to have a 
broad view of the possibilities in the past. He argues: 
 
The conjuring up of the past requires art as well as information. 
And the reason why historical studies are in crisis today is not 
because a bunch of wild-eyed ‘postmodernists’ have captured the 
minds of the impressionable young; it is because historical studies 
have manifestly failed in their efforts to become the kind of 
‘science’ they hoped to become in the nineteenth century. Prior to 
this time, history was cultivated in profitable combination with 
belles-lettres, epistolography and philosophy, as branches of 
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rhetoric, serving as the foundation of a pedagogy of virtue and as a 
kind of archive of experience useful for statesmen, diplomats, 
soldiers and other servants of the public weal. But the scientization 
of historical studies was thought to require their severance from any 
connection between, not only poetic and rhetoric but also between 
philosophy and imaginative literature (the novel and especially the 
romance).109 
 
As a philosopher of history, White upholds the distinction between information 
and art, as if one could exist without the other, or as if the two were really 
distinct. Nowadays, so his argument runs, disciplinary history is in crisis 
because since the nineteenth century, the historians have abandoned non-
scientific disciplines like philosophy, rhetoric, literature, art, etc. in order to 
claim history as a science that seeks the truth and rejects anything fanciful, 
imaginative and bordering on probability and conjectures. However this 
severance from other disciplines like rhetoric, literature, law, or philosophy did 
not make history truly scientific. Unlike scientific facts, historical writings are 
debatable and are often reversed through new interpretations. Most importantly, 
historiography is not simply the transfer of information. Historians tell. They 
use art. They might even use dangerous arts since they ‘conjure up’. 
Although the very phrase ‘conjuring up’ would make any scientist or 
scholar nervous, such nervousness would very much interest postmodern 
authors. The Dutch philosopher of history, Frank Ankersmit, concurs with 
White’s thoughts when he says about his colleague historians that they: 
 
…are painfully aware that historical debate rarely leads to 
conclusive results and that such regrettable things as intellectual 
fashions or political preference may strongly color their opinions 
about the past. In short, deep in their hearts historians know that, 
despite their emphasis on the necessity of accurate investigation of 
sources and on prudent and responsible interpretation, history ranks 
lowest in scientific status of all the disciplines taught at a 
university.110 
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Frank Ankersmit takes the view that historians mainly focus on interpretations 
of the available facts and evidences and that their debates are unavoidably 
coloured by the intellectual fashions of the times and also by the political 
preferences of the times. He also brings in a matter of hierarchy and academic 
politics when he claims that history ‘ranks lowest’ in scientific status. Not only 
are objectivity and truth most likely to be affected when historians represent an 
historical reality, they are politically in choppy waters for two reasons: their 
writing is always politically invested and, academically speaking, their writing 
is political.  
Despite its positivist thrust, disciplinary history is evidently still not 
acknowledged as a scientific discipline. For White and Ankersmit this is no 
reason for despair. They emphasize how historical discourse utilizes narrative to 
emplot stories on the basis of past incidents and events, and they accept the 
inevitability of language as the medium to narrate. For several reasons this 
language contains rhetorical tropes and figures of speech in order to configure 
plots with a proper beginning, middle and end. Emplotment demands what 
White would call ‘tropological inventions’. In this respect, narrative is not a 
natural given in historical representations, as if narrative were a genre that 
enabled historians to shape stories from the past transparently. As Hans Kellner 
explains: 
 
I do not believe that there are ‘stories’ out there in the archives or 
monuments of the past, waiting to be resurrected and told. Neither 
human activity nor the existing records of such activity take the 
form of narrative, which is the product of complex cultural forms 
and deep-seated linguistic conventions deriving from choices that 
have traditionally been called rhetorical; there is no ‘straight’ way 
to invent a history, regardless of the honesty and professionalism of 
the historian.111 
 
In light of my earlier discussion about The Crucible’s historical accuracy, 
Kellner would argue that narratives are not ontologically comparable to what 
one could ‘find’, like a letter or a stone. Narratives are a cultural form and 
product, depending on language conventions, which act as a medium that allows 
historians to translate real life events from the past into written records. These 
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past events do not repose in the archives as readymade stories which could 
somehow naturally be reproduced, they need to be fabricated. They cannot 
simply be shown, they need to be told.  
The necessity of fabrication in the writing of history, or the impossibility 
of simply showing history, causes a distinct disciplinary unrest. Ernst van 
Alphen defines this unrest as a form of justified suspicion when he deals with 
the historians’ thrust upon narrative. In clear consonance with White and 
Kellner, he writes: 
 
But when considering what it is that makes the historical mode so 
urgent, the inevitable conclusion is that even history-writing is not 
good enough for the purpose. Many historians approach even the 
most elementary narrative plot with suspicion. They do have a 
point; narrative plots are always simplifications compared to the 
complexity of historical reality. And the coherence and unity of 
traditional plots produce meaning effects that may not have been 
present in the past. One aspect of the realist plot, for instance, is its 
closure: everything comes to an end, an end that somehow satisfies. 
And more often than not, that end is good. If the very shaping of 
facts into a narrative, however truthful, is inherently unable to do 
justice to the facts, then the only mode of representation that might 
satisfy, however poorly, is the archival mode: the collecting, 
ordering and labelling of facts, items, pieces of evidence, 
testimonies.112  
 
Several elements are of relevance for my analysis of The Crucible. Narratives 
do not come into existence as true pictures of the historical events. They are 
rhetorical and cultural in nature and are served by linguistic tropes that elaborate 
upon the available facts and evidences in written and oral histories. Compared to 
the enormous complexity of historical facts, narrative plots are rather simplistic 
and artificially coherent to create meaning effects, leading for instance to happy 
endings (most of the times actually, as Van Alphen observes). Moreover, one 
defining characteristic of narratives is that they lead to forms of closure. Such 
closure is always artificial, which is why archival evidence may come to the 
rescue, as when ‘items, pieces of evidence, testimonies’ – as first-hand historical 
sources - are used to show how ‘it’ was, without such artificial closure. As Van 
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Alphen suggests, they may somehow be a better source than narrative history to 
‘do justice to the facts.’ I leave aside the paradoxical situation that arises as the 
interpretation of archives also requires narrative plots to link various dots 
dispersed throughout time. Yet of the essence is this ‘doing justice to the facts.’ 
Doing justice does not reside in the past. One does justice to a fact from the 
present and showing is of more importance here than telling. 
When The Crucible seeks to do justice to historical facts, these facts are 
twofold. They are facts from the past but also from the present in which the play 
is written and in which it intervenes. For instance, John Proctor’s statement to 
Danforth in Act 4 of the play bears a close resemblance to the public nature of 
confessions in both historical episodes: ‘I have confessed myself! Is there no 
good penitence but it be public? God does not need my name nailed upon the 
church! God sees my name; God knows how black my sins are! It is enough!’113 
The passage serves to connote both past and present, be it in different generic 
modalities. Regarding its relation to the past, this passage, and by implication 
the play as a whole, has first of all a narrative quality to it, in the form of the 
historical research underpinning it, which shaped the drama’s plot. Secondly, in 
the written version of the play, narrative sections positioned and introduced the 
historical characters. In light of the past and the Salem trials historiography, the 
play is narrative in the sense that it is closed, in that it provides one of the many 
interpretations of the incident that have so far been presented by the historians 
and interpreters from other disciplines. In its relation to the present, the narrative 
of Miller’s opponents is broken open by means of the play in a dramatic mode. 
Such a dramatic mode may connect to the ‘archival mode’ that Van Alphen 
talked about, as when a testimony from the past is presented that does justice to 
the facts and as such has an openness to it that jeopardises the narratives of 
closure.114 This is much more than what Barthes called the reality effect. Such 
an effect takes place, for instance, when Proctor speaks to Elizabeth in Act 2 
and sketches the beauty of Massachusetts in winter: ‘Lilacs have a purple smell. 
Lilac is the smell of nightfall, I think. Massachusetts is a beauty in the 
spring’.115 For the development of the plot lilacs are irrelevant. They simply 
serve to give the impression of reality. When John Proctor gives this testimony, 
however, this is clearly fictional but not entirely. Miller’s historiographical 
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mode of dealing with such testimony, through theatre, may also work, in part, 
under the heading of what Van Alphen calls an archival mode. It is then as if 
John Proctor is a voice from the past giving testimony in the present. 
David Lewis dwells upon the fragmentary nature of such an archival 
mode when he states: 
 
We depart from actuality as far as we must to reach a possible 
world where the counterfactual supposition comes true (and that 
might be quite far if the supposition is a fantastic one). But we do 
not make gratuitous changes. We hold fixed the features of 
actuality that do not have to be changed as part of the least 
disruptive way of making the supposition true. We can safely 
reason from the part of our factual background that is thus held 
fixed.116  
 
Something is held factually fixed, despite counterfactuals. In The Crucible, 
Miller also introduces counterfactual suppositions, for instance by altering 
Abigail and Proctor’s age, by showing the relentless wickedness of the 
prosecution and also by inventing a love triangle between John Proctor, Abigail 
and Elizabeth. But he did not alter historically proven facts, such as the roles 
played by each character in history. His play is not just a play. It is a play based 
on research.117 As such, the play is the opposite of historically naïve, however. 
It aims not to merely represent the past truthfully but to do so in order to be 
effective in the present. Miller alludes to this motive in his autobiography: ‘I 
knew that to simply will a play into existence was to insure a didactic failure. 
By now I was far beyond the teaching impulse; I knew that my own life was 
speaking here in many disguises, not merely my time’.118 Thus, for Miller, there 
was clearly a personal element in this historical episode that he dramatized in 
his own times, which witnessed political witch-hunts of another sort. Yet this 
personal element was not a subjective matter. If we take Miller seriously, his 
own life is historically ‘speaking,’ as if it were an expressive subject. Likewise 
we could say that the historical characters in his play are historically ‘speaking’. 
Of course, their creation is a matter of ‘conjuring up’ history as Sean Purdy puts 
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it.119 This conjuring up, however, can only get teeth if there is also an archival 
element to it, an element of labelling, of evidence, of testimony. Yet what is the 
difference then, between the reality of Miller’s own life, which he made to 
speak through his work, and the reality of his characters? 
It is relevantto emphasize, in this context, that the postmodern 
historiographers that I have focused on so far do not deny historical reality. On 
the contrary. According to Kellner, the honesty and upright professionalism of 
historians contributes to the writing of ‘true’ narratives. Such truthfulness, in 
turn, does not deny fiction. The rhetorical aspect of historiography is akin to 
literary representations, as Kellner suggests: ‘If beginning and ending a 
historical text are artful, literary acts, then are not historical periods, or historical 
events themselves, equally literary creations, composed by the same conceptual 
process?’120 Ankersmit elaborates on White’s position on the metahistorical 
nature of the past in historiography, although not so much to raise this query to a 
level of radical dismissal of objective truth and ultimate scientific veracity in 
historical representation. Ankersmit writes: 
 
Precisely by focusing on and by problematizing the historian’s 
language, White demonstrates not the impossibility of getting hold 
of past reality, but the naiveté of the kind of positivist intuition 
customarily cherished in the discipline for how to achieve this goal. 
More specifically, what these positivist intuitions proudly represent 
as historical reality itself is a mere spectral illusion that is created 
by the historical discipline itself. Surely there is a historical reality 
which is, in principle, accessible to the historian. But historians 
have forgotten about this historical reality and mistaken the product 
of their tropological encoding of the past for the past itself.121 
 
Plainly, Ankersmit accepts the objective existence of an historical past, as he 
does accept our ability to study it. This is something else, however, than the 
outcome of that study. In fact, Ankersmit hints at a metahistorical aspect of any 
historical writing. Such writing is not only a representation of a past reality but 
also and predominantly a verbal and intellectual construct that is impossible 
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without the mediality of language, as a result of which it becomes a ‘spectral 
illusion’. In disciplinary history the representation of the past is presented 
unreflectively as a ‘show’, as an optimal and transparent picture of the historical 
truth. In both White and Ankersmit’s observations, this nevertheless amounts to 
representation, one that is illusionary or, rather, spectral as compared to the real 
past that was physically lived in by its real actors and participants.  
In the context of The Crucible, this presents us with a doubly fictive, 
narrative and archival mode that relates to two different modes of spectrality. 
On the one hand the play, in its narrative mode, presents us with a spectral 
illusion of the past on the level of representation. On the other hand, as a drama, 
the play shifts to a more archival mode that depends on the fact that this play 
also is some sort of a testimony, in that it offers a spectral illusion of live bodies 
coming to us from the past through language and theatre performances (in 
chapter 5 we will come back to spectrality in yet another mode). The play thus 
works through a nuance, or perhaps it does much more than this, in the 
discussion about the postmodern nature of historiography. The question may not 
so much be whether historical representations relate epistemologically to events 
in the past but whether they relate ontologically to the construction of worlds in 
the present. This is particularly relevant in The Crucible because this play is re-
enacting history in the context of its action in a present. In this context it does 
more than represent history, either in a narrative or archival mode. 
 
2.2 Beyond Representing History? 
As may have become clear, the relation of language with historical reality is not 
just a matter of the past, but it is not a matter of simple scientific epistemology 
either. Adrian Kuzminski, in his analysis of White’s notion of ‘metahistory’, 
correctly notes that the distinction between arguments and narratives for White 
is that ‘for arguments there are the modes of Formism, Organicism, Mechanism, 
and Contextualism; for emplotments there are the archetypes of Romance, 
Comedy, Tragedy and Satire; and for ideological implication there are the 
tactics of Anarchism, Conservatism, Radicalism and Liberalism’.122 Whereas 
the first two sets relate to argument and emplotment on the level of 
representation, the last set relates to an ideological position that not only 
concerns the present but an attitude, a position in, and a preference for a distinct 
world. The respective subcategories of arguments, plots and ideologies lend 
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historical writing more than a rhetorical tinge. They mean much more than the 
fact that history writing is inevitably reduced to encoded intellectual constructs 
in language. In fact, historiography understood in a truly postmodern sense 
weaves together past and present ideologically.  
Both White and Ankersmit seem predominantly concerned with 
historiography in its relation to the past. They argue, for instance, that the 
postmodern nature of history as a discipline is evident from the relation between 
reality and language, which historians use to represent the past. Likewise, they 
observe that historical language retains an opacity that historians most often 
associate with the past reality itself. Although historical debates must revolve 
around finding a true picture of the past, this always concerns language as well 
as the words that mediate a past reality into its current representations. As 
already became clear, Ankersmit observes that, in their intellectual discussions 
and debates, historians frequently confuse historical language with the past 
reality itself. In this context Ankersmit argues that the postmodern nature of 
history as a discipline exposes and accounts for the neglect of the language-
reality dichotomy displayed by historians when they confuse the truth-making 
capacity of language as a medium with the historical reality itself.123 
Nevertheless, his concern, and the concern of historians in general, is the past.  
To be sure, Ankersmit’s position cannot be reduced to the view that 
historiography relates only to the past. This is what John Zammito observes 
regarding Ankersmit’s thoughts about language in historical representation: 
 
Ankersmit claims that sets of statements – texts or ‘narratios’ or 
verbal representations – have logical or epistemological 
peculiarities that demand philosophical attention. For him, such sets 
taken as wholes expand ontology: they add new things (‘narrative 
substances’) to the world. In a word, there are some things that 
belong both to language and to reality, and historical 
representations are a primary instance. ‘A historical representation 
is a thing that is made of language’ (HR: 13) [sic.]. The point 
Ankersmit wants to make, without falling back into the 
analytic/synthetic dichotomy, is that ‘language can be a truth maker 
no less than reality’ (HR: 13). He is persuaded that as one moves 
from the natural sciences to the humanities, ‘the indeterminacy of 
                                                          
123 Frank Ankersmit, ‘Historiography and Postmodernism’, in The Postmodern History Reader, 
ed. by Keith Jenkins (New York: Routledge, 1997), p. 284. 
64 
 
truth by this compulsion of experience and truth by the compulsion 
of language will increase to the extent that it will be more difficult 
to pin down with precision which part of language corresponds to 
what chunk of reality’ (HR: 37).124 
 
At first sight Zammito scrutinises Ankersmit’s position on the relation between 
language and historical reality with reference to the sets of statements in 
representation. He argues that these sets of statements or verbal representations 
are distinctive and logical in nature with regard to knowledge about the past, 
and that they need to be assessed independently from a philosophic perspective. 
Yet they are also a source of production of new things which Ankersmit calls 
narrative substances. The world comprises both things that are historically real 
and present in the contemporary situation, not just on a linguistic level. 
Ankersmit anchors his argument in the proposition that language constructs 
truth, and that this is no less a truth-maker than reality itself.  
Yet, I would argue that the shift of interest towards narratives and verbal 
representations after the linguistic turn and in postmodern approaches towards 
history has turned into an obsession. According to Samuel James, it is an 
obsession about: ‘what humanity made of its world, and thereby displaced the 
question of how the world might be in itself’.125 Here, clearly, the scope of the 
argument has been extended from a purely epistemological level to an 
ontological one. The question therefore is whether White and Ankersmit would 
want to follow James to the very end. As true historians, White and Ankersmit’s 
position appears to be ambiguous. In a sense their attention remains by and large 
focused on the past. They assert, for example, that historians are actually at a 
loss when they claim to have grasped the past to the full and when they believe 
that their intellectual constructs explain a historical reality to the highest level. 
White and Ankersmit contend that, in fact, the historians’ interpretations of the 
available facts are mostly linguistic representations, just like the representations 
of some past event or reality by literary artists who are better equipped to 
explain a truth through their imaginative insights about the ‘probable’ aspects of 
an historical reality that the historian might overlook. Here, however, they move 
towards the present, without acknowledging it. A literary work of art is not so 
                                                          
124 John Zammito, ‘Ankersmit and Historical Representation’, History and Theory 44 (2005), p. 
157. 
125 Samuel James, ‘Louis Mink, “Postmodernism”, and the Vocation of Historiography’, Modern 
Intellectual History 7.1 (2010), pp. 152-53. 
65 
 
much judged for its scholarly adequate representation of the past but for its 
effective force in the present.  
Ankersmit appears to be aware of this, or relates to this when he reflects 
on the postmodern concept of history: 
 
To formulate this in the paradoxical manner so popular among 
postmodernists: the essence of the past is not, or does not lie in, the 
essence of the past. It is the scraps, the slips of the tongue, the 
Fehlleistungen of the past, the rare moments when the past ‘let 
itself go,’ where we discover what is really of importance for us. I 
suspect that at least a partial explanation can be found here for what 
Jorn Rusen referred to as the ‘paradigm change’ in present-day 
historiography, a paradigm change which in his opinion consists 
mainly of exchanging makrohistorische Strukturen for 
mikrohistorische Situationen und Lebensverhältnisse as the object 
of the historian’s attention. What we are witnessing could perhaps 
be nothing less than the definitive farewell for the time being to all 
the essential aspirations which have actually dominated 
historiography as long as it has existed.126  
 
In first instance, Ankersmit maintains that recent interests have been shifted 
from macro-histories to micro-histories, which have in the past escaped the 
attention of historians as unimportant and non-significant in the context of their 
respective narrative plots. As John Rusen’s observations suggest in this quote, 
the focus in postmodern historiography is on the localized narratives of the 
living conditions of the oppressed of history who have been denied a 
representation by those in power - as the latter merely had an interest in what 
they would want to call ‘the essence and true meaning of history’. In this light, 
postmodernism sees history as comprising many small narratives, unlike the 
Enlightenment model of rationalist metanarratives. Ankersmit moreover 
observes that essentialism in history has been the guiding principle for historians 
in the West across the board. The Augustinian theological concept of history, 
for instance, was the precursor of its secularized version of science and 
positivism as the lone rescuer of humanity’s progress.127 Having said that, and 
despite the phrase ‘what is really of importance for us,’ the passage shows that 
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Ankersmit is an historian at heart, focusing on the past and not so much on the 
construction of new worlds in the present. To put this differently, his main focus 
remains epistemological, which is not very postmodern.  
The above is of importance in relation to my postmodern reading of The 
Crucible. Does this play’s power only reside in a (modernist) correct 
epistemologically testable narrative of past events (as I suggested in chapter 1) 
or does the play work performatively, by ontologically fusing two different 
worlds in order to produce something new? A fusion of two worlds may be 
found at play when John Proctor addresses Danforth in the climax of Act 4 and, 
in refusing to sign what he confessed, expresses how his soul has been seized 
from him through a false confession under duress and under pressure of the 
authorities: 
  
Because it is my name! Because I cannot have another in my life! 
Because I lie and sign myself to lies! Because I am not worth the 
dust on the feet of them that hang! How may I live without my 
name? I have given you my soul; leave me my name!128  
 
This is a character speaking from the past whereas equally well it could have 
been a contemporary of Miller who had gone through the anti-Communist 
prosecutions in the 1950s. In this context, the point would be that we move 
away from postmodernism’s obsession with representation and its almost 
parasitic relation to modernism and modernity in terms of a critical response. 
This position of dependence is hinted at when White, for instance, states that: 
‘Postmodernism is a term which names, first a certain epochal self-
consciousness, a sense shared by many artists and intellectuals of having to 
work and create in a situation deprived of the certainties of twentieth century 
modernism’ (sic). This becomes even more explicit when he adds that 
postmodernism ‘arose on the ruins of the search for certainty, objectivity, 
foundations and even truth itself that had underwritten the West’s belief in 
‘progress’ since the time of the enlightenment’.129 According to White, 
consequently, the term postmodernism can be defined rather by what it has 
denied, rejected, or simply abandoned with regard to the philosophical and 
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social endowment of the Enlightenment, than by any positive cognitive content 
or utopian aspiration of a distinctively modern kind.130  
As Brian McHale makes clear, postmodernism exists without any 
particular clear point of reference and it is a discursive artefact constructed by 
readers, writers and literary historians, as a consequence of which it can be 
constructed in a variety of ways.  
 
Thus there is John Barth’s postmodernism, the literature of 
replenishment; Charles Newman’s postmodernism, the literature of 
an inflationary economy; Jean Francois Lyotard’s postmodernism, 
a general condition of knowledge in the contemporary 
informational regime; Ihab Hasan’s postmodernism, a stage on the 
road to the spiritual unification of humankind; and so on.131  
 
Here we turn, by implication, from a focus on the past to a focus on the present 
since all the people mentioned by McHale act in the present. Literature is 
considered in this case not so much in terms of the adequacy of its 
representation, but in terms of its ability to make the world, or to make worlds, 
by battling one another through language. On the positive side this does not 
support any accusation of moral relativism. In fact, postmodernism encourages 
endless debate on all values. This also clearly emerges from Jane Flax’s 
definition, from a feminist perspective, of the core issues of postmodernism:  
 
These crucial subjects include: (1) contemporary Western culture - 
its nature and the best ways to understand it; (2) knowledge - what 
it is, who or what constructs and generates it, and its relations to 
power; (3) philosophy - its crisis and history, how both are to be 
understood, and how (if at all) it is to be practiced; (4) power - if, 
where, and how domination exists and is maintained and how and if 
it can be overcome; (5) subjectivity and the self - how our concepts 
and our experiences of them have come to be and what, if anything, 
these do or can mean; and (6) difference - how to conceptualize, 
preserve, or rescue it.132  
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So, according to Flax, postmodernism is concerned with our understanding 
contemporary Western Culture, the nature of the production of knowledge in its 
relation with power, and the crisis of philosophy. All three again emphasize 
issues of epistemology. Yet Flax considers postmodernism critically from a 
feminist standpoint, with reference to its failure to bring about change in the 
world apart from only interpreting it. To be sure, power is a dominant motif of 
postmodernism and it is studied in an attempt to discern the modalities of 
domination and the ways to overcome it. But Flax asks how practical 
postmodernism can become, in this respect, and how it can do justice to the 
subjects that are still struggling for emancipation and self-realisation. In general, 
the concept of subjectivity is analyzed in postmodern studies more with 
reference to what the self might mean, than for what it might do. As we will see 
in the conclusion of this thesis, it will take Judith Butler to overcome the 
postmodernist tendency to read differentially as opposed to acting differentially. 
The latter is also what Flax is concerned with.  
Flax’s position is of importance in my dealing with Miller’s play, for if I 
read it as a postmodern play, some forms or aspects of postmodernism might 
have reduced its powers in terms of effect. The question is: which forms or 
aspects empowered it? In my take on the matter I consider a version of 
postmodernism relevant which considers historiography as a battlefield for 
truth. So I need to return to Linda Hutcheon. 
 
 
2.3 The Crucible as a Postmodern Parody of History: Salem as the Parody 
of McCarthyism 
The production of the play in the early 1950s is in itself not enough to call it 
postmodern. Yet, its intense self-reflexivity, and its obvious intention to 
intervene in the playwright’s present political environment compel me to read 
The Crucible as a postmodern work. Its self-reflexivity is evident from the 
interspersed narrative commentary in the text which reminds the reader that 
he/she is reading a text, language, and a drama and not viewing a world without 
mediation. However, the point is that the drama itself facilitates a mapping of 
two worlds and the question is how we can understand this mapping. The latter 
is evident when Miller explains the genesis of The Crucible in an interview with 
Olga Carlisle and Rose Styron. In it he says that in the 1950s, when Senator 
Joseph McCarthy waved the card in the air by saying ‘I have in my hand the 
names of so-and-so’, it felt eerily similar to the standard tactic of seventeenth-
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century prosecutors. In Salem, they would announce: ‘we possess the names of 
all those people who are guilty. But the time has not come yet to release them’. 
This was a way of inflicting guilt upon the whole village. Many responded 
genuinely and many out of fear. McCarthy re-enacted this show at the national 
level in the 1950s by demonizing the Communists.133  
The mapping of two worlds is distinct from the potential of postmodern 
fiction to represent history in order to open it up to the present. Linda Hutcheon 
explains this relation of historiography to the present in postmodern fiction as 
follows: ‘Postmodern fiction suggests that to re-write or to re-present the past in 
fiction and in history is, in both cases, to open it up to the present, to prevent it 
from being conclusive and teleological’.134 Hutcheon elaborates on this in her 
essay ‘Historiographic Metafiction’: 
 
In the postmodern novel the conventions of both fiction and 
historiography are simultaneously used and abused, installed and 
subverted, asserted and denied. And the double (literary/historical) 
nature of this intertextual parody is one of the major means by 
which this paradoxical (and defining) nature of postmodernism is 
textually inscribed.135 
 
The difference with White and Ankersmit is crucial. It concerns not so much 
opposing two approaches as the simultaneous realization of possibilities. So-
called postmodern metafiction is a type of fiction that self-consciously addresses 
the devices of fiction without, however, turning everything into mere fiction. In 
drawing attention to itself as a work of art, the work both emphasizes artifice 
and exposes the truth inhering it. In Patricia Waugh’s view, metafiction is a 
fictional writing that draws attention to itself as an artefact, not to ignore but to 
raise questions about the relationship between reality and fiction. In self-
critically assessing its methods of construction, metafictional writings examine 
the fundamental structures of narrative fiction and explore alongside the 
possibility of the truth of a world outside the literary texts.136  
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In The Crucible, the dynamic at play is similar when Miller introduces 
John Proctor through a narrative comment on his dramatic character in relation 
to historical realities outside the play: 
 
But as we shall see, the steady manner he displays does not spring 
from an untroubled soul. He is a sinner, a sinner not only against 
the moral fashion of the time, but against his own vision of decent 
conduct. These people had no ritual for the washing away of sins. It 
is another trait that we inherited from them, and it has helped to 
discipline us as well as to breed hypocrisy among us.137  
 
The passage is a good example of historiographic metafiction as John Proctor’s 
dramatic character is narrated with reference to his socio-historical time and also 
with reference to the sustained cultural practices that ‘we’, i.e. Miller’s 
contemporaries in the fifties, had inherited. The Crucible has therefore a vast 
postmodern potential as its subject is an historical event whereas, through 
dramatic performance and theatricality, Miller has established a double 
relationship between fact and fiction, working through both past and present to 
unearth new meanings for both. Yet what is the nature of this process of 
working through? For this the notion of parody in historiographic metafiction is 
of relevance.  
When Hutcheon emphasized the importance of parody in postmodern 
historiography, it was certainly not a pejorative literary device meant to ridicule 
and imitate history. As Hutcheon explains: 
 
What I mean by ‘parody’ here is not the ridiculing imitation of the 
standard theories and definitions that are rooted in eighteenth-
century theories of wit. The collective weight of parodic practice 
suggests a redefinition of parody as repetition with critical distance 
that allows ironic signaling of difference at the very heart of 
similarity. In historiographic metafiction, in film, in painting, in 
music, and in architecture, this parody paradoxically enacts both 
change and cultural continuity.138 
 
                                                          
137 Miller, The Crucible p. 21. 
138 Linda Hutcheon, ‘The Politics of Postmodernism: Parody and History’, Cultural Critique 5, 
Modernity and Modernism, Postmodernity and Postmodernism (Winter, 1986-87), p. 185. 
71 
 
So, in historiographic metafiction, the parody of history is performed through 
critical representation of the past with a view to finding difference and 
continuity in perspectives with respect to the present. Hutcheon sees in this an 
urge for a public discourse that articulates the ‘presentness of the past’ through a 
social placing of art in cultural discourse, thus linking art with what Edward 
Said calls the ‘world’.139  
In The Crucible, for instance, the ‘Black slave from Barbados,’ Tituba, 
can be seen as a specific example of parody of double oppression of race and 
gender patterns in American history. Miller introduces her character to critically 
revive the ghosts of race relationships from America’s past in a new space of 
modern American multiculturalism.140 When, for example, Tituba’s speaks to 
Reverend Parris in Act 1 of the play, she says: 
 
He say Mr. Parris must be kill! Mr. Parris no goodly man, Mr. 
Parris mean man and no gentleman, and he bid me rise out of my 
bed and cut your throat! (They gasp.) But I tell him ‘No! I don’t 
hate that man. I don’t want kill that man.’ But he say, ‘You work 
for me, Tituba, and I make you free! I give you pretty dress to wear, 
and put you way high up in the air, and you gone fly back to 
Barbados!’ And I say, ‘You lie, Devil, you lie!’ And then he come 
one stormy night to me, and he say, ‘Look! I have white people 
belong to me.’ And I look - and there was Goody Good.141 
  
There is an obvious Caribbean tinge to Tituba’s style of speech. Marion Starkey 
calls it ‘slurred southern speech’.142 In the play, she is presented as a black slave 
woman who is an expert in traditional folk healing methods and black magic. 
Her identity and background have certainly played a part in her being accused in 
first instance of practising Voodoo. In this quote, in citing the Devil’s enticing 
temptations, Tituba subconsciously vents her desire for freedom and 
emancipation from slavery, which refers to the historic tragedy of the Africans 
and the Indians in the Caribbean and the Americas. There is tangible evidence 
that Miller introduces her character as a parody, in Hutcheon’s sense, of a past 
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that still lurks in America’s present (be it our contemporary present or the 
1950s, but more so in the fifties) in the form of problematic race relations 
between blacks and whites.  
Hutcheon defines the function of parody in her study of Robert Coover’s 
The Public Burning from 1977.143 It concerns a fictionalized account of the 
Rosenberg case, told from Richard Nixon’s viewpoint. The novel combines 
metafictional techniques with a critique of American history and ideology and 
had a pronounced impact on Hutcheon’s views on postmodernism. Hutcheon 
writes in this respect:  
 
Postmodernism deliberately confuses the notion that history’s 
problem is verification, while fiction’s is veracity (Berthoff 1970, 
272). Both forms of narrative are signifying systems in our culture, 
both are what Doctorow once called modes of ‘mediating the world 
for the purpose of introducing meaning’ (1983, 24). And it is the 
constructed, imposed nature of that meaning (and the seeming 
necessity for us to make meaning) that historiographic metafiction 
like Coover’s The Public Burning reveals.144 
 
The important point here is that when both fiction and historiography are 
signifying systems in cultural space, and postmodern metafiction is meant to 
mediate the world aesthetically and politically, this is all meant not just to grasp 
or find meaning but to make meaning, as Doctorow would also suggest. The 
past is given meaning by verifying it through the veracity of the fictional 
discourse. Likewise, The Crucible works on the basis of this confusion of 
verification with veracity, i.e. historical facts in relation to the truth in their 
representation. Or, to put this yet differently, the veracity of the play as a truth 
practice calls for verification, with regard to both the past and the present, in 
line with Hutcheon’s approach: ‘It is part of the postmodern stand to confront 
the paradoxes of fictive/historical representation, the particular/the general, and 
the present/the past’.145 
The general picture is that postmodern historical novels, like Coover’s 
The Public Burning, use metafictional techniques to juxtapose historical facts 
with fiction, thus not only reminding the readers of historical fiction’s 
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limitations as a textual version of history but also of the disturbance created by 
mixing historical facts through fiction.146 Yet this disturbance is not just a 
simple matter of disturbance. In The Crucible the normative historical narratives 
of Salem and the persistent ideology of good and evil in American cultural 
discourse is problematized and somehow challenged through metafictional 
drama techniques. The truth is nowhere to be found, it has to emerge through 
this process. Thus the text creates room for radical political engagement in the 
sense formulated by French philosopher Alain Badiou:‘it is our encounter with 
the emerging truth that can ultimately force us towards an ethical confrontation 
or choice: the recognition of truth of an event ‘compels us to decide a new way 
of being’.’147 
Postmodernism’s revisiting of the past, in this respect, is not nostalgic; it 
is a critical revisiting of the past based upon a parodying dialogue of both art 
and society with the past. In postmodernism, this critical reflection deals with 
aesthetic and social formations of the past in its relation to the present. To be 
sure there are those who do see in postmodernism a nostalgic tendency, such as 
Christian Gutleben in Nostalgic Postmodernism.148 And even in The Crucible, 
as we will see in chapter 5, there might be a perverse nostalgia in the desire to 
revisit the dark past with its clear-cut forces of good and evil. Such nostalgia, 
however, was not at issue in the fifties. At that time, The Crucible was able to 
twist the narrativization of Salem, with the aim of finding new possibilities of 
meaning in the present. It did work, distinctly, as a parody: 
 
Historiographic metafiction works to situate itself within historical 
discourse without surrendering its autonomy as fiction. And it is a 
kind of seriously ironic parody that effects both aims: the intertexts 
of history and fiction take on parallel (though not equal) status in 
the parodic reworking of the textual past of both the ‘world’ and 
literature.149 
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The key term here is ‘reworking’. The pivotal issue is that the past is not 
finished. In the case of The Crucible, there is moreover another, related, 
problem. Not only is the past not finished, but nor is the making of history in the 
present. Hutcheon explains that: 
  
Historiography and fiction, as we saw earlier, constitute their 
objects of attention; in other words they decide which events will 
become facts. The postmodern problematization points to our 
unavoidable difficulties with the concreteness of events (in the 
archive, we can find only their textual traces to make into facts) and 
their accessibility. (Do we have a full trace or a partial one? What 
has been absented, discarded as non-fact material?).150 
 
The first and last sentence are of particular relevance to Miller’s play. Its main 
concern, again, is not to investigate the Salem case per se, but to provoke 
investigation into the manipulative making of events by McCarthy and his ilk, 
and the consciously used partiality of traces. If I read The Crucible as a 
postmodern play, it is firstly as a parody in the sense that the Salem period is 
used as a parody of McCarthyism. Secondly, it is also a parody of 
historiographical metafiction itself. It seems to focus chiefly on the past but it is 
actually interested in the present, in which ‘full traces and partial ones’ are used 
politically as a matter of public manipulation. For Hutcheon a parody of the past 
is used to work on historiographical sources in literary texts, whose self-
reflexivity or metafictional nature reveal the possibility of alternative versions 
of truth that are textually inscribed in historical records. The parody works like 
this and yet differently in The Crucible. Its parody of the past is both aimed at 
finding different forms of truth in the past and calling for the truth in the 
present.  
When Hutcheon shows that parody is central to postmodernism, her 
argument is simultaneously formal, strategic and political.151 Not only does she 
formally link parody to ironic quotation, pastiche and intertexuality, she also 
relates it also to appropriation, which is a matter of strategy. Such forms and 
strategies become political when ‘ideological consequences’ are involved. The 
parody of the past in postmodern works of art is not nostalgic or 
                                                          
150 Hutcheon, ‘Historiographic Metafiction: “The Pastime of the Past Time”’, p. 122. 
151 Linda Hutcheon, ‘The Politics of Parody’, in The Politics of Postmodernism (New York: 
Routledge, 1989), p. 93. 
75 
 
commemorative, nor is it based on lamentation of the past; rather it is always 
critical and seeks new meanings from the past whilst having its feet entrenched 
in history and fiction at the same time, which in terms of parody boils down to 
‘installing and ironizing’ simultaneously. Miller’s The Crucible proves the 
point. The play both claims to install an historical reality whilst ironizing it. 
Miller’s main goal is not to just represent the Salem events correctly but to 
present them in such a way that they appear as a parody of themselves and of 
McCarthyism. In strategic terms, he appropriates the Salem events to criticize 
the contemporary McCarthy events, which are parodied in? the play. There is 
thus a double parody in play. Considered in this way, The Crucible is a 
theatrical piece that confronts the established narrative of the 1950s US political 
environment by dramatizing an historical episode, or by redoing this episode in 
the context of the play’s contemporaneous present. As a result, its theatricality 
has the effect of transversing time scales (about which more later). 
In this context, Walter Benjamin’s reading of Brecht’s epic theatre is 
relevant, in particular when Benjamin mentions that the use of gesture and 
citability distinguish epic theatre from classical drama. Regarding this gesture 
and citability, Samuel Weber explains: 
 
Epic theater, it could be said, turns the traditional claims of drama 
inside out. This is why gesture as such is only the ‘raw material’ of 
theater, and why Benjamin citing Brecht, singles out the citability 
of gesture as the defining principle and resource of his theater. For 
‘gesture’ does not merely interrupt some thing external to it: the 
expressive intentionality of an action, the teleology of a narrative, 
or the causal necessity or probability of a sequence of events. It 
does all of this, but it also does something more: insofar as it is 
citable, it interrupts itself, and indeed, only ‘is’ in its possibility of 
becoming other, of being transported elsewhere.152 
 
The gesture in epic theatre possesses a dialectical dimension in that it interrupts 
a specific movement towards meaning, comprehension and closure and brings 
out effects to render these apparent. The point in relation to this quote is, again, 
that The Crucible does not intend to be a classic dramatic piece that tells a 
closed, yet gripping story that may fascinate us. The relation between Salem and 
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McCarthyism is, indeed, one of citability. In this case, it is not so much the 
actors working by means of gesturing, but the play itself, as a whole, that 
functions as gesture. The play itself is ‘the raw material’ of theatre that 
interrupts the gripping and dramatic events of the present in which it is brought. 
As such it is citable as well, as we will see in chapter 5 and in the conclusion. 
Sarah Bryant-Bertail states that ‘epic theatre rejects the old dichotomy 
between, on one side, human consciousness as the interior time of the spirit of 
history; and, on the other side, the world, including the human body, as the 
exterior space and matter of nature’.153 Miller’s The Crucible uses theatrical 
gesture much like Brecht’s epic theatre because it refuses such a dichotomy, for 
it would restrict literature and art to the position of reflecting on history’s 
internal sense and meaning. Instead The Crucible is very much concerned with 
the world of acting bodies, both political bodies and individual ones. The piece 
retains this strength to confront the grand narrative of its age by interrupting it 
and intervening critically. As Sarah Bryant-Bertail says: ‘theater can still be 
used as a forum to stage and critique the crises of our own era, to help us see the 
images we have constructed of our own historical existence, constructions that 
have real-life consequences’.154 The argument in this section is that this does not 
hold for theatre per se, but for specific forms of theatre, of which The Crucible 
is one example.  
In relation to history, the play does not only work by means of parodic 
gesture and citability, however. Its parodic potential is even more complicated, 
or doubly doubled, as when Salem becomes the parody of McCarthyism.  
 
2.4 The Crucible in the Present: the Preposterousness of McCarthyism 
Parodying Salem 
The Crucible deals with an historical episode and it is because of it being 
written in the 1950s, i.e. Miller’s present, that an anachronistic effect is 
unavoidably generated. It may be a form of anachronism, however, that doubles 
the parody of which I spoke in the previous section. When cultural analyst 
Mieke Bal developed her idea of preposterous history, she meant that the time 
scales may be reversed by means of works of art. Especially in Quoting 
Caravaggio, in which she examines the way in which postmodern artists 
reworked the baroque, she explores how works of art can foster a way of 
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looking at the past in which the present precedes the past on the chronological 
scale.155 Korsten, working on theatre plays from the baroque himself, 
summarizes Bal’s position as follows: 
 
History seems to be defined chronologically by a pre and a post. 
Yet this seemingly natural order of things is not that solid. The 
point was put forward convincingly by Mieke Bal, who coined the 
term preposterous history in order to indicate how past and present 
are caught in an embrace that confuses chronological order. In the 
case of Bal, in her Quoting Caravaggio, she considered the way in 
which many postmodernist artists reworked material of the 
baroque. On average, this would be seen as a matter of influence, or 
of chronologically hierarchized intertextuality. Bal’s point was that 
it works the other way as well. We now read baroque works of art 
also through the pre-position of postmodernist art. In the case of 
literature I would say that, for instance, we now read Iliad as much 
through Derek Walcott’s Omeros as that we read Omeros through 
Iliad. But as the term preposterous suggests there is more to it than 
simple reversal. Taking her cue from anthropologist Johannes 
Fabian, Bal is talking about ‘shared time,’ of a coevalness between 
scholar and historical subject.156 
 
Almost naturally the chronological order of things seems based on the notion 
that the past precedes the present which leads to the future. However, as Bal 
argues in her notion of preposterous history, past and present are caught in a 
mutual embrace in postmodern works of art, and not just in postmodern works. 
For instance, the reworking of the historical subjects in the postmodern works of 
art, as in the case of baroque paintings, has enabled the readers to view the past 
through these present representations. Hence from this logic, the present 
preposterously precedes the past in the postmodern works of art to disrupt an 
apparently solid hierarchy of chronologically ordered things in which the past 
always leads to the present. Yet there is more to it. This logic also allows for the 
possibility of a ‘shared time,’ which is located here in the interstice between the 
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pieces of art and the studying scholar, but which can be extended to any 
audience dealing with such works of art. 
In postmodernist writings, the present reworking of historical subjects 
enables the reader to view the past through them. But this is more than a matter 
of ‘viewing’. According to Van Alphen, ‘ The complex ways in which art acts 
upon the past - or more specifically its predecessors - and conventional motifs 
and modes of representation, suggests that it is the past, not the present, that is 
conditioned by a perpetual flux’.157 So, it is not only the artists’ complex 
reworking of historical subjects that obliterates the natural order of things from 
the past to the present. In the postmodernist logic, this constant reworking of 
history makes the past, through its interpretations and re-workings, conditioned 
by a continuous process of flux and change. That being said, the opposition 
suggested by Van Alphen may be more complex in the case of The Crucible. A 
preposterous order of history, in which the present leads to the past’s mould-
ability, is crucial in assessing The Crucible’s political power as a parody.  
At first it may seem that the play uses Salem as a parody of McCarthyism. 
If, however, we take the logic of preposterousness seriously, it reverses that 
order: McCarthyism becomes the parody of Salem. The play’s critical 
intervention is even more devastating, since McCarthyism itself, in its pompous 
pretence to make history, becomes the object of history now. McCarthyism 
becomes the parody of a past event and, as a consequence, it loses its totalitarian 
grip in and on the present.  
It is time now to have a closer look at the intervention of the play in its 
contemporaneous present.  
                                                          




Using the Past to Intervene in the Present: Spectacular Framing and the 
Point of Theatre 
 
No kind of literary gratification is so much within the reach of the 
multitude as that which is derived from theatrical representations. 
Neither preparation nor study is required to enjoy them: they lay 
hold on you in the midst of your prejudices and your ignorance.158 
 
In the following two chapters I will not be concerned with arguing in favour of 
or against other interpretations of The Crucible, such as those proposed by 
scholars like Robert Warshow, Henry Hewes, Walter Kerr, Joseph T. Shipley, 
Eric Bentley, Penelope Curtis and others.159 Nor will I elaborate extensively on 
the literature available about an unsettling period of American history known as 
the McCarthy era. Instead, I will look at the different ways in which The 
Crucible intervenes in the political circumstances of its times as a piece of 
theatre. Whereas in the previous two chapters the relation between theatre and 
the representation of history was the focal point, in the following two chapters I 
will be looking at the play’s relation to its present in terms of theatricality. As a 
piece of theatre or literature, the text cannot intervene directly in the present. Or, 
at least, it cannot do so in a way that resembles a political decision – or a 
subpoena, for that matter. Literature and theatre are part and parcel of the 
present, but the way in which they work on the present will have to relate it in 
terms of a time lapse, by means of past and future. Or, to put this differently, in 
the case of The Crucible, theatre intervened slowly in light of the speed of the 
show.  
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In this chapter I will focus on the play’s intervention in the present in 
relation to the immediate past, and in the next chapter on its relation to the 
future that it appeals to. The pivot between the two will prove to be allegory, 
either as means to circumvent censorship and use and rework historical rifts, or 
as a mean to call for a better future. This chapter will address the main problem 
of how Miller’s theatre play intervenes in and subverts the politics of its own 
times. It concerns, in a sense, a battle between two forms of artifice. Miller, in 
those days, had the impression of living in an artificial realm, as he indicated in 
his Massey lecture at Harvard: ‘We were living in an art form, a metaphor that 
had no long history but had suddenly, incredibly enough, gripped the 
country’.160 Apparently, the control by the radical Right was reminiscent of the 
artist’s control of language, in its power to juxtapose the real with the unreal.161 
The whole national scene was as surreal like a scripted text. Miller described its 
scenario as follows:  
 
That all relationships had become relationships of advantage or 
disadvantage. That this was what it all came down to anyway and 
there was nothing new here. That one stayed as long as it was 
useful to stay, believed as long as it was not too inconvenient, and 
that we were fish in a tank cruising with upslanted gaze for the 
descending crumbs that kept us alive.162 
 
The situation that Miller describes here concerned the so-called ‘red-baiting’ 
trials, initiated by the House Un-American Activities Committee, also known as 
the McCarthy hearings. These were all mass media campaigns that required 
famous public figures to first confess their past or current affiliation with 
Communism and then recant their former political idealism, shunning it as a 
product of their youthful naïveté.163 Tema Nason put it simply in her fictional 
biography of Ethel Rosenberg, when she makes Ethel say: ‘It is all clear to me 
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now, finally at this late hour. They had their script. I had mine. Theirs: 
“Confess, lie, and you'll live”’.164  
Obviously, the tropes of official signatures and public testimonies in the 
1950s strongly resemblance with the pattern of ‘naming names’ in Salem in 
1692. Likewise there was a strong similarity between the arrogance or pride of 
the prosecutors both in the Salem period and under McCarthyism. About this 
similitude, Miller says in his autobiography: ‘The same misplaced pride that had 
for so long prevented the original Salem court from admitting the truth before its 
eyes was still alive here. And that was good for the play too, it was in the 
mood’.165 Miller is hinting here at the play’s opponent: The House Committee 
on Un-American Activities (HUAC), which had been preceded by a number of 
sub-committees since the early twentieth century. These were the Overman 
Committee (1918-19), the Fish Committee (1930-31) and the Dies Committee 
(1938).166 As Caute explains, the Dies Committee was refurbished as HCUA in 
1945 and voted by 207 to 86 to become a permanent standing committee with 
unique powers to investigate and subpoena. This committee had powers to 
investigate: 
 
(1) The extent, character and objects of un-American propaganda 
activities in the United States, (2) the diffusion within the United 
States of subversive and un-American propaganda that is instigated 
from foreign countries or of a domestic origin and attacks the 
principle of the form of government as guaranteed by our 
Constitution, and (3) all other questions in relation thereto that 
would aid Congress in any remedial legislation.167 
 
On 21 June 1956, three years after the Broadway premiere of The Crucible, 
Arthur Miller was subpoenaed by the HCUA while he was under investigation 
for an allegedly unauthorized passport.168 The charges against him were: 
‘Signing CRC statements against anti-Communist legislation and against HCUA 
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itself; appealing on behalf of Gerhart Eisler and Howard Fast, attending five or 
six meetings of Communist writers in 1947’.169  
In this case, Miller only had to respond to the last of the charges. The 
charge document also detailed his support of the world youth festival in Prague, 
a Washington Post advertisement protesting against punitive measures directed 
against the Communist party of America, a statement by the Veterans against 
Discrimination advocating the abolition of the House Committee and certain 
actions of the Civil Rights Congress.170 Both organizations were part of the so-
called Attorney General’s List of Subversive Organizations (AGLOSO). It 
originated through President Harry Truman’s executive order 9835 on 21 March 
1947.171 During previous nationwide scares, such as the post-World War I First 
Red Scare (called the first one, obviously, after McCarthyism proved to be the 
second one) and the World War II internment of Japanese Americans, the 
federal government had not widely publicized the list of suspicious 
organizations and individuals.172 However, early December 1947, as part of 
Democratic president Truman’s Loyalty and Security Program, the federal 
government publicized the list on a grand scale and used it to threaten, damage 
and nearly destroy 300 organizations. These organizations were all listed 
without any notice, evidence or hearing.  
I would like to point out that in this case the list was made public on a 
massive scale, unlike during previous ‘scares’. This is an index of the generally 
public nature of McCarthy’s working method. Make no mistake: there were 
many hidden machinations and secret actions but, strategically speaking, 
McCarthyism aimed to bring everything into the open in the form of a national 
spectacle. His policy was based on reducing the national scene to a frame of 
American democracy versus pro-Soviet Communism. This frame appeared 
strong enough inasmuch as failure to defend oneself against incrimination was 
considered as proof of seditious activities against the state.  
On account of his past left wing leanings, Miller was implicated in the 
process. However, his response to being framed by McCarthy and his affiliates 
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was to produce his own frame, namely a theatre play in which he dramatized 
history for his own present. The play was an artistic intervention in the public 
show on which the hearings relied. Thus, in The Crucible, Miller used a famous 
Salem ritualistic trial from 1692 to expose the ritualistic nature of the 1950s 
McCarthy hearings. In this chapter I shall explore the socio-political 
circumstances that paved the way for congressional investigations and 
persecutions in the 1950s, and that gave rise to McCarthy’s right-wing politics 
and the role of HCUA in investigating artists, academics and federal 
government servants. I shall proceed to explain how Miller’s play intervened in 
the politics of his times to confront and expose the trial ritual that resurfaces in 
American culture at times of emergency. The chapter concludes with the 
radicalization of the notion of frame when I argue that Miller constructs his own 
theatrical frame to unhinge the frame created by McCarthy through his 
spectacular display of patriotic and unpatriotic Americans on the national scene 
during nationwide televised hearings. 
 
3.1 McCarthy’s Response to, and Use of, Forms of Anxiety 
From 1950 until 1954, a junior Senator from Wisconsin, Joseph McCarthy, 
disrupted everyday politics in the US in his attempt to purge government 
institutions, universities, performing arts hubs like Hollywood as well as 
organizations which had allegedly suffered communist influence from the 
Soviet Union. Robert Griffith states that the set of judgments, attitudes and 
assumptions that gave rise to this brand of politics had its roots in American 
history and was a natural expression of America’s political culture.173 
McCarthy’s politics were certainly influenced by American foreign policy, the 
threat of communism and the Korean War. Yet, as Michael Paul Rogin points 
out, McCarthyism also ‘reflected the specific traumas of conservative 
Republican activists: internal Communist subversion, the new Deal, centralized 
government, left-wing intellectuals, and the corrupting influences of a 
cosmopolitan society’,174 In the context of these experiences in the 1950s, 
Thomas C. Reeves defines McCarthyism ‘as a method, a tactic, an attitude, a 
tendency, a mood, an hysteria, an ideology, and a philosophy.’175 Whatever it 
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was, it was not entirely new, but tapped into previous attempts to purge 
American society. 
The American post-World War II political landscape, approximately from 
the late 1940s until the mid 1950s, offers more than just glimpses of a manifest 
use of fear, enhanced surveillance, blacklisting and repression, all elements used 
as part of the right-wing ideologues’ tactic against government employees, 
educators, entertainers and trade union activists with left-wing political 
affiliations. The Cold War antagonism between the capitalist world and 
communism hastened the need in America to purge society from leftist entities 
belonging to the Communist party of America who were allegedly on the 
Kremlin’s payroll with a view to violently disrupting the US democratic 
government for the sake of a global socialist revolution. In Cold War 
historiography, this is popularly known as the orthodox or traditional view, held 
by historians like Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr, Herbert Feis and Louis J. Halle – 
and this version, according to Edward Crapol, has remained the official view of 
the US government.176 According to the traditional view in the late forties and 
early fifties, there had been an attempt to safeguard America’s national security 
and democracy against the totalitarian threat from Soviet Russia, which led 
public and private actors to collaborate with each other to conduct inquisitorial 
loyalty tests on liberals, socialists, free-thinking intellectuals and labour 
unionists.177 The ‘new Left’ revisionist theorists, amongst them William 
Appleman Williams, challenged this traditional and orthodox view and 
reassessed American foreign policy from the 1890s well into the twentieth 
century, as an expansionist policy that was aimed at building an economic 
empire.178 In their view the US bore more responsibility for creating the Cold 
War than Soviet Russia. The ‘post-revisionist’ scholar John Lewis Gaddis 
formulated a synthesis of the two preceding schools of thought, presenting a 
widely accepted view of the events.179  
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On the international scene, Soviet Russia’s emergence as a post-war rival 
of capitalist democracies, the loss of China to Mao’s Communist forces in 1949, 
the end of the American nuclear monopoly following the Soviet nuclear test in 
1949 and the start of the Korean War (1950-53) were events that prompted 
vigilance in American power circles. They became proactive in unravelling 
elements of the Communist Party of America who were allegedly operating as 
foreign agents and spies. ‘Who lost China’ became an instant mantra in the 
mouth of Republicans.180 The sweeping and Manichaean response from the 
leadership as custodians of global peace, freedom and prosperity against Soviet 
totalitarianism, also offered an opportunity to the Republicans to pit their 
politics against the Democrats at home. On the face of it, this strategy provided 
them an overwhelming support from the American people, who, in a state of 
nationwide paranoia, relinquished their right of free speech in order to give 
precedence to national security.181  
As may be clear, it is hard to fully separate the domestic from the 
international agenda. President Truman’s Loyalty and Security Program of 1947 
was initiated by an urgent need to safeguard national security but, because of the 
prevailing Red Scare, it was implemented without due regard towards 
safeguarding individual rights as guaranteed by the American Bill of Rights. 
The Justice Department collaborated with the state in giving precedence to 
national security over individual rights. The right of free speech was ignored on 
the ground that inflammatory speeches could excite violence and potentially 
trigger an overthrow of the democratic system.182 The central premise of 
President Truman’s Loyalty and Security Program was to dismiss federal 
executive agency employees found guilty of involvement in any indigenous or 
foreign organization designated by the Attorney General as totalitarian, fascist, 
Communist or subversive.183 Yet the arbitrary nature of the Attorney General’s 
list of organizations, the secretive operational process of laying charges of 
disloyalty, conspiracy, political strikes, sabotage, etc. against a federal 
employee, and the denial of rights to rebut the charges riddled the process with 
procedural defects. Moreover, the inclusion of charges based on establishing 
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‘guilt by association’ with Communist organizations, left little margin of 
defence for those who belonged to them with genuine ideological zeal and no 
intent of causing harm to the state.  
Thus, state security and state unity were given a holy resonance in the 
official political discourse, just as Salem’s so-called cunning folks were 
considered a threat to Puritan community unity. Thomas P. Adler also refers to 
this connection: 
 
If, in Salem, Miller discerned at work a ‘cleansing’ through a 
‘projection of one’s own vileness onto others in order to wipe it out 
with their blood,’ in 1950s America he sadly found ‘a public rite of 
contrition . . . an obligatory kowtow before the state, the century’s 
only credible god.’184 
 
The quote suggests more than metaphor. If the state has become God, this may 
indicate how opaque the force of the state was, and how small individuals 
appeared in front of its committee, and this in turn led to attempts to save one’s 
life by accusing others. For instance, statesman Alger Hiss was convicted on the 
basis of former Communist party member Whittaker Chamber’s accusation that 
Hiss had been a Communist spy. The latter was found guilty of perjury and was 
jailed for five years.185 As for opaqueness, the Jewish couple Julius and Ethel 
Rosenberg was sentenced to death for sharing nuclear secrets with the Soviets, 
in a far from transparent legal process. They were convicted of conspiring to 
pass atom secrets to the Soviet Union, but the administration used circular logic 
to interpret their crime as the cause of death of fifty-thousand American soldiers 
who laid down their lives in Korea when the US nuclear monopoly ended.186  
The exact cause of the international historical confrontation between the 
US and Soviet Russia, or the Communist forces globally, is not the primary 
point of concern here. What had happened to the US in the decades preceding 
the fifties will be more helpful in uncovering the roots of the unfavourable 
opinion of Communism in America and how this related to various forms of 
societal fear. Like Miller, I am more interested in a home-bred cultural dynamic. 
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McCarthyism proved very effective in a political environment structured by a 
non-violent and quasi-consensual form of repression, specific to America, which 
was qualitatively different from the abrupt outlawing and banishments by 
totalitarian regimes elsewhere. Ellen W. Schrecker sums this two-phase process 
up when she states that ‘first, the objectionable groups and individuals were 
identified – during a committee hearing, for example, or an FBI investigation; 
then, they were punished, usually by being fired’.187 
To be sure, the shift in character of the global Communist movement – 
from national forms of hostile attack against liberal democratic institutions to 
apparent cooperation with reform organisations transnationally – made the 
American political elite sceptical about its own liberal Left. On the domestic 
scene, the status anxieties of Americans were also exploited by McCarthy, who 
received support from certain sectors of the population such as Catholics, semi-
educated people, Republicans, Irish Americans, lower-class and retired 
people.188 The educated elite, university professors, students and professional 
workers affiliated with managerial and clerical jobs were McCarthy’s vehement 
opponents, as they feared a curtailment of their freedom and personal rights by 
the investigating Committees.189 And, indeed, McCarthy’s principal targets were 
artists, free thinkers and liberals, including Harvard professors, intellectuals, so-
called ‘fellow travellers’, trade unionists, Jews and American elites in the 
administration. Especially the latter proved eventually to be his nemesis when 
his own Republican coteries withheld their support for him after the Army - 
McCarthy hearings in 1954 during the Eisenhower period.190 
American historian Richard Hofstadter observes that in the post-industrial 
environment in which people’s economic fortunes were in a state of flux and 
when the pre-World War II middle and lower middle class immigrant groups 
were replacing the old rich classes of Americans in their social standing, 
McCarthy’s right-wing campaign against the communists was received like a 
clarion call by his supporters.191 These people found in McCarthy’s politics an 
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expression of their grievances. Robert Griffith characterizes this as the anti-
intellectual and anti-establishment mood of McCarthyism, which heavily relied 
on scorning liberals, diplomats and young men born with good fortunes.192 
Despite the guarantee of civil liberties and individual rights that the 
Americans were used to in normal circumstances, in the new political landscape 
the government deemed that giving free rein to left-wing liberal revolutionaries 
and their secret associates was a potential threat to security and the very 
structure of democracy. Civil liberties, although a great American strength and 
principle in peace time, were now increasingly perceived as a weakness in the 
system, especially during emergency and war situations – weaknesses that the 
enemy could exploit for disruptive purposes. As a result, a considerable number 
of politicians trampled on civil liberties without much hesitation. During the 
HCUA hearings, the defendants were denied the protection of the First and Fifth 
Amendment of the American Bill of Rights, which enshrine the right of free 
speech and protection against self-incrimination respectively. The protection of 
the First Amendment, guaranteeing the right of freedom of speech, was not 
granted to the accused because their political ideas were deemed antithetical to 
the official views on loyal citizenship. Their indictment was often enough to 
convict them during the hearings. Secondly, those defendants who refused to 
cooperate with Congress or Senate committees, by invoking the Fifth 
Amendment protection against self-incrimination, were still considered guilty as 
the ‘Fifth Amendment Communists.’ Therefore many absolved themselves by 
informing the hearing committees of other Communists and former fellow 
travellers they knew. This is similar to the practice of confessions, accusations 
and the blaming and naming of others in order to negotiate one’s life, as the 
Salem accused did in front of Danforth and Hale. It is worth noting, as James L. 
Gibson points out, that safeguarding democracy by non-democratic means of 
repression was itself illogical, as was the degree of the communist threat as a 
non-democratic means to disrupt democracy that had to be weighed against the 
degree of un-democratic repression that was unleashed by American democracy 
in the 1950s.193 The threat proved to be exaggerated, according to Gibson, and 
by fighting it through repressive and non-democratic means, American 
democracy acted against itself.  
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Both the Republicans and the conservative Democrats in a virulently anti-
Democrat and anti-New Deal congress of 1946 initiated a campaign of far-right 
Americanism and waged a war of criticism on the Truman administration for 
being too soft on Communists.194 Following this uproar, Democrat president 
Truman’s Loyalty and Security Program of 1947 revealed a dual purpose of 
containing the indigenous left-wing’s covert infusion of Soviet-styled 
revolutionary Socialism and countering criticism of the conservative 
Republicans for being too lenient on them.195 According to Robert Griffith, the 
new political environment offered an opportunity to conservative businessmen, 
organized veterans and patriotic societies like ‘US Chambers of Commerce’ and 
the ‘American Legion’ to amplify their concerns through the press about the 
perils of Communism.196 Various interest groups harped on the string of fear 
and suspicion at different resonance and pitch, which then spiralled into the 
phenomenon of McCarthyism. It was not a populist movement, as Schrecker 
shows: there were different shades of anti-Communism on the American 
political horizon. Whereas the ultraconservatives were actually against 
favourable references to internationalism and the UN in textbooks, the liberals 
supported scrutiny of the Communists if it could be done without rankling non-
Communists. Meanwhile, leftist radicals argued against Stalinism on account of 
the Soviet prime minister’s corruption of the global socialist ideal. But, 
Schrecker continues, the main interest group consisted of conservative 
Republican men who furthered their political careers by manipulating the 
national environment of popular myths and stereotypes according to their own 
partisan concerns. Richard Nixon and Joseph McCarthy are prime examples of 
this, along with the FBI’s J. Edgar Hoover.197  
Liberal political sentiments flourished in America between 1930 and 
1945, ignited by an internationally fuelled anti-rightist stance against Fascism 
and Nazism in Europe. The thirties saw anti-big business and anticonservatism 
flourish in America under the aegis of various Congressional committees, such 
as the Nye Committee, against some Wall Street bankers’ involvement in 
plunging America in World War I in order to maintain their investments; the La 
Follette Committee against large corporations’ secret induction of labour spies 
to inhibit labour union formations; and the Truman Committee against the big 
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business profiteering during World War II.198 The liberal Left’s supremacy 
offered an opportunity to the Communist Party of America to strengthen its 
various leftist groups and trade unions in the country. The party however 
followed a secretive path instead of winning electoral mass support in a 
democratic way. The secretive nature of the Communist Party organization 
sparked fears about their engagement in so-called un-American activities that in 
turn might lead to revolutionary defeatism of the democratic set-up. So, the 
political rhetoric of the thirties that focused on conservatives, isolationists, 
business leaders, Catholics, Republican senators and business leaders as 
traitorous semi-fascists, took a sharp turn in the post-war social and political 
scene when liberals had to be on the defensive against a far-rightist cult of 
conservatism banking on support from interest groups let down by the New 
Deal reform process.199 From the mid-forties onwards, this process suffered 
severe setbacks and witnessed a virtual demise in the Cold War era due to the 
conservatives’ discontent with and stance against their social reform 
domestically, and their thrust towards America’s non-interventionist pacifist 
foreign policy. After all, until the Pearl Harbor attack, isolationism had its 
strains in both the left- and the right-wing political factions in the US. But as 
Justus D. Doeneke observes, the country’s first pacifist national-socialist group, 
‘The Keep America Out of War Congress’ (KAOWC; 1938-41) was created to 
oppose Roosevelt’s overseas commitments.200 So, the Left had actually been 
anti-war and pacifist in its foreign policy agenda. McCarthy challenged their 
pacifism in the face of an impending Red Scare in the US. 
A collaborative anti-Communist inquisition campaign by federal, state 
and local politicians, bureaucrats, journalists and the so-called ‘professional 
witnesses’ and informers set the tone for an environment of fear, suspicion and 
secrecy in the country which led the way to neglect of due process in loyalty 
hearings at most venues. Congressional bodies like the House Un-American 
Activities Committee, the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee and the Senate 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations were assisted by the FBI in 
identifying Communists at various work venues with the help of ex-Communist 
witnesses and informers. Small things could bring employers of accused people 
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to fire them from their jobs.201 These punitive measures had didactic, 
educational and deterrent purposes for the population at large, who thus came to 
know the economic price of having revolutionary utopian ideas, or ideas 
bordering on these. The fear of infamy, the publicity value and the spectacle of 
criminal proceedings, the fact that people’s patriotism was publicly doubted or 
that people were directly branded as unpatriotic, made most liberal employers 
acquiesce to Congress and dismiss many employees, even without sufficient 
evidence.202 The hearings functioned like a stage performance, and the entire 
country watched them, as audience, in a state of paranoia.203  
In Miller’s The Crucible, Danforth’s statement in Act 4 echoes the role 
played by the Justice Department in the McCarthy era when he says: 
 
Postponement now speaks a floundering on my part; reprieve or 
pardon must cast doubt upon the guilt of them that died till now. 
While I speak God’s law, I will not crack its voice with 
whimpering. If retaliation is your fear, know this – I should hang 
ten thousand that dared to rise against the law, and an ocean of salt 
tears could not melt the resolution of the statutes.204 
 
As may be clear from Danforth’s statement, the judges and the ministers in 
Salem who persecuted the people were under the impression that they were 
defending God’s holy law against an attack from the Devil’s mercenaries in 
occult forms. They were thus able to execute any deviant people without 
impunity. Likewise, McCarthy and his associates launched a national 
purification initiative in 1950s against the Communist spies, which led Miller to 
say, as we saw earlier, that the state had by now replaced God. The state then, in 
the embodiment of McCarthy and his associates, could freely suppress people’s 
liberties through stringent congressional statutes and the politics of legislation 
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that gave their investigations a constitutional cover.205 The Alien Registration 
Act or Smith Act (1940), the Magnuson Act (1943), the McCarran Internal 
Security Act (1950), the McCarran-Walter Act (1952) and The Communist 
Control Act (1954) were part of the legislation process which contributed to a 
full-fledged anti-Communist rage in the country.206 The Smith Act made it 
illegal for any individual or organization to deliberately intend or attempt to 
disrupt and overthrow the government through violence or force. The McCarran 
Internal Security Act, which is also known as the Subversive Activities Control 
Act of 1950, had a clandestine purpose of harassing Communist organizations 
by making it compulsory for them to register with the U.S Attorney general. The 
Immigration and Nationality Act or McCarran-Walter Act enabled the 
government to deport immigrants or naturalized citizens who were found guilty 
of involvement in revolutionary activities. The Communist Control Act 
thwarted any claim for legal rights and privileges for Communist organizations. 
The port security program or Magnuson Act (1950), besides ensuring coastal 
surveillance of the Navy, gave an opportunity to right-wing labour organizations 
to settle their scores with the leftist labour unionists who were still strong in that 
sector.207  
 Sketched like this, it almost seems inconceivable that any one individual 
would dare to rise against McCarthyism Miller did not operate as an individual 
however. He acted as an artist with an important public and collective tool: a 
play. But again, what could a theatre play achieve against in the face of such a 
massive spectacle? Let me have a closer look at this battle between different 
genres, with a different generic logic and force. 
 
3.2 Power and the Frame of Spectacle 
Against the backdrop of the right wing’s supremacy in the US in the 1950s, The 
Crucible is a conscious and purposeful theatrical response to the seemingly 
theatrical but in essence spectacular operations of McCarthy and his men, i.e. 
spectacular in the sense of the adjective relating to spectacle. Miller illustrates 
the parallels between Salem and his own times by saying: 
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But gradually, over weeks, a living connection between myself and 
Salem, and between Salem and Washington, was made in my mind 
– for whatever else they might be, I saw that the hearings in 
Washington were profoundly and even avowedly ritualistic. After 
all, in almost every case the Committee knew in advance what they 
wanted the witness to give them: the names of his comrades in the 
Party. The FBI had long since infiltrated the Party, and informers 
had long ago identified the participants in various meetings. The 
main point of the hearings, precisely as in seventeenth-century 
Salem, was that the accused make public confession, damn his 
confederates as well as his Devil master, and guarantee his sterling 
new allegiance by breaking disgusting old vows – whereupon he 
was let loose to rejoin the society of extremely decent people. In 
other words, the same spiritual nugget lay folded within both 
procedures – an act of contrition done not in solemn privacy but out 
in the public air.208 
 
The key issues are the theatrical form of ritual and the element of public 
confession, as opposed for instance to the confessions during the inquisition by 
the Catholic Church, which were often obtained in isolated chambers of 
interrogation and torture. For Miller, a work of art could illuminate the dark 
aspects of reality that the political spectacle had masked. He states: ‘So I 
suppose that in one sense The Crucible was an attempt to make life real again, 
palpable and structured. One hoped that a work of art might illuminate the tragic 
absurdities of an interior work of art that was called reality, but was not’.209  
Arthur Miller was first inspired by the 1692 Salem episode through 
Marion Starkey’s The Devil in Massachusetts from 1949.210 The subject of 
witchcraft in a pre-modern theocratic society was initially a challenging subject 
in the context of the twentieth century and Miller adds that, ‘a drama cannot 
merely describe an emotion, it has to become that emotion’.211 Miller saw a 
living connection between the ritualistic scene of the hearings in Washington 
and the proceedings in Salem. The former were ritualistic in the sense that the 
Committee had already drawn its conclusions and its sole purpose was to extract 
confessions from the witnesses according to a pre-formulated verdict. Each 
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hearing was characterised by this notion of purge through confession and the 
naming of fellow partners. He argues: ‘The overwhelmingly significant truth, I 
thought, as I still do, was the artist-hating brutality of the Committee and its 
envy of its victims’ power to attract public attention and to make big money at it 
besides’.212 Miller faced this brutality himself on 21 June 1956, when the House 
Un-American Activities Committee subpoenaed him. This happened two years 
after March 1954, when Miller had tried to renew his passport in order to travel 
to Belgium to attend a production of The Crucible. He was charged with 
contempt of Congress and his application was turned down on account of his so-
called support of global communist activities which could undermine and 
endanger US national security.213 Miller was now asked, amongst other things, 
for the names of the communist writers who were present at the meeting of 
communist authors held in New York City in 1947. Miller testified that he had 
never been a communist but that he had been associated with a number of 
communist-front groups in the past. He was present at five or six meetings of 
the communist writers but he refused to name those who had attended the 
meeting. The following excerpts from the questioning by Arens, Jackson and 
Scherer of the Committee illustrate Miller’s position: 
 
Mr. Arens: Can you tell us who was there when you walked into 
the room? 
Mr. Miller: Mr. Chairman, I understand the philosophy behind this 
question and I want you to understand mine. When I say this, I 
want you to understand that I am not protecting the communists or 
the communist party. I am trying to, and I will, protect my sense of 
myself. I could not use the name of another person and bring 
trouble on him. These are writers, poets, as far as I could see, and 
the life of a writer, despite what it sometimes seems, is pretty 
tough. I wouldn’t make it any tougher for anybody. I ask you not to 
ask me that question. . . . 
Mr. Jackson: May I say that moral scruples, however laudable, do 
not constitute legal reason for refusing to answer the question. . . . 
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Mr. Scherer: We do not accept the reason you gave for refusing to 
answer the question, and . . . if you do not answer . . . you are 
placing yourself in contempt. 
Mr. Miller: All I can say, sir, is that my conscience will not permit 
me to use the name of another person.214 
 
The last sentence is clear in its defiance. I should hasten to add that Miller did 
not recant from his past affiliations but he did express regret about having been 
a communist sympathizer in the past, after having witnessed the Soviet 
leadership’s persecutions of their own citizens and intellectuals.215 Nevertheless, 
he refused to betray others. His defiance was such that he was charged with 
contempt of congress for refusing to incriminate his past associates. He had to 
pay $40,000 in lawyer’s fees as well as a $500 fine and received a one year 
suspended sentence for Contempt of Congress. It was a year of creative 
inanition in his life.216 
Thus the theatrical aspect of the hearings, with ‘theatrical’ being used 
here in its common-sense, derogatory meaning, lay in the fact that the accused 
were supposed to produce confessions, name their past affiliates and vow to 
have renewed pacts of allegiance to the state and its official ideas through a 
public expression of remorse. Those who did so were amicably granted the 
status of decent citizen whereas the dissidents, in line with the nature of the 
trials in both historical episodes, were subjected to persecution and public 
vilification. Yet, although the accused were brought into a situation with 
theatrical elements and aspects that also play an important role in any legal 
arena such as a court, the theatricality of the situation was governed by, or better 
framed by, the generic form of the spectacle, the modern manifestation of which 
was addressed by Guy Debord in The Society of the Spectacle in 1967.  
Admittedly Debord was not primarily concerned with McCarthyism. He 
defined the modern spectacle in a broader sense as ‘the reigning social 
organization of a paralyzed history, of a paralyzed memory, of an abandonment 
of any history founded in historical time, is in effect a false consciousness of 
time’.217 In Debord’s reading, any society where modern conditions of 
production prevail, in people’s lives, which were once lived directly, are now 
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represented through an immense accumulation of various spectacles.218 Debord 
considers that modern spectacle in its essence is the autocratic reign of the 
market economy that had acceded to an irresponsible sovereignty and totality of 
new techniques of government which constitute social relationship between 
people through mediation of images.219 Debord’s analysis is however helpful in 
shedding light on the spectacle of McCarthyism, as an analogy of the guise of 
power, which is the topic of the Situationists’ radical critique of not only 
modernist art practice, but also the politics of everyday life under modern 
capitalism.220 The Crucible in a sense is a precautionary tale of the role of 
media-power in modern society, that Guy Debord would analyse more than a 
decade later.  
However, the formulation ‘society of the spectacle’ might be too general a 
qualification. In this respect, the art critic Jonathan Crary points out: 
 
One can still well ask if the notion of spectacle is the imposition of 
an illusory unity onto a more heterogeneous field. Is it a totalizing 
and monolithic concept that inadequately represents a plurality of 
incommensurable institutions and events? For some, a troubling 
aspect about the term spectacle is the almost ubiquitous presence of 
the definite article in front of it, suggesting a single and seamless 
global system of relations. For others, it is a mystification of the 
functioning of power, a new opiate-of-the-masses type of 
explanation, a vague cultural-institutional formation with a 
suspicious structural autonomy. Or is a concept such as spectacle a 
necessary tool for the figuration of a radical systemic shift in the 
way power functions noncoercively within twentieth-century 
modernity? Is it an indispensable means of revealing as related 
what would otherwise appear as disparate and unconnected 
phenomena? Does it not show that a patchwork or mosaic of 
techniques can still constitute a homogenous effect of power?221  
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The questions are as relevant as they are revealing in terms of what Crary 
considers to be the key characteristics of the notion of spectacle. To a certain 
extent Crary is responding to Debord, here, regarding the emphasis on the 
representation of things in a monolithic and totalized form, when spectacle is 
used as a generic form by means of which a ‘plurality of incommensurable 
institutions and events’ is restricted to singular scope and interpretation. Debord 
himself says: 
 
The spectacle appears at once as society itself, as a part of society 
and as a means of unification. As a part of society, it is that sector 
where all attention, all consciousness, converges. Being isolated – 
and precisely for that reason – this sector is the locus of illusion 
and false consciousness; the unity it imposes is merely the official 
language of generalized separation.222 
 
The key sentence is the first one. Spectacle is both the generic form that defines 
a society, it is a part of that society as something to be watched and enjoyed, and 
it is a unifying force. Debord observes and predicts that in the modern spectacle 
society, just about everything we consume – and most of what we do – 
embodies a mixture of distraction and reinforcement that serves to reproduce the 
mode of society and economy that has taken the idea of spectacle to its radical 
extreme. Following a Marxist analysis, Debord states that the sheer production 
and consumption of commodities in neoliberal economy has divested people of 
the essence of their labour and brought about alienation and separation. Labour 
has become abstract. Diverging from the orthodox Marxist analysis, however, 
Debord proceeds to explain that the spectacle in this scenario is not just a 
collection of images, rather that it constitutes a social relation between people 
that is mediated by images. He writes: ‘It is the very heart of society’s real 
unreality. In all its aspects, manifestations – news or propaganda, advertising or 
the actual consumption of entertainment – the spectacle epitomizes the 
prevailing model of social life’.223 John Harris summarizes Guy Debord’s 
analysis of contemporary society as follows:  
 
Essentially Debord argues that having recast the idea of ‘being into 
having’, what he calls ‘the present phase of total occupation of 
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social life by the accumulated results of the economy’ has led to ‘a 
generalized sliding from having into appearing, from which all 
actual ‘having’ must draw its immediate prestige and its ultimate 
function’.224 
 
 The critical two steps are the one from being to having and the one from having 
to appearing. Under capitalism being has become a function of what people 
have and what they have can only become socially functional when they know 
how to appear.  
One can relate this notion of spectacle to the McCarthy hearings, which 
made not only the entire American society hostage to a Red Scare and where the 
spectacle was not just a part of society but became something through which 
society appeared to itself as itself. Through public trials, fabricated or enforced 
confessions and televised displays of people’s alleged betrayal of and disloyalty 
to the official national creeds, a spectacle was constructed aimed at not only 
scaring an entire society but also at dividing it by means of an ‘official language 
of generalized separation’ in order, perhaps paradoxically, to make it whole. 
McCarthy built the spectacle around the issue of American national security and 
American purity and purgation. Debord’s idea of spectacle is useful precisely in 
the way society appeared to itself in the form of a spectacle, while spectacle was 
also a dominant part of that society and as such could be a unifying force. The 
spectacle was not so much something that appeared within a frame, it was the 
frame itself. Or, to put this differently, the McCarthy hearings were not just 
taking place in an historical context. They framed context by using a strategy of 
framing.225  
Firstly, there was the seemingly undefeatable frame proposed by 
McCarthy of American democracy against communist totalitarianism. It is in the 
context of this Manichean frame that McCarthy profiled all communists as 
traitors and framed them in a nationwide spectacle as the enemies within. This is 
why, to my mind, Crary’s analysis is relevant when he considers the effect of 
such strategies but I also would like to add an extra argument. This is what 
Crary describes: 
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Thus, as I will argue, spectacular culture is not founded on the 
necessity of making a subject see, but rather on strategies in which 
individuals are isolated, separated and inhabit time as 
disempowered. Likewise, counter-forms of attention are neither 
exclusively nor essentially visual but rather constituted as other 
temporalities and cognitive states, such as those in trance or 
reverie.226  
 
I agree, again, as long as we consider the society of the spectacle in its general 
sense. McCarthyism was a distinct form of spectacle, however, in that wanted to 
make its audience see only one thing, in the context of a strategy that framed 
time itself, as if time could be reduced to the single opposition between 
historical counterparts. The result was nevertheless similar in that all those 
confronted with the spectacle were, indeed, disempowered in the sense that they 
were subject to the spectacle and not the subject of history. 
Miller’s response was not one of trance or reverie. His theatrical response 
was, in a distinct sense, pointed, in an attempt to historicize the present and to 
pierce the frame that was set up. Let me describe this pointed-ness in more 
detail. 
 
3.3 Theatricality, the Spectacle’s Veil and Allegory-in-Reverse 
Throughout his literary work Miller’s artistic sensibilities portrayed the political 
events of his age, such as the Great Depression, the Nazi invasion of Europe and 
the Holocaust, the anti-Communist repression of the 1950s, the anti-Vietnam 
war movement of 1960s and the demise of the Nixon presidency.227 The 
Crucible not only represents an intersection of the political with Miller’s 
personal life in a dramatic way, it was a dramatic play in itself, that was meant 
to be staged in the theatre despite the historical nature of its theme and its 
pointed allegorical relevance. As E. Miller Budick observes, Miller re-created 
another subjective reality in the form of a theatre play, by bringing history and 
literature together to confront the apparent subjective reality and the holy 
resonance of piety and patriotism created by both the political proponents in the 
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1950s and their historical counterparts in seventeenth-century Salem. 228 Miller’s 
play is thus a literary re-articulation of history through the inclusion of memory 
and imagination to interpret history from the viewpoint of the present, however 
not only as a play, but as what I would like to call a truth practice. The 
performance did not just take place in a given present, it was aimed at that 
present, but how can we define this aim? 
Before I move to Erin Graff Zivin’s contention that The Crucible is an 
example of hauntology, I would like to focus on the play’s ability to mark the 
historicity of its own present.229 Frederic Jameson defines the relation of 
historicity to the present in the following terms: 
 
Historicity, is, in fact, neither a representation of the past nor a 
representation of the future (although its various forms use such 
representations): it can first and foremost be defined as a 
perception of the present as history; that is, as a relationship to the 
present which somehow defamiliarizes it and allows us that 
distance from immediacy which is at length characterized as a 
historical perspective. It is appropriate in other words, also to 
insist on the historicity of the operation itself, which is our way of 
conceiving of historicity in this particular society and mode of 
production; appropriate also to observe that what is at stake is 
essentially a process of reification whereby we draw back from 
our immersion in the here and now (not yet identified as a 
‘present’) and grasp it as a kind of thing - not merely a ‘present’ 
but a present that can be dated and called the eighties or the 
fifties.230  
 
The Crucible, as a theatrical representation of a historical subject, is always 
supposed to be performed in a present, that much is clear. However, something 
else is at stake. It may be precisely because The Crucible deals with a distant 
historical period at a time that historical novels were not in fashion, that the 
question arises: Why this play now? The consequence of this question is, as 
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Jameson would argue, that the perceptions of the past in present contexts define 
historicity in the first place, as a result of which the present comes into the 
picture as a moment of history. Despite the fact that the representations of the 
past and the future would use historicity as a concept to understand history, it is 
in the perception of the present as history that one can discern a certain distance 
from the immediate present and establish a historical perspective. So, in the 
1950s, The Crucible helped the readers and the audience to create a distance 
from their immediate present and form an historical perspective of their times 
by viewing the politics of their present as history. The Crucible is an artefact 
that not only frames the past in the present context, i.e. the 1950s, but it does so 
in a pointed way, through its performance, and puts the perception of the present 
at a distance as a result of which it can be had as history. By translating its 
theme from the past to the present, Miller presents a different historical 
perspective through theatricality, and I use the term perspective in a different 
meaning than frame, here. Perspective is ruled by a point de distance, or 
distance point. This is not to put things at a distance, though, but it is to produce 
the effect of depth by means of a point of organization that both produces an 
illusion and is a mathematical starting point from which the illusion can be 
unravelled.  
A good example of this is Danforth’s argument in Act 3 of the play, 
which is only similar to the logic of the ritualistic hearings by the congressional 
committees in 1950s when put in perspective. This is what Danforth says: 
 
In an ordinary crime, how does one defend the accused? One calls 
up witnesses to prove his innocence. But witchcraft is ipso facto, on 
its face and by its nature, an invisible crime, is it not? Therefore, 
who may possibly be witness to it? The witch and the victim. None 
other. Now we cannot hope the witch will accuse herself; granted? 
Therefore, we must rely upon her victims - and they do testify, the 
children certainly do testify. As for the witches, none will deny that 
we are most eager for all their confessions. Therefore, what is left 
for a lawyer to bring out?231  
 
The passage may function as a ‘distance point’ that provides the congressional 
hearings in McCarthy era with a historical resonance or depth, as a result of 
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which these hearings themselves become historicized.232 Miller himself defines 
this historical resonance or depth as follows:  
 
Three hundred years apart, both prosecutions were alleging 
membership of a secret disloyal group. Should the accused confess, 
his honesty could only be proved in precisely the same way – by 
naming former confederates, nothing less. Thus, the informer 
became the very axle of the plot’s existence and the investigation’s 
necessity.233  
 
The way in which things needed to be put in perspective is the more ‘pointed’ 
because of the fact that the alleged crimes were invisible, be it witchcraft or 
crimes like espionage and political subversion.  
With this in mind, the idea of theatricality is vital to assess the play’s 
disruptive qualities, or its pointed engagement with its times. Thomas Postlewait 
and Tracy C. Davis dwell upon the comprehensive term of theatricality in the 
context of its relation to the historical ideas of mimesis, theatrum mundi and 
performance. They argue that the idea of theatricality has historically been 
demeaned in religious traditions owing to its mimetic inclinations towards 
representing the world, which Plato also considered an imitation of the real or 
ideal. Hence theatre and mimesis of the world through performance were 
discouraged as being conceived twice removed from the real or ideal. However, 
in other cultures and traditions, theatricality has been recognized in more 
comprehensive ways: 
 
Although it obviously derives its meanings from the world of 
theatre, theatricality can be abstracted from the theatre itself and 
then applied to any and all aspects of human life. Even if limited to 
theatre, its potential meanings are daunting. Thus it can be defined 
exclusively as a specific type of performance style or inclusively as 
all the semiotic codes of theatrical representation. Some people 
claim that it is the definitive condition or attitude for postmodern 
art and thought; others insist that it already achieved its 
distinguishing features in the birth of modernism. Within 
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modernism, it is often identified as the opposite of realism, yet 
realism is also seen as but one type of theatricality. So, it is a mode 
of representation or a style of behaviour characterized by histrionic 
actions, manners and devices, and hence a practice; yet it is also an 
interpretative model for describing psychological identity, social 
ceremonies, communal festivities, and public spectacles and hence 
a theoretical concept.234  
 
Theatricality thus clearly derives its name from the world of theatre and despite 
its derogatory use in common parlance, it can be used as a comprehensive 
application to all sorts of aspects of human life. The general characteristic, 
though, is that it involves a specific type of performance which implies all the 
signs that feature in the semiotics of theatrical representation. When we deal 
with the pointed-ness of theatre, however, perhaps the most distinguishing 
element in Postlewait and Davis’s passage is the word ‘histrionic’. Its acoustic 
association with historicity is coincidental, although I find it of relevance here. 
The term histrionic has a distinct etymology from history, going back to the 
Latin histrionicus (meaning: pertaining to an actor), which is said to be derived 
from histrio, the Etruscan term for actor or player. As Wladimir Krysinski 
states, theatricality has, on the one hand, due to its metalanguage and 
literariness, the status of a literary object. Yet, due to presence of the physical 
element of performance and acting, it is ludic and histrionic as well.235 In 
relation to ‘histrionicity’ Postlewait and Davis define theatricality as a practice 
because of its affected style of representation in which actions, devices and 
manners are enacted and performed in such a way that they cannot be ignored, 
they attract attention, irritate, or fascinate. As concerns The Crucible, the 
theatricality of the play resides in the fact that it is used in an histrionic way, in 
that it draws attention by its theatrical or dramatic gesture, if only through its 
historical excessiveness. Thus Miller confronts and disrupts the spectacle of 
McCarthyism by bringing in his own theatrical perspective, with its distance 
point, which is a point that has to pierce not so much the frame but the veil of 
illusion that it supports. 
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I would like to reiterate Postlewait and Davis’s warning against a too 
general definition of theatricality in relation to politics. Postlewait and Davis 
sketch the general use of the term theatricality to politics as follows: 
 
In this spirit, an expensive idea of theatricality has been enlarged 
and applied to politics, whereby political behaviour and its defining 
rhetoric are seen as theatrical (especially in the modern age of 
media and advertising). In addition, the ideas of national identity 
and imagined history are constructed as modes of performed 
identity. The public realm is the performative realm. This idea of 
the performative nation appeals to many observers, not just because 
in the US the actor Ronald Reagan was elected to the presidency, 
but also because political events – all the craftiness of state 
management – seem to be managed by the essential traits of 
stagecraft. Perhaps, though, the idea explains too much and too 
conveniently. The temptation needs to be tempered and the claims 
particularized.236  
 
When Postlewait and Davis apply the concept of theatricality to the political 
realm in modern contexts, it is ostensibly in line with the origins of politics in 
the Greek, theatrical city state. They are correct in stating that the political 
behaviour and the rhetoric of politicians can be called theatrical. Moreover, the 
realm of politics is similar to the stage where the performative skills of the 
political actors are on display. Politics exists because of a breach in 
representation, as Frank Ankersmit called it, as a result of which the political 
manoeuvring space consists in the fact that there can and must be a difference 
between what the represented want and what the political actor deems possible 
or wise.237 Here, ‘the public realm is the performative realm’. 
Yet, this is all different from the appeal of the term theatricality that may 
result in a use that is too general, as a result of which it loses its scholarly and 
analytic function and power. This happens when ‘the craftiness of state 
management’ is also called a form of theatricality, as it is made possible through 
stagecraft in a so-called political theatre.238 One could of course argue that 
‘spinning’ uses elements of theatricality. Yet it is not a form of theatricality per 
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se.239 Likewise, advertisements may use elements of theatricality, but this is not 
to say that advertisement is equivalent to theatricality. It is necessary to 
particularize or specify the claims to theatricality when examining the political 
acts of some era, or the agential force of theatre plays. The reason is that there 
are important political implications at stake, as well as different forms of 
responsibility, when distinguishing, for instance, between the spectacle and the 
theatrical.  
Miller’s refusal to testify against his associates as well as his defence of 
the artists’ exemption from the excesses of the Smith Act were a public defence, 
not so much a theatrical one but one in the context of a spectacle that was 
performed in the name of preserving national security. As a result, The Crucible 
enforces and embodies a different sort of theatricality from the conventional 
average political ones in the sense that Miller chose a historical subject and 
infused it into the practices of HCUA by both linking it to and contrasting it 
with their own performance techniques. The Salem confessions and court 
proceedings were dramatized as a parallel image of the congressional spectacle 
of 1950s America. Theatre is presented as an instrument of social change in this 
way, which is also apparent when Miller expresses his commitment to the task 
of making societal life ‘real,’ in opposition to the spectacular political work of 
manipulation and fabrication, fuelled by the mistrust of the state in its own 
people.240 The spectacle could be pierced, however. As Miller states: ‘Paranoia 
breeds paranoia, but below paranoia there lies a bristling, unwelcome truth, so 
repugnant as to produce fantasies of persecution to conceal its existence.’241 In 
order to get to this unwelcome truth, he had to make his point theatrically, and 
theatrically pointed, to bring the unwelcome truth into the full light of existence.  
The theatrical point was made allegorically and the question is how 
allegory relates to the issue of historicity in the sense of offering a perspective 
on one’s own time in terms of historicity.242 An obvious criticism from modern 
viewers and readers about the parallel between witches and communists was 
that communism and its sympathizers were a palpable presence in America, 
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whereas witches and witchcraft were a cognitive error and an optical illusion.243 
Historically speaking, this is a mistake, as we have seen in chapter 1. Given the 
number of people executed for alleged occult practices in Europe and America 
in the Middle Ages and afterwards, there is no reason to doubt that the belief in 
the existence of witches was real. The church and the Bible sanctioned belief in 
witchcraft and the Bible backed them up: ‘Thou shalt not suffer a witch to live 
(Exodus 22:17)’.244 Therefore, in a theocratic society such as Salem, denying 
the existence of witches could by implication be a denial of the Biblical words. 
In post-Reformation Europe too, when the Bible became the sole source of 
religious truth, most people in the European Christian community interpreted 
the scriptures and the passages pertaining to witchcraft literally.245 Likewise, 
being suspected of being disloyal, a traitor or a communist in the 1950s was 
tantamount to endangering one’s life but it was equally dangerous to deny the 
threat itself.  
Put like this, The Crucible hardly seems an allegory but rather a simple 
analogy. This becomes even more apparent when we consider the way Craig 
Owens sketches allegory’s function in relation to history, or the relation 
between past and present: 
 
Allegory first emerged in response to a similar sense of 
estrangement from tradition; throughout its history it has 
functioned in the gap between a present and a past which, without 
allegorical reinterpretation, might have remained foreclosed. A 
conviction of the remoteness of the past, and a desire to redeem it 
for the present – these are its two most fundamental impulses.246 
 
Thus, as Owens states, allegory is a reinterpretation of a past that helps to 
redeem a remote past, but also a strange past, for the present. The allegorist’s 
main interest is to fill the vacuum between the present and the past, to fill a gap 
that results from the past’s distance, its ‘remoteness’, and to make a tradition 
appear as such. Miller did the same, albeit with an interesting twist. His main 
aim was not to historicize the Salem process so that it could become part of a 
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particular tradition again. Instead, he sought to historicize McCarthyism, to put 
it at a distance and bring it on a par with what had happened in a far-away past. 
In this sense his use of allegory is an example of an allegory-in-reverse.  
Allegory is pivotal as ‘an attitude as well as a technique, a perception as 
well as a procedure’. 247 All four aspects relate to the distance point of theatre as 
opposed to the frame of the spectacle. With regard to the frame, The Crucible is 
procedural in that it asks people to follow a procedure in translating not so 
much the situation of Salem to their own time, but rather the other way around. 
This procedure is facilitated because of a perception, namely that the power 
structures in the McCarthy era were similar to those of the Puritan society in 
Salem.248 Miller intended to allegorically juxtapose, as a technique, issues of 
character but, again, in reverse. Proctor’s character is not highlighted in an 
allegorical fashion. Allegorically speaking, the question is which character, in 
the 1950s, appears before Proctor, as the one who comes to speak out against 
deliberate villainy and the authorities’ institutionalized hysteria. Here, the 
allegorical technique of juxtaposing characters is the consequence of an attitude, 
the attitude of allegoresis, as a mode of reading the times. The allegorical 
dynamic of the play, taken together as a perception, a procedure, a technique 
and an attitude, provides it with a theatrical point that consists of the distance 
point where two historically different times not only converge, but from which 
both are organized by means of illusion, while, as I showed, making clear what 
the mathematical point is from which the illusion starts, as a result of which it 
can also be unravelled. This distance point is needed both to pierce the frame of 
spectacle and the veil that it supported. The point of theatre, made allegorically, 
also concerns the similarity between the two periods with regard to the 
unexpectedness of the turn of events, and the way a society based on principles 
of justice can suddenly turn against itself. The House Committee on Un-
American activities, for instance, had been in existence since 1938. It had 
received no objections against the social economic reforms of the New Deal. 
Suddenly, however, the post-Second World War scenario prompted an 
American attitude of empathy with the former German enemy and distinct 
feelings of antipathy towards the Russians, despite the fact that they had been 
allies in the war only two years earlier; they were now communist enemies. 
Miller laments the uncanny speed of this change when he says:  
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But as in Salem, a point arrived, in the late forties, when the rules 
of social intercourse quite suddenly changed, or were changed, and 
attitudes that had merely been anti-capitalist-anti-establishment 
were now made unholy, morally repulsive, and if not actually 
treasonous then implicitly so. America had always been a religious 
country.249  
 
In effect, the so-called free, vibrant and open society that was America faced a 
strife, backed by the authorities, to achieve monolithic public morality. As a 
result, America’s policies became no different from the practices of the 
totalitarian regimes which they were discrediting in their public addresses as 
typically Soviet. Arthur Miller saw a strong similarity between the enforcement 
of certain political values and the Salem theocracy. Yet, as he points out, there 
was much more than a similarity at stake: ‘America had always been a religious 
country’. In this respect, the allegorical point made by the play could become 
pointless since there was no real allegory involved, only similarity and 
continuity. Miller was up against much more than a politically motivated 
spectacle of fabrication and framing and the play had to be more, consequently, 
than a simple allegory, in order to intervene in its present on a deeper level, not 
only in relation to a similar past but also to an alternative future. I will return to 
this in chapter 4. For now I would like to conclude this chapter with the question 
why the point had to be theatrical as opposed to other generic possibilities. 
 
3.4. An In-Between State of the Spectacle and Clairvoyance 
I would like to come back to my take on McCarthyism as it ties in to the 
powerful analysis proposed in first instance by Guy Debord, and subsequently 
by Jonathan Crary, of modern society as a society of spectacle. There is a 
marked difference with regard to the media during the specific periods that we 
are dealing with. Crary’s position, for instance, is summarized as follows by 
Leslie Kan:  
 
Addressing Debord’s Society of the Spectacle in a more modern 
context, Jonathan Crary examines the ‘totality’ or dominance of the 
television as a spectacular commodity in the ‘Eclipse of the 
Spectacle’. He argues that starting with the mid-1970s, the 
television ceases to be a medium of representation and undergoes a 
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structural change in which the television becomes the ‘heart of 
another network,’ or a system of mass distribution and regulation 
(Crary 1984, 284). The ‘totalizing response to television’ or the 
pervasiveness of television in the modern everyday lives of people 
(i.e.: in broadcast news, shows, surveillance) becomes what Crary 
calls ‘the eclipse of spectacle’.250 
 
The important point here is that, in the late 1940s and early 1950s, that is during 
McCarthyism, television was on the threshold of becoming an enormous power 
to be reckoned with. Yet the so-called eclipse of the spectacle was not yet 
operative in a society that relied on newspapers, the radio and the cinema as the 
main instruments of distribution and manipulation and for which nationwide 
television broadcast was something relatively new. If, for Crary, spectacle as 
such becomes almost untraceable as spectacle in the era of television, then 
spectacle was very much traceable and alive in the fifties.  
The media spectacle of the hearings was basically a systematic method 
for injecting organized yet distorted communication nation-wide. The ultimate 
purpose of the spectacle was to disseminate fear, as Miller points out: ‘I said 
that it was not the Reds who were dispensing our fears now, but the other side, 
and it could not go on indefinitely, it would someday wear down the national 
nerve’.251 The theatricality of the witnesses’ performance during the hearings 
intensified the effect of the nationwide broadcast spectacle and this would 
ultimately be the measure of their supposed or enforced loyal citizenship.252 It is 
also telling that McCarthy’s spectacle had its denouement on television, when 
he picked a fight with the Army and found himself facing lawyer Joseph Welch 
as his opponent – the same Joseph Welch who eventually caused McCarthy’s 
downfall after saying in a live broadcast: ‘Until this moment, Senator, I think I 
never really gauged your cruelty or your recklessness […]. You have done 
enough. Have you no sense of decency?’253 Surprisingly, this scene is distinctly 
theatrical in terms of what Arendt defines as action and, consequently, 
actualization. It was an unexpected moment in which the former tyrant was 
suddenly exposed in a theatrical way for what he was: a petty slanderer. 
                                                          
250 Leslie Kan, ‘Spectacle’, 2004, The University of Chicago: Theories of Media: Keywords 
Glossary, n.p. < http://csmt.uchicago.edu/glossary2004/spectacle.htm > [accessed 5 November 
2012]. 
251 Miller, The Timebends, p. 334. 
252 Tony Perucci, ‘The Red Mask of Sanity: Paul Robeson, HUAC, and the Sound of Cold War 
Performance’, TDR/The Drama Review 53.4 (2009), p. 22. 
253 Timothy Hoff, ‘Anatomy of a Murder’, Legal Studies Forum 24 (2000), p. 664. 
110 
 
Preciously, Joseph McCarthy’s focus had shifted from investigating fraud 
and waste in the executive branch of government to wholeheartedly prosecuting 
the communists. The impulse to harass political opponents became totalitarian 
and legal procedural defects abounded. The website of the US Senate reflects on 
it as follows: 
 
A dispute over his hiring of staff without consulting other 
committee members prompted the panel's three Democrats to 
resign in mid 1953. Republican senators also stopped attending, in 
part because so many of the hearings were called on short notice or 
held away from the nation's capital. As a result, McCarthy and his 
chief counsel Roy Cohn largely ran the show by themselves, 
relentlessly grilling and insulting witnesses. Harvard law dean 
Ervin Griswold described McCarthy’s role as ‘judge, jury, 
prosecutor, castigator, and press agent, all in one’.254 
 
In Ervin Grisworld’s qualification, the nature of procedural defects, to put it 
mildly, may be evident, but there is also a curious ambiguity at play as to how 
we should read the roles that are brought together generically. As the phrase 
‘running the show’ suggests, there was indeed a show. Yet the roles of judge, 
jury and prosecutor belong to the theatrical setting of the court room. The 
castigator belongs to the confined spaces of interrogation and punishment, the 
press agent to public space. All in all, however, the theatrical aspects weigh 
heavier and form the core of who McCarthy was, publicly. This may explain 
why he had to be attacked by means of theatre as well. 
It is clear that McCarthy could only become who he was through the 
media. It was only after the end of the hearings that people realized what had 
happened. Caute argues that ‘McCarthy’s role was historically healthy because 
he dramatized intolerance, lent it crude, villainous features, personalized it, stole 
it away from the low-profiled bureaucrats.’255 Yet Caute’s study is called The 
Great Fear for a reason. During his moment of glory, McCarthy was far from 
being ‘healthy’ as defined by Caute. The effect of fear and paranoia that helped 
to cover the truth and hold an entire nation hostage to a new wave of patriotism 
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was part and parcel of what Richard Hofstadter calls, following Adorno, 
pseudo-conservatism. Let me quote him at some length: 
 
Unlike most of the liberal dissent of the past, the new dissent not 
only has no respect for non-conformism, but is based upon a 
relentless demand for conformity. It can most accurately be called 
pseudo-conservative – I borrow the term from the study of The 
Authoritarian Personality published five years ago by Theodore W. 
Adorno and his associates – because its exponents, although they 
believe themselves to be conservatives and usually employ the 
rhetoric of conservatism, show signs of a serious and restless 
dissatisfaction with American life, traditions and institutions. They 
have little in common with the temperate and compromising spirit 
of true conservatism in the classical sense of the word, and they are 
far from pleased with the dominant practical conservatism of the 
moment as it is represented by the Eisenhower Administration. 
Their political reactions express rather a profound if largely 
unconscious hatred of our society and its ways – a hatred which one 
would hesitate to impute to them if one did not have suggestive 
clinical evidence.256  
 
Hofstadter’s analysis is accurate with regard to his own times, and may still be 
today. It testifies to an inability to deal with what Arendt calls democracy’s 
inherent, principal plurality, the plurality of public, unpredictable action. The 
issue that I would like to emphasize is the fact that this pseudo-conservatism is 
linked to what the title of Adorno’s study hints at: an ‘authoritarian personality’. 
It was this form of personality that was able to deploy its full force by means of 
spectacle, and it is also this form that distinguishes the McCarthy type of 
spectacle from the way the society of the spectacle would develop a little later. 
As Leslie Kan explains: 
 
For theorists such as Foucault, Crary, Debord, and Baudrillard, the 
spectacular shifts from its theatrical origins and now carries with it 
issues of class ideology and modern subjectivity. With the shift into 
modernity, the traditional notion of spectacle as a visual and 
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affective medium begins to delineate a more complex 
understanding of the spectacle and its relationship to the 
spectator.257 
 
Apparently, in earlier times the spectacle was considered in terms of its 
theatrical origins but it changed in essence because of modern media 
technologies which were starting to shape the modern subjectivity of a mass 
audience. With McCarthyism, I suggest, we are at an in-between point. The 
theatrical origins were not entirely lost yet and it is significant that Miller 
explicitly responded to the McCarthyism’s modern media spectacle through a 
theatre play.  
As already indicated, the questions raised by Crary earlier in this chapter 
make it difficult to affix Debord’s notion of the spectacle seamlessly to 
McCarthyism. One reason is that McCarthy’s spectacle was so ostensibly used 
in terms of framing. Framing refers not merely to the unavoidable act of framing 
that is required in a semiotic sense, but to the conscious social construction of an 
attack on opponents by mass media, political or social actors, political leaders, 
or any other powerful public actors or organizations. One can hardly say that 
this is an example of ‘the way power functions noncoercively within twentieth-
century modernity’. In fact coercion was evident. In the McCarthy hearings, the 
monolithic scope of the red scare was used to yoke artists, academics, writers, 
activists, dissidents etc. together and coerce them into testifying in public 
hearings in order to subject them. Likewise, it may be equally difficult to see 
how McCarthy’s spectacle functioned as an opiate for the masses that was 
deliberately constructed to create a false image to beguile the masses and prod 
their consent for the fulfilment of the ulterior motives that power hides in its 
wings.258 Obviously the hearings did not function as an opiate that would be 
analogous to opiates as provided by, say, the musical industry. They were meant 
to rouse the audience.  
In this environment, Miller’s play was an experiment or a wager aimed at 
destabilizing something that is, as yet, a mixture of generic modes. The obvious 
historical allegory could not only intervene in the present by piercing through 
the veil of the spectacle, but also by hinting at the theatrical, fragile origins of 
the spectacle which could establish that McCarthy was outdated, located ‘back 
in time’. Here again, the allegory used can be seen as an allegory-in-reverse. Let 
me recall an earlier quote from Avelar in which he asserts that in totalitarian 
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systems allegory may be used ‘because the petrified images of ruins, in their 
immanence, bear the only possibility of narrating the defeat’.259 It has perhaps 
not been sufficiently emphasized that The Crucible, in terms of a truth practice, 
has an air of clairvoyance about it. Written and published in 1952, and 
performed in 1953, it was ahead of McCarthy’s demise in 1954. At the time of 
its publication, few thought that McCarthy was heading for his downfall. Yet he 
went down, and Miller’s history of Salem predicted it. In this respect the play 
helped to create, performatively, the possibility of an alternative future. This we 
will explore now. 
                                                          
259 Idelber Avelar, The Untimely Present: Post-Dictatorial Latin American Fiction and the Task 







Actualizing History: Responsibilities with Regard to the Future 
 
Whereas the previous chapters focused on the play’s relation to the past, this 
chapter will be looking at the play’s present in relation to a future. If, as is the 
case, the play is an intervention in its contemporary circumstances, this is 
obviously with the aim of moving towards a better future. The question then 
becomes: how does the play deal with the past in the way that the Salem trials 
relate, by means of a theatrical intervention, to a future? In the twentieth century 
the relation of theatre, and of theatricality in general, with the future was 
paradigmatically explored in the work of Bertolt Brecht. In his view the role of 
theatre was to produce a distance, not an unreflexive and emotional involvement 
in a plot. This distance or alienation was necessary to make people see behind 
the scenes of the socio-political and economic system as a result of which they 
would start to think and become able to act in order to change the course of 
history. This appears to be an essential strategy as well if we think about the 
powers of spectacle, as they have been dealt with in the previous chapter, and a 
possible theatrical response to them.260  
 Brecht’s ideas about the powers of theatre are an aesthetic and political 
elaboration of Marx’s views about the role of philosophy which famously was 
that philosophy should not reflect on the nature of reality but intervene in it. 
This should be done by unveiling the true reality of a mode of production that 
was hidden by the surface of daily social traffic. In this respect, Miller’s play is 
Marxian in that it is not primarily aimed at reflecting reality but at intervening in 
it in order to change it. Yet its formal elements are not simply aimed at 
unveiling. The form of allegory is, in first instance, not just aimed at unveiling 
things, on the contrary. It is aimed at veiling things, which is understandable as 
we saw previously, in the context of censorship. Since the play is aimed at 
altering the course of history, hence leading to another future, we can ask how 
this relates to the allegorical form Miller chose. This implies having a closer 
look at the play’s generic quality of being an allegory in relation to history as 
the actualization of history, not in terms of the representation of an historical 
past, but in terms of the role of representation with regard to alternative futures. 
I will be taking my cue especially, in what follows, from Ernesto Laclau’s 
approach to history in discursive terms, more specifically in terms of tropes. In 
                                                          




the context of actualization it is also important, however, to ask what kind of a 
historical actor Miller himself was. What were his opportunities to intervene in 
his times whilst, as a literary artist, he also was a ‘child of his times’?  
 
4.1. Miller as ‘Child of his Times’ 
Although Miller does not draw any direct political analogy between the Salem 
era and the McCarthy era in his mix of dramatic themes in The Crucible, the 
play is explicitly synchronic with the age it was written and staged in, i.e. 1952 
or 1953. Miller could hardly have remained indifferent to the fates of Alger 
Hiss, Owen Lattimore, Julius and Ethel Rosenberg and many other professionals 
in America, including Miller’s close associate Elia Kazan.261 At the same time 
an almost exact or direct political analogy between witch-hunting and red-
hunting was in a sense so unmediated that the allegory did not protect Miller 
from a bludgeoning by conservative Cold War critics who were not to be 
convinced by an analogous portrayal of red-hunters and witches. They evidently 
refused to accept the hallucinatory nature of communist threats. In this context 
they also rejected the author’s sympathy for the liberals’ right to a variety of 
freedoms. In other words, equating the persecution of ‘unreal’ witches in late 
seventeenth-century Salem with restrictions on real communist spies in 1950s 
America was a problematic political allegory to say the least, precisely because 
it was hardly an allegory, which may be why Graff Zivin remarks on two 
occasions that the Wikipedia lemma on allegory does not consider The Crucible 
as an allegory (unfortunately Graff Zivin does not mention on what date she 
accessed the site - the reference to The Crucible has now been removed, July 
2014).262 The issue was not only confined to the past or only to the present. The 
play’s intervention clearly concerned the future course of the nation.  
In the context of the future to which the play opens up, the main question 
I would like to address first is: can Miller be called a ‘child of his times’ and, if 
so, how? This common phrase refers here to the play’s meaning as restricted to 
its own times, or what I called earlier its own ‘occasion’. Clearly Miller’s 
artistic sensibilities were influenced by the socio-political aura of the fifties and 
the concrete political circumstances of his age. Yet in response to both, he 
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anchored his theatrical intervention along the witch-hunting metaphor not only 
in order to comment on the politics of his age in search of a truth that was 
submerged in an official environment of fear, but also to change circumstances. 
As for this conscious response, it is important to assess his status as an artist, 
and to clarify my position regarding his options to intervene in society by 
artistic means.  
Let me take the circumstances of the times seriously and use a Marxian 
analysis first, and then twist it. It will help me to see how Miller was the effect 
of his times and circumstances, and how his writing was not. It will also help to 
prepare for my argument later, in dialogue with Ernesto Laclau.  
In a classical Marxian analysis, Miller, as a literary artist, would have 
belonged to the superstructure of American society which rested upon its 
economic base. In an economic structure of society on which the legal and 
political superstructure is erected, the artist is by necessity shaped by the 
production relations and Miller’s response would be seen in terms of 
predisposition. In his study on the relation between Marxism and literature, 
Raymond Williams repeats a much quoted passage from Karl Marx’s 1859 
preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. According to 
Williams it is relevant to define the relations between the mode of production 
and the socio-political and cultural superstructure as Marx defined it: 
 
In the social production of their life, men enter into definite 
relations that are indefensible and independent of their will, 
relations of production which correspond to a definite stage of 
development of their material productive forces. The sum total of 
these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of 
society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political 
superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social 
consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions 
the social, political and intellectual life process in general. It is not 
the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the 
contrary their social being that determines their consciousness.263  
 
According to the Marxist critical perspective, a literary artist’s sensibilities are, 
firstly, shaped, triggered and stimulated by the economic circumstances and, 
secondly, by the entire set of social, cultural, legal and political realities and 
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contradictions of his age. For classical Marxists the literature of any age 
amounts to little more than one of the many other channels of discourse in 
which the energies of an historical epoch are discharged. That is to say that the 
same materially defined energy is dissipated by societies through their political 
movements, religious thought, philosophic speculations, language, moral codes 
and other symbolic activities, such as art and literature, through forms of 
cultural expression. In the Marxian view, all these expressions belong to the so-
called ‘superstructure’ of society which is guided and driven by the economic 
‘base’ that consists of its specific modes of production and, as a consequence, 
the class in which man is born, with its corresponding powers and privileges. In 
relation to the base, cultural expressions remain asymmetrically interrelated. 
There is little chance of changing the mode of production, for instance, by 
means of the superstructure.  
Yet the paradox and historical irony, of course, is that Marx’s writings 
were the driving force behind extensive material changes and substantial 
changes in history. In a sense, Marx’s writings, or his discursive powers, turned 
his own material analysis on its head, and proved that discursive material can be 
as basic and material as the modes of production. Still, a useful aspect of the 
Marxian analysis remains that the literary thought of an age does not only owe 
its genesis to any present, discursive scenario of a society; instead, it blossoms 
and shoots from the preceding currents and cross-currents of thoughts that 
follow from a material base. Therefore, from the reader’s point of view, the 
literature and the arts of an age per se must be read and received in connection 
with the current socio-economic dynamics of the age. At the same time, Marx’s 
writings have taught us that writing can radically alter the actualization of 
history because writing is an action, in Arendt’s sense of intrinsic political 
action. 
In terms of its action, any literary work also needs to be read in 
connection with the contemporaneous movements and cross-currents in other 
areas of cultural life. The findings resulting from this dual determinism of socio-
economic history and cultural interdependence and agency reveal the literary 
artist as both the product of, and an actor in his time who, by virtue of his 
imagination and individuality, not only tries to rescue his creations from the 
dominance of a material base, or for that matter from the lethal label of 
journalistic historical documents, but also seeks to transform his work of art into 
an active force without whilst, as Arendt emphasizes, being in control of his 
actions, or the actions of his work. Thus, politically speaking, a literary writer 
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cannot make a literary piece work the way he or she wants, in a specific and 
particular way, as its action depends on its actualization of a future. 
As I already discussed, before introducing the events of Salem in 1692, in 
the opening of the play Miller first clarifies some issues regarding historical 
accuracy and unambiguously dissociates the play from historiography in terms 
used by academic historians. But as an historical drama, it is an artist’s attempt 
to conceptualize history in order not only to ascertain the truth of history but 
also to reproduce it. As Herbert Lindenberger notes: ‘Historical drama, in so far 
as it reflects upon and interprets past events, can be considered a branch of 
historical thought, though one which projects hypotheses and individual theories 
about history more than it does fully worked out philosophies’.264 Lindenberger 
rightly points to the particular take adopted by artists here, but in addition hints 
at the artist’s attempt to project a philosophic insight into the customary linear 
view of history in order to find reversible and synchronic patterns, which 
Michael J. O’Neal terms as a ‘vertical’ view of history.265 This essentially 
structuralist view of history and culture sees patterns of history: history is not 
considered as causal and sequential in terms of narrative ordering. Or, to put this 
differently, history becomes punctuated with facts and domains of historical 
subsets which are vertically projected as recurrent patterns on a model of 
linearity. In this respect, Miller dramatizes history to intervene in his 
contemporary times in order to reveal how an artist’s imagination can transform 
and frame politics with a view to opening history up to new things that would 
not follow the familiar pattern.  
Miller’s views on the relation between dramatic art, with its moral 
purpose, and the social reality of its own times with regard to alternative futures, 
were reflected in his introduction to the Collected Plays. He writes: 
 
These plays in one sense, are my response to what was ‘in the air’, 
and they are one man’s way of saying to his fellow men, ‘This is 
what you see every day, or think or feel; I will show you what you 
really know but have not had the time, or the disinterestedness, or 
the insight, or the information to understand consciously’. Each of 
these plays, in varying degrees, was begun in the belief that it was 
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unveiling a truth already known but unrecognized as such. My 
concept of the audience is of a public each member of which is 
carrying about with him what he thinks is an anxiety, or a hope or a 
preoccupation which is his alone and isolates him from mankind; 
and in this respect at least the function of a play is to reveal him to 
himself so that he may touch others by virtue of the revelation of 
his mutuality with them. If only for this reason I regard the theatre 
as a serious business, one that makes or should make man more 
human, which is to say less alone.266  
 
As Miller’s remarks cogently reflect, The Crucible, like his other social plays, is 
an attempt to bring on stage the political and social anomalies which people 
encounter in their daily lives but which they don’t have the time and 
imagination to see, confront or correct. Moreover, in a Marxian sense, the play 
is aimed at unveiling the true reality of the social world and, in doing so, making 
collective action possible. The plays are not meant to touch the individual 
members of an audience aesthetically but to touch them in order to create a 
collective on the basis of ‘mutuality,’ which is to say: to make man more social. 
The quote is also explicit as to the plays’ function in history. The play is 
historically oriented towards the past in terms of what already ‘was in the air’; 
towards the present in terms of unveiling the truth; and towards the future in 
terms of a ‘revelation’, or for the sake of ‘making man more human’. With 
respect to this threefold function the play allegorically relates the Salem witch 
hunts to the 1950s anti-Communist frenzy. Miller’s target is his audience who 
he believes to be a collective of individuals in which each individual member is 
a carrier of anxiety and internal disquiet, whom he wants to offer hope of 
change, change in everyone’s individual capacity to become part of a collective. 
In reviving this hope through the revelation of truth and by offering alternative 
options on stage from those offered by real life, Miller attempts to lead each 
viewer to recognize his/her mutuality and shared responsibility in confronting 
political lies, and to move away from them for the greater benefit of the society. 
That is why for Miller theatre is a serious platform to energize a society which 
can easily fall apart at times of political crises, perceived or real. The important 
task of dramatic art advanced by Miller resonates strongly with Noam 
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Chomsky’s position on the responsibility of intellectuals who says that ‘it is the 
responsibility of the intellectuals to speak the truth and to expose lies’.267 
The lies are exposed, here, through allegory, which brings two different 
historical periods together metaphorically, as two different signifiers which, 
through the play, relate to one signified. As for this one signified, and the desire 
expressed through it, one way of dealing with it was endorsed by Donald E. 
Brown, for whom patterns of human behaviour and human responses to social, 
economic and political circumstances alike stay the same.268 According to 
Brown the most fundamental features of human nature in different historical 
periods remain consistent despite the paradoxical fact that human nature itself is 
seen as having historically developed from multiple social circumstances. Yet, 
as he argues, in actuality there exists a broader uniformity and similarity in 
human responses to historical settings in different times. This might explain 
why people tend to seek precedents in history in order to match them with a 
present crisis at any point in time, as if to reassure themselves that the present is 
an improvement on the past, or simply to understand the present better. 
However, the question remains as to how allegory relates to a future that is not 
predetermined but instead opened up to alternative futures.  
 
4.2 Intervention I: Allegory as a Means to Open Up an Alternative Future 
Opening up future alternatives requires, first of all, that we disregard the 
concepts of teleological or directional historical progression based on the 
premise of a purposeful and ordained order in the wake of the Enlightenment, 
and instead consider human agency as the bearer of choices and options, as 
Hannah Arendt did, within a constraining structure of circumstances defined by 
thinkers like Althusser in terms of discontinuities, ruptures and various time 
scales which lead to alternative historical outcomes, including revolutions.269 
These outcomes are neither entirely determined by the cause and effect principle 
nor are they purely accidental. Taken as a whole, history is devoid of any 
structured order directing it, on a fixed path and pattern, from a known past to a 
known future.  
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Again, the formal forces of allegory need to be scrutinised. Allegory may 
initially aim at concealing, but in the classical sense it should lead the informed 
to the highest meanings, or to the ultimate meaning of a seemingly universal and 
preordained frame from which one would have to see things. It is critical in this 
respect to consider allegory as a discursive form. When periods of history are 
singled out and studied in relation to established facts, the subsequent narration 
by historians and interpretation by artists through literary works, with their 
specific interests and deductive lenses, will eventually construct meaning from 
them. Even myths, legends and oral histories, although unconfirmed with regard 
to their veracity on critical epistemic weighing scales, are rushed in literary 
historical representations to stretch and enrich speculative interpretive plot 
structures. As has often been remarked, the story-telling capacity and narrative 
propensity of humans thus serves to construct their historical identity. They 
cannot alienate themselves from such narratives because they, as indicated, give 
meaning to their identity, culture and present circumstances by means of 
narrative. Yet from this essentially historicist perspective, any current actions of 
people must be seen as the outcome of their historically produced character. 
However, theatre and allegory are the vehicles able to dismantle this.  
With regard to the future Miller uses the trial ritual allegorically, not 
merely to highlight the resemblances between past and present but to unveil the 
patterns which determine the inherent contradictions of the chronologically 
distinct scenes. These inherent contradictions lead to fissures in the historical 
continuity. Admittedly, the demons of Salem and the McCarthy era can be 
discerned right in the heart of the prosecution itself and the power of the past, 
i.e. the 1692 witch hunting, is seen to reassert itself in the present of the 1950s 
McCarthy hearings, as if both belonged to a category of guilt forms, historically 
similar in nature, and as if both were shared by the community and the 
individual. The point, however, is that discursively speaking allegory can never 
simply bring together two different historical periods under a single heading. 
This is where Ernesto Laclau’s tropological approach of history comes in. 
The Crucible is a political allegory which associates, both metaphorically 
and metonymically, the Salem episode with the 1950s anti-Communist purge in 
America. Metonymically, the two events are both contiguous and contingent 
with each other. They are contiguous through the culture they share within the 
same political space. They are contingent in remaining historically different and 
their relation in this sense is ontologically heterogeneous. There is no possibility 
of conflating things that border on one another. Metaphorically, however, as I 
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already indicated, they appear to be brought under one signified, or one heading. 
In the discursive context of metaphor and metonymy, Ernesto Laclau, in his 
response to the work of Paul de Man, considers the possibilities of history’s 
make-ability in terms of a struggle about inevitable forms of hegemony. 
Metaphor, for Laclau, is the discursive vehicle of hegemony, bringing two 
different historical periods under a single dominant heading which is then 
accepted as the correct one, with ‘true’ meaning. Since any proposition is 
metonymic, it could neither be true nor false when one compares two 
chronologically distant paradigms of history. Yet their heterogeneity can be 
reduced by means of metaphorical hegemony in a strict political sense, as is the 
case when the Salem period is staged and read in the 1950s, for instance.270  
Laclau’s concept of hegemony is based, obviously, on Antonio Gramsci’s 
work on hegemony. In an earlier work Laclau defined hegemony as follows: 
 
‘Hegemony’ will allude to an absent totality, and to the diverse 
attempts at recomposition and rearticulation which, in overcoming 
this original absence, made it possible for struggles to be given a 
meaning and for historical forces to be endowed with full 
positivity.271  
 
The absent totality Laclau refers to effectively opens up the political realm in 
which any power will have to establish itself discursively. In the second edition 
of Hegemony and Socialism, Laclau and Mouffe define hegemony along similar 
lines, saying that its ‘very condition is that a particular social force assumes the 
representation of a totality that is radically incommensurable with it’.272 
Representation is no longer the reflection of a socio-economic basis. Instead the 
social element is conceived as a discursive space.  
In going back to Gramsci, Laclau and Mouffe struggle with the same 
problem that I faced earlier: the discrepancy between the material economic 
forces, on the one hand, and the cultural forces, on the other, or, in the context 
of my study, discursive forces. For Gramsci there was no necessary coincidence 
between a society’s mode of production and the politico-cultural system. This 
made it possible to explain how capitalism could manifest itself in culturally and 
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politically different societies; it also allowed for a completely different political 
analysis in which people were not simply the object of dominating modes of 
production but also able to act upon them. In other words, Gramsci was 
interested in opening up alternative futures. This is how Laclau looks at it: 
 
The requirements of ‘hegemony’ as a central category of political 
analysis are essentially three. First, that something constitutively 
heterogeneous to the social system or structure has to be present in 
the latter from the very beginning, preventing it from constituting 
itself as a closed or representable totality. If such a closure were 
achievable, no hegemonic event could be possible and the political, 
far from being an ontological dimension of the social – an 
‘existential’ of the social – would just be an ontic dimension of the 
latter. Second, however, the hegemonic suture has to produce a re-
totalizing effect, without which no hegemonic articulation would 
be possible either. But third, this re-totalization cannot have the 
character of a dialectical reintegration. It has, on the contrary, to 
maintain alive and visible the original and constitutive 
heterogeneity from which the hegemonic articulation started.273  
 
Laclau maintains that in the political arena, the ‘hegemonic’ prevents politics 
from ever becoming a closed system, which could otherwise no longer be 
political in essence. The reason is that any hegemonic force never completely 
coincides with the economic system of power. It is, in an ontological sense, 
different from it. Hence, from the outset, hegemony is indispensable for the 
political as a qualifier.  
In second instance, however, the hegemonic ‘suture’, its jointing and 
stitching force in the political field, has to bring into effect a re-totalization of 
the scene after its intervention. Without this there would be no room for power, 
or further hegemonic articulation. But unlike the synthesis attainted in the 
dialectical process to reintegrate things, hegemony also expands the innate 
heterogeneity in the political after its intervention and this is the beginning of 
the next hegemonic movement. Laclau’s reading helps me to understand 
Miller’s play politically and historically in terms of an intervention with regard 
to the future. It is clear that Miller associates two episodes of history 
metonymically and metaphorically in his play. The metonymy relates to 
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heterogeneity, for example when the Salem part is heterogeneous to the political 
system of the fifties but at the same time present in it ‘from the very beginning’. 
The metaphor relates to a re-totalizing move, from both sides. For McCarthy, 
the idea is to see communism under the heading of evil, for Miller the idea is to 
see McCarthy under the heading of a deluded witch hunter. As a result, the play 
has the potential effect of an hegemonic move to disrupt the hegemony of 
McCarthy and his associates in American society to reassert both its own 
hegemony and an alternative future. Hence, through contingency, or 
heterogeneity, between two events that necessarily border on each other 
historically, Miller challenges politics metaphorically and allegorically.  
Let me deal with this dynamic more specifically in terms of the play 
itself. Within the framework of the trial ritual, Miller condenses the abstract 
notion of authority in the personalities of Danforth and Hawthorne to dramatize 
some parallels with the Congressional Committee hearings and the fear 
mongering by McCarthy loyalists. In the play, Reverend Parris and judge 
Hawthorne are so worried about their position that they raise their voices when 
the lawfulness of the trials is queried, suspecting it as an attempt to defile the 
respect for a sacred court of law and its proceedings. Like the Manichean split 
of American society in the McCarthy era between patriots and the alleged 
enemy battalions of communists and liberals, the Salem court drew a straight 
line between friends of God and the Devil’s obedient lieutenants. This is evident 
from Danforth’s word to Francis Nurse: ‘But you must understand, sir, that a 
person is either with this court or he must be counted against it, there be no road 
between’.274 Danforth expresses more than once the arrogance of authority in 
Act 3: ‘And do you know that near to four hundred are in the jails from 
Marblehead to Lynn, and upon my signature?’ and he continues to boast without 
remorse, ‘And seventy-two condemned to hang by that signature?’275 His 
dedication to confront the so-called anomaly in front of him is unquestionable. 
He abides by the letter of the legal proceedings while blindly accepting the 
testimony of the girls, despite Hale and Proctor’s insistence that the girls were 
dissembling.  
The discursive relation between Danforth and McCarthy is distinctly 
metaphorical but, yet again, also metonymic. In terms of metaphor, a similar 
strike against unquestionable authority and a generalized sense of responsibility 
to the national cause of security reverberate in Joseph McCarthy’s use of the 
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fear-prone pool of American national socio-politics, for instance when he thrills 
the Republican Women’s Club in Wheeling, West Virginia, in 1950 with his 
speech: ‘I have here in my hand a list of 205…a list of names that were made 
known to the Secretary of State as being members of the Communist Party and 
who nevertheless are still working and shaping policy in the State 
Department’.276 The metaphorical comparison with Danforth when boasting 
about the numbers is revealing, and is motivated synecdochically as if Danforth 
and McCarthy were both part of the same semi-jurisprudential body of texts and 
signatures. Metaphorically speaking, McCarthy’s was a similar attempt to 
inspire awe and thrill about the seriousness of danger in America, which he, as 
‘patriotic’ and ‘knightly’ figure, had vowed to affront and unravel. In the first 
instance, the reception of these claims prompted his political career to rise 
meteorically for a while, much like the success of the accusing girls in Salem. 
Yet, the metonymic relations between Salem and McCarthy, their bordering on 
one another in history and culture, also remain heterogeneous, for example 
when the hand of the witch hunter Danforth remains a hand that not only 
enforces McCarthy’s agenda by means of similarity, but that could also 
jeopardise its power.  
Miller asserts the metaphorical relation between the two episodes in terms 
of the second, re-totalizing suture that Laclau refers to, through his analysis of 
the scene in the 1950s, when he says: 
 
It was the fact that a political objective, knowledgeable campaign 
from the far right was capable of creating not only a terror, but a 
new subjective reality, a veritable mystique which was gradually 
assuming even a holy resonance. The wonder of it all struck me 
that so practical and picayune a cause, carried forward by such 
manifestly ridiculous men, should be capable of paralyzing thought 
itself, and worse, causing to billow up such persuasive clouds of 
‘mysterious’ feelings within people. It was as though the whole 
country had been born anew, without a memory even of certain 
elemental decencies which a year or two earlier no one would have 
imagined could be altered, let alone forgotten. Astounded, I 
watched men pass me by without a nod whom I had known rather 
                                                          
276 Joseph McCarthy, ‘Senator Joseph McCarthy Hunts Communists: Speech delivered in 
Wheeling, West Virginia, February 9, 1950’, in Reading the American Past, ed. by Michael P. 
Johnson, vol. 2 (Boston, MA: Bedford Books, 2012), p. 221. 
127 
 
well for years; and again, the astonishment was produced by my 
knowledge, which I could not give up, that the terror in these 
people was being knowingly planned and consciously engineered, 
and yet that all they knew was terror. That so interior and 
subjective an emotion could have been so manifestly created from 
without was a marvel to me. It underlies every word in The 
Crucible.277 
 
It is worth noting the way in which Miller talks about the fabrication of fear, 
saying that the terror ‘was knowingly planned and consciously engineered’ and 
that this terror was nevertheless real. Miller’s explanation also defines the effect 
of McCarthyism as a country being ‘born anew’ because McCarthy succeeded 
in cutting metonymical relations with periods of one or two years earlier, by 
reconfiguring the other highly metonymically motivated capacity: memory. The 
fact that the play is an allegory is significant. It is iconic for the McCarthy’s re-
totalizing strategy which the play highlights as an object of study at a time when 
thought was ‘paralyzed.’ In a Brechtian attempt to make people see what was 
actually taking place, Miller wanted to show the American public’s vulnerability 
to a political rhetoric of suspicion, fear and paranoia; a public that displayed an 
attitude of uncritical acquiescence to the ingenious narratives of a ‘Great 
Conspiracy’ allegedly organized by the enemies of democracy.  
The right wing, as A. Peter Foulkes describes it, benefitted from a 
particular logic of making the sign fit the interpretation rather than the other way 
around, in a configuration that is metaphorical in two ways: it is similar to the 
Salem theocracy and fits in the re-totalizing power to read all signs under one 
heading and one heading only.278 McCarthy ventured on a twofold path of 
political prominence and unfairly silencing politics of dissent in America. The 
manipulation of political facts by the profiteering mass spokespeople in 1950s 
America, influenced by a general atmosphere of paranoia against communism, 
served to construct conspiratorial fables of imminent threat from the enemy and 
his deputies and successfully brought the Americans’ deepest instinctive fears to 
the surface in testing times. This skilful tampering with public sensibilities and 
fears is a comparable phenomenon, metaphorically speaking, both of the Salem 
era and the McCarthy era. In response to this, Miller hints at the heterogeneity 
of metonymy when he says, for instance: ‘of course, the paranoid, real or 
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pretended, always secretes its pearl around a grain of fact’.279 This is why any 
response to manipulation must focus on this grain of fact, on the truth. 
Similarly, as Richard Hofstadter remarks, the spokesperson for the paranoid 
style in the public realm is a double sufferer as he is afflicted by the vagaries of 
the real world but also by the fantasies of his own.280 In terms of my argument, 
Miller and Hofstadter’s assertions amount to what Jonathan Culler described as 
a metaphor’s force, which is its metonymical motivation, indicated here by the 
‘grain of fact’ and ‘the real world’. This heterogeneous kernel endangers the 
very power of the metaphor. 
One such kernel of fact or element of the real world was the existence of a 
strong socialist movement within American Society in earlier decades. During 
the fifties American democracy no longer appeared to allow any space to 
socialist political ideology, suspecting it to be totalitarian, unnatural and 
atheistic, hence as an evil rival to American constitutionalism. Seymour Martin 
Lipset and Gary Marks give an account of the causes of socialism’s downfall 
and failure in the US: the pivotal role of American political values and 
institutions in this respect, the splits between American trade unions and the 
socialist party, the unsettling force of immigration and the fragmentation of the 
American working class, the secretive nature of the strategic choices of the 
socialists, and state repression duly aided by the legal mechanism at hand. 
Nevertheless, the reality of a socialist alternative could not be denied, despite 
many attempts to vilify it.281  
Once again, The Crucible testifies of a metaphorical re-totalization, 
through which signs had to fit the already established interpretation. The 
theocratic jargon of Puritan Salem made the entire community suffer when 
certain individuals transgressed its tenets, which is evident in the play when 
Danforth reasons with the girls upon receiving Mary Warren’s deposition: 
‘Now, children, this is a court of law. The law based upon the Bible, and the 
Bible, writ by Almighty God, forbid the practice of witchcraft, and describe 
death as the penalty thereof. But likewise, children, the law and Bible damn all 
bearers of false witness’.282 Since witchcraft was an invisible crime, it served as 
an excellent vehicle for fitting the sign to the interpretation and, as a 
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consequence, the guilty girls instantly became bewitched victims to protect 
themselves from clerical wrath. The court, led by Danforth, although 
passionately committed to exorcise evil in the community, starts from a point of 
defeat by confirming witchcraft as a crime and accepting testimonies of ‘self-
styled’ victims and their freakish narratives of the phantasmal wonders of the 
spirits, without any tangible shred of evidence or proof from the witnesses. This 
is illustrated by Danforth’s attitude towards the accusers’ testimony: ‘Do you 
know, Mr. Proctor, that the entire contention of the state in these trials is that the 
voice of heaven is speaking through the children?’283 Therefore he is 
unconcerned whether lives are wasted and people’s reputation is soiled. Until 
the alpha and omega of the legal procedure are met, he assents to every 
testimony and allegation to establish guilt, even though the testimonies are 
based on spectral evidence. The contradiction lies in the fact that he publicly 
vows to entertain only factual details and literal facts during the proceedings, 
while he is in fact himself a hostage to a whimsical syllogism, which is to 
disclose the hiding places of the occult.  
As William Inboden points out, the McCarthy era is characterised by an 
identical religious and moral absolutism that underlays the ideological 
framework of the decision-making apparatus, whose religious world view 
sufficiently influenced the cold war to take the course it did.284 The core of 
twentieth-century American exceptionalism consisted of more than the odd 
remnant of old Puritan spiritual ideas about the Americans as God’s chosen 
people, or Woodrow Wilson’s belief in America’s manifest destiny, a concept 
that long predated him, and the international mission to democratise and remake 
the world in its own liberal image. Both Truman and Eisenhower set out to 
contain atheistic communist economics, politics and culture with an 
unambiguous reach for religious semiotics, which grew organically out of a 
metaphor from their American spiritual history with predominantly Protestant 
Christian roots. Likewise President Eisenhower associated God with the country 
in his public addresses. 285 As Lee Canipe illustrates based on the president’s 
public papers: ‘Recognition of the Supreme Being is the first, most basic 
expression of Americanism. Without God, there could be no American form of 
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government, nor an American way of Life’.286 Meanwhile, as if to prove the 
point, in the so-called communist satellite states in Eastern Europe, religious 
persecutions were carried out with the excuse that the church acted as the 
enemy’s legal organization.  
In The Crucible as in the McCarthy trials, the trials failed to reach the 
professed goals of providing justice. They were ruled by a denial of personal 
responsibility and showed the deliberate wickedness of the legal elites, working 
towards a monolithic and undemocratic social order without room for plural 
ideas, without room for politics that is. John Proctor, in the play, tellingly 
summarises his disgust of church ostentation and Parris’s megalomaniac 
obsession with his ministerial prerogatives as ‘Lord’s man in the Parish’, in his 
robust disdain for the misuse of authority: ‘I mean it solemnly, Rebecca; I like 
not the smell of this “authority”’,287 When personal truth clashes with the legal 
version of the predetermined truth of a politically motivated partisan jury, trials 
tend to disconnect the social and individual sense of justice, thus prompting 
people with a clear conscience like Proctor – and by implication the many 
ideologically loyal friends of international socialism in 1950s America – to 
internalise justice and register their dissent instead of being committed to 
authorities and abstract theocracy. The antagonists in the play, in the figures of 
Abigail, Parris and Putnam, insist on strict enforcement of the law for the 
safeguard of their vested interests, and in so doing disturb the community’s 
balance by creating paranoia about the Devil and its associates, subverting the 
real function of the law, namely providing justice. The format of the trial, with 
its theatrical collection of heterogeneous voices, proves to be a disturbing 
element that will always threaten Laclau’s secondary metaphorical, political 
attempt to re-totalize hegemony. In this respect, Miller’s play is not merely an 
allegory. It introduces the heterogeneous elements of trials in two different 
historical periods and in both cases the trials serve to open up alternative 
histories.  
Let me turn, finally, to this opening up of alternative histories, especially 
in relation to the complex issue of justice and the role of literature with regard to 
it. I will distinguish, in what follows, between two aspects of Miller as an artist. 
One fits the picture of what can be described as the more classical role of the 
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artist in a democracy, the other is more radical; one is defined in terms of 
responsibility, the other in terms of irresponsibility. 
 
4.3 Intervention II: Responsibility or Literature’s Classical Role in 
Democracy 
The parallel consequences of the Congressional hearings, of loyalty oaths and 
individual slander in the McCarthy era, raise more general modern questions 
about the state and the law which, as Alzo David-West illustrates, classical 
Marxism views as the repressive apparatus of coercion and systemized 
violence.288 In this context, by theatrically enacting an historically inglorious 
trial against the backdrop of McCarthy hearings, Miller seems to question the 
legitimacy of the state and its power apparatus. This brings him close to Lenin’s 
argument in State and Revolution (1917), in which Lenin argues in favour of 
attaining an ideal of absolute democracy, promised by international Marxism as 
a result of the state and its institutions, including the law, withering away, in the 
consecutive phases of capitalism, followed by a dictatorship of the proletariat, 
and finally the higher stage of communism in a classless and free utopia.289 Is 
Miller’s play also hinting at such a utopian future, which in the end is 
necessarily totalitarian, or is it trying to open up history and, if so, how?  
As an artist in a democracy, Miller revives and reconstructs, through art 
and literature, liberal democratic values and morals in the interest of survival of 
its principal tenets. In doing so, he does not shrink from this duty of raising 
questions about civil liberties in an environment of legalized and enforced 
morality by a government that finds itself in a frenzy of safeguarding national 
security at all costs. In response to this, Miller’s play is an attempt to change 
attitudes. It does not belong, however, to the revolutionary left-wing theatre, 
which flourished between 1911 and 1939 and called for a revolutionary socialist 
change in America.290 Instead it seeks to promote democratic individual rights 
such as free speech, civil liberties and the independence of the courts in times of 
internal conflict. This call for political change had only been culturally validated 
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a decade earlier in a democratic system that granted artists the freedom to 
express themselves without fear. Yet the times changed and the artist’s role 
became more controversial. Miller said as much in an interview with Phillip 
Gelb: 
 
The enemy is the wrong word to me, although I would concede it. 
The artist is the outcast; he always will be. He is an outcast in the 
sense that he is to one side of the stream of life and absorbs it and 
is, in some part of himself, reserved from its implications; that is to 
say, a man like Vidal says we’re out to destroy every thing. I think 
that you can’t see a thing when you are in the middle of it. To some 
extent, an artist has to step to one side of what is happening, 
divorce himself from his role as a citizen, and in that sense he 
becomes the enemy because he does not carry forth in himself and 
believe what is being believed around him. He is the enemy 
usually, I suppose, of the way things are, whatever way they are.291 
 
Thus Miller implies that the artist cultivates a certain form of socio-cultural 
estrangement or adopts a rather antagonistic stance in all circumstances towards 
the doxa of society. In other words he is obliged by his vocation to affront stasis 
and does not accept reality as it is presented. He is encouraged by his critical 
genius to be either an outsider of the tradition, or a seer of the unseen, at times 
an inveterate optimist, and a sworn critic and anything but a eulogist of the 
status quo. By analogy, Miller applies a similar partial dissociation from the 
1950s paranoid American citizenry and confronts it through his work of art. His 
literary artefact is a blunt statement against the political assassination of 
democratic values. This artistic crusade was the principal means to safeguard 
the values of liberty, democracy and truth.  
Miller argues in The Crucible that it is a misleading to presume that a 
stable society can only continue to exist through the legal enforcement of 
morality. The objective reality that qualifies any vibrant and dynamic society is 
based on each individual’s right to freedom, taking the universal values of good 
and evil as his point of departure. In this context, Miller warns against legal 
coercion and legal punishment as a means that is not morally justified to 
preserve collective morality in society. As can be seen in the case of the sublime 
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virtue of Salem’s martyrs, Miller asserts that a society’s morality is best secured 
through individual norms and virtues that attend to the interests of social order 
and its vitality but also to the basic right to individual liberty. Miller’s position 
on individual liberty mirrors John Stuart Mill’s views in On Liberty:  
 
Protection, therefore, against the tyranny of the magistrate is not 
enough; there needs protection also against the tyranny of the 
prevailing opinion and feeling; against the tendency of the society 
to impose, by other means than civil penalties, its own ideas and 
practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from them; to 
fetter the development, and, if possible prevent the formation, of 
any individuality not in harmony with its ways, and compels all 
characters to fashion themselves upon the model of its own.292 
 
 Two forces appear as a threat to the precious right to individual liberty: state 
repression but also repression by socio-cultural norms. These norms may lack 
the ability to enforce things by means of legal punishment but their power is 
nevertheless considerable. Miller holds the same view, as can be seen from his 
depiction of the voices of conscience in the Salem trials and from the example 
of his own testimony before HUAC. 
The most revealing aspect of Miller’s cautious stance on individual 
liberty is reflected in the famous Hart-Devlin debate on the subject of legal 
enforcement of morality.293 In this debate, Miller took sides with Hart about 
refraining from legal coercion for attaining social conformity and stability 
because the human moral instinct and liberty instinct are entrenched side by side 
and society cannot attain one at the expense of the other through legal pressings. 
In fact, such pressings constitute moral negatives by maintaining an overt 
monopoly.294 Basically, a democratic society has to honestly accommodate 
individual freedom and dissolve the seamless web that the Salem theocracy 
misunderstood, or was not willing to accept.295 In such a theocracy, any 
deviation from mainstream thought and practices, no matter how well-
intentioned, was likely to be seen as an attack on the fabric of society. In this 
respect, any individual would in all likelihood face suffering and disregard for 
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his freedom, if his individualistic transgressions from the accepted norms and 
values were equated with treason, vice and sedition and would be retributed 
with the violence of law. Paradoxically, this would receive the stamp of 
approval from a scared public. In this perspective, Miller’s stance as an artist 
testifies of respect for democracy and its future in more or less classical, 
humanist terms. In other words: in terms of responsibility.  
The Crucible, as a dramatization of history in the context of contemporary 
circumstances in 1950s is, in one sense, a reflection of its age, as I already 
indicated. Yet, through his literary intervention, Miller radicalises this reflection 
into an call for change by initiating a debate in a society that approved the 
production of fear at recurrent historical moments without much protest. Miller 
engages the moral legislators of his times (in this case the American government 
and judiciary) in a dialogue through his literary art which contains a truth that 
was not always universally beautiful and digestible. His position on the effect of 
literature on society is not dissimilar to the stance of liberal democratic theorists 
such as Martha Nussbaum or Richard Rorty who postulate?, as Simon Stow 
observes, that reading literary writings can promote liberal democratic values 
and edify people by making them morally good.296  
The ability of literature to arouse feelings of empathy in the reader’s heart 
and mind makes it republican in its appeal, which to Rorty is essentially 
instrumental in cultivating the two democratic values of contingency and 
solidarity in society.297 These two values induce sympathy amongst readers for 
the personae of the characters in the text and their real social counterparts in life. 
Secondly, through a tentative approach – hovering in the orbits of probability 
and staying remote from orthodoxy and fanaticism – the reader adopts a 
democratic way of assessing things, which shows him the fluid, relative and 
contingent nature of facts. In the same vein, Arthur Miller targets his audiences 
while keeping faith in literature’s capacity to generate in its readers ‘a rigorous 
scrutiny of everything they believe in and live by’.298 He thus suggests that 
reading literature initiates a dialectical, democratic and responsible process 
between the text and the readers. 
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Literature’s function, however, is not limited to turning us all into decent, 
responsible citizens, certainly not when it helps us to think about alternative 
futures. This I will address in my conclusion. If The Crucible is a play waiting 
for the occasion, such an occasion could be slightly bigger, or much bigger, than 
any political situation within a region or nation state.  
 
4.4 Intervention III: Irresponsibility, or Literature as Democracy 
When Jacques Derrida reflected on the relation between literature and 
democracy, it almost seemed to be a direct echo of The Crucible:  
 
Literature is a modern invention inscribed in conventions and 
institutions which, to hold on to just this trait, secure in principle its 
right to say everything. Literature thus ties its destiny to certain 
non-censure, to the space of democratic freedom (freedom of the 
press, freedom of speech, etc.). No democracy without literature; 
no literature without democracy. One can always want neither one 
nor the other, and there is no shortage of doing without them under 
all regimes; it is quite possible to consider neither of them to be 
unconditional goods and indispensable rights. But in no case can 
one dissociate one from the other. No analysis would be equal to it. 
And each time that a literary work is censured, democracy is in 
danger, as everyone agrees.299 
 
Obviously there are many ways in which, and political regimes under which, 
literature can flourish. But the modern version of literature is intrinsically 
related to democracy. Through The Crucible, Miller addresses the dangers of 
censorship. He also shows that a paranoid democracy will destroy its very 
fundaments when it is ruled by a fear of being targeted by enemies, real or 
imagined. This thought is akin to Derrida’s idea of auto-immunity of 
democracies in times of risk and threat when they, in a self-contradictory 
process of survival, put a partial end to themselves, just like when in a 
biological context the human body works against a part of itself to survive.300 
Democracies will still appear in this context as sovereign forces, embodying a 
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supreme power, whereas they are supposed to empower the people, individually 
and collectively.  
As for the role of literature in this regard, Derrida’s thinking about 
democratic responsibility is key. One form of responsibility can be defined as 
the basis of deconstruction, as becomes clear when he argues: 
 
For a deconstruction [of the state] to be as effective as possible, it 
should not in my view, oppose the state head on and in a unilateral 
fashion. In many contexts, the state might be the best protection 
against certain forces and dangers. And it can secure the citizenship 
of which we have been seeking. The responsibilities to be taken 
with regard to the state thus differ according to the context, and 
there is no relativism in this. But, ultimately, these necessary 
transactions must not obstruct a deconstruction of the state form, 
which should, one day, no longer be the last word of the political. 
This movement of ‘deconstruction’ did not wait for us to begin 
speaking about ‘deconstruction’; it has been underway for a long 
time, and it will continue for a long time. It will not take the form 
of suppression of the sovereign state at one particular moment in 
time but will pass through a long series of still unforeseeable 
convulsions and transformations, through as yet unheard-of forms 
of shared and limited sovereignty. [...] The deconstruction of 
sovereignty has thus already begun, and it will have no end, for we 
neither can nor should renounce purely and simply the values of 
autonomy and freedom, or those of power or force, which are 
inseparable from the very idea of law.301  
 
What Derrida proposes here, is a slow and by implication responsible 
transformation through deconstruction, a process that would transform the 
current form of the representative democracy and the sovereign state into ‘a new 
international law, a new international force’; a democracy that would function in 
the shape of new institutions, and that would embody a new concrete and 
equitable form of shared sovereignty. What Derrida envisions is a more 
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democratic society of the future, which he names ‘democracy to come’, one that 
will be legal in nature.302  
A second form of responsibility comes into play when Derrida considers 
that the democracy to come will no longer be limited to isolated states or nation 
states. The future democracy should be considered in radically different terms 
than what is now commonly perceived as a global village, or an international 
democratic order. He explains this in an interview with Richard Beardsworth: 
 
Second, in the determination or behavior of each citizen or 
singularity, there should be present, in some form or other, the call 
to a world of democracy to come, each singularity should 
determine itself with the sense of the stakes of a democracy which 
can no longer be contained within frontiers, which can no longer be 
localized, which can no longer depend on the decisions of a 
specific group of citizens, a nation or even of a continent. This 
determination means that one must both think, and think 
democracy, globally. This may be something completely new, 
something that has never been done, for we’re here talking of 
something much more complex, much more modest and yet much 
more ambitious than any notion of the universal, cosmopolitan or 
human. I realize that there is so much rhetoric today - obvious, 
conventional, reassuring, determined in the sense of without risk 
which resembles what I’m saying. When, for example, one speaks 
of the United Nations, when one speaks in the name of a politics 
that transcends national borders, one can always do so in the name 
of democracy.303 
 
Derrida proposes a delocalized and global version of democracy, one that is not 
confined to the national borders of certain states and groups of people. A global 
battle for democracy is desirable. As a ‘democracy to come’, it will by necessity 
be a broad and all-encompassing model of democracy. It is distinctly different 
from the conventional forms of democracy that we currently have, e.g. the 
United Nations. The democracy to come will not depend on national and 
ideological borders of different cultures or the institutions associated with them. 
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It will not be based on one particular constituency. And whilst we have to work 
towards it humbly, and by implication responsibly, the endeavour is not without 
risk. Today the rhetoric of an international order always reassuringly falls back 
on existing democracies. The democracy to come cannot be realized without 
risk, however. 
Derrida further highlights the radical difference between contemporary 
forms of democracy and the democracy to come: 
 
One has to make the difference clear, then, between democracy in 
this rhetorical sense and what I’m calling ‘democracy to come.’ 
The difference shows, for example, that all decisions made in the 
name of Rights of Man are at the same time alibis for the continued 
inequalities between singularities, and that we need to invent other 
concepts than state, super state, citizen, and so forth for this new 
international. The democracy to come obliges one to challenge 
instituted law in the name of an indefinitely unsatisfied justice, 
thereby revealing the injustice of calculating justice whether this be 
in the name of a particular form of democracy or of the concept of 
humanity. This democracy to come is marked in the movement that 
has always carried a present beyond itself, makes it inadequate to 
itself, ‘out of joint’ (Hamlet); as I argue in Specters of Marx, it 
obliges us to work with the spectrality in any moment of apparent 
presence. This spectrality is very weak; it is the weakness of the 
powerless, who, in being powerless, resist the greatest strength.304  
 
The pith of Derrida’s thoughts on a ‘democracy to come’ resides in the contrast 
with the concept of sovereignty, which is enshrined not only in the prevalent 
concept of the nation state but in law and ethics as well. This ‘democracy to 
come’ is beyond borders, universal and non-reductive, unlike the prevalent 
model of the nation state with its fixed boundaries and finite domain of 
sovereign powers, and its ultimate aim is the realisation of autonomy and true 
freedom of the individual. As potential, moreover, it is not entirely something of 
the future. It is already present, in the shape of a spectrality.  
 As concerns the issue of opening up a new future it is, I think, of 
relevance to read The Crucible in the light of Derrida’s democracy to come. The 
actors involved in the play or addressed by the play are no longer haunted by 
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ghosts from the past, but they may sense the play’s potential for the future. In 
this respect, Arthur Miller’s The Crucible, as a piece of literature, is a source 
and a medium to represent a historical experience through theatricality. The 
medium equips him with the means to confess everything, to say everything and 
reveal all secrets and truths about the disrupting forces in paranoid societies. As 
a piece of literature, in Derrida’s definition, it stands opposed to those works 
which lack such candour and robust interplay of past and present, and through 
allegory it not only relates past with present metaphorically and metonymically 
but also presents us with the ghost of an alternative future. It is of importance to 
emphasize that this future itself has not been clearly outlined. In fact, it works 
the other way around. Literature always starts with the present but cannot be 
reduced to that very present, as Derrida states: 
 
Experience of being, nothing less, nothing more, on the stage of 
metaphysics, literature perhaps stands on the edge of everything, 
almost beyond everything, including itself. It is the most interesting 
thing in the world, maybe more interesting than the world, and this 
is why, if it has no definition, what is heralded and refused under 
the name of literature cannot be identified with any other discourse. 
It will never be scientific, philosophical, conversational.305  
 
So, what Derrida hints at is not just that literature is the domain that cannot be 
grasped, in the end, by political forces. It allows us to experience being on the 
edge of things, not within the domain of ideology but on its borders. This is not 
to romanticize literature in terms of its superior essence in comparison with 
other modes of discourse. Instead, as Jonathan Culler observes, ‘Derrida gives 
great importance to literary discourse due to its experience during its 
engagement with all the aspects the world, on the edge of the world and the 
engagement that it calls forth in the readers’.306 Literature, in its capacity of a 
historical institution, with its conventions and rules, produces the space that 
Derrida calls instituted fiction and a fictive institution.307 It operates in a way to 
defy all moral or legal sanctions, institutions, rules and prohibitions, whilst 
subscribing to its own law. It also exceeds the actual while simultaneously 
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including its possibilities by giving due attention to various conditions of 
possibility.308 This allows a literary artist to say everything, in the sense of 
Derrida’s tout dire, and this is where it predominantly relates to alternative 
futures.  
In this respect, Arthur Miller’s belief in literary art and its richness and 
efficacy seems similar to Derrida’s. Let me recall what he said about The 
Crucible, in particular its effect on the audience: ‘This is what you see every 
day, or think or feel; I will show you what you really know but have not had the 
time, or the disinterestedness, or the insight, or the information to understand 
consciously’. Again, the aim, here, is not to redirect people to the present and 
the present only. Miller works on an historical event in order to make something 
happen historically. He attempts to change people’s sensibilities in the present, 
by means of the ‘presented’, through fiction, which carries both ghosts from the 
past and the future. The play is written and aimed at a democratic goal in the 
Western legal and political sense, which is of saying everything and 
communicating the full truth. This is the epic feature of the democracy to come, 
in fact.  
In light of the democracy to come, literature’s role cannot be one of 
responsibility only. The excerpt from Derrida at the beginning of this section 
continues as follows:  
 
The possibility of literature, the legitimation that a society gives it, 
the allaying of suspicion or terror with regard to it, all that goes 
together – politically - with the unlimited right to ask any question, 
to suspect all dogmatism, to analyze every presupposition, even 
those of the ethics or the politics of responsibility.309 
 
Thus there is a direct link between the freedom to say anything via the 
institution of literature and the political ideal of democracy, an ideal that may be 
negatively influenced by the imposition of censorship by political, legal or 
religious elites. Not only does Derrida see democracy and literature as 
necessarily existing together in a free world, but literature as an institution also 
holds a certain sense of seditious irresponsibility within itself, in its prerogative 
to say everything, question any dogmatism and analyse any presupposition.  
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This irresponsibility, in terms of the discretionary powers the literary 
artist derives from his vocation, is tantamount to his refusal to be accountable 
and establish responsibility before socio-political or ideological bodies. Derrida 
would welcome this as the highest form of responsibility: ‘this duty of 
irresponsibility, of refusing to reply for one’s thought or writing to constituted 
powers, is perhaps the highest form of responsibility’.310 The duty of 
irresponsibility is the highest responsibility function within the frame of the 
ideal of democracy, which is not the current democracy or an achievable 
democracy, but a democracy à venir, to come. In this context I want to read The 
Crucible and Miller’s expostulations against the practices of the United States 
government and the HUAC hearings of artists and academics as a distinct 
response in one sense. In another sense, The Crucible, as a messianic call for 
strengthening democratic ideals per se, for a democracy to come, is also a non-
response. Derrida continues:  
 
This non-response is more original and more secret than the 
modalities of power and duty because it is fundamentally 
heterogeneous to them. We find there a hyperbolic condition of 
democracy which seems to contradict a certain determined and 
historically limited concept of such a democracy, a concept which 
links it to the concept of a subject that is calculable, accountable, 
imputable and responsible, one that has-to-respond, has-to-tell 
[devant-répondre, devant-dire] the truth (‘the whole truth, nothing 
but the truth’) before the law, having to reveal the secret, with the 
exception of certain situations that are determinable and regulated 
by law (confession, the professional secrets of the doctor, the 
psychoanalyst, or the lawyer, secrets of national defence or state 
secrets in general, manufacturing secrets, etc.). This contradiction 
also indicated the task (task of thought, also theoretico-practical 
task) for any democracy to come.311 
 
The argument is complex and the tropical figure governing this complexity is 
hyperbole. There is something in literature that will exceed any limit imposed 
on it, and it is precisely this aspect that makes it suspect in current democracies 
and that makes it the vehicle for a democracy to come. It could be argued that 
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Miller’s The Crucible is, indeed, hyperbolic. Some saw the hyperbole in the 
comparison between witch-hunts and the fight against communism. In Derrida’s 
approach, however, the element of hyperbole is more abstract. Here the 
argument would have to be that The Crucible is hyperbolic whenever an 
occasion gives rise to its being performed. Earlier I stated that the re-totalizing 
effect of metaphor demands a motivated response. In one sense Miller’s play 
provides such a response. At the same time, given the circumstances, the play is 
also distinctly irresponsible. That is to say: it is not a response to McCarthyism 
nor to the pertaining system of democracy. It has to be, and will have to be, 
irresponsible for the sake of an alternative future.
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Chapter 5  
The Crucible and the Production of Fear in the Contemporary World: The 
Future and Persistency in Culture 
 
As indicated in the introduction, for the purposes of our study, I consider a work 
of art to be both an analytical and a productive tool that organizes, afflicts or 
feeds a certain culture. In chapters 1 and 2, I used Miller’s play to analyse the 
relations between a present and an historical past. There I used the term, coined 
by Mieke Bal, of preposterousness. Although the play was clearly written 
centuries after (‘post’) the events in Salem, it was through the play that we could 
connect to those events. In this sense the play was ‘before’ (pre-) the past itself. 
The dynamic of preposterousness served, I argued there, to work through the 
past from the viewpoint of the present. The play, then, does not capture or 
describe an historical reality but, in its relation to the past, it serves as an 
analysis in the sense of a psychoanalysis, as a ‘working through.’ The things of 
the past are not ‘past’ as a consequence. They are alive in an enacted or 
dramatized past, and need to be relived for the purpose of a cure. In chapters 3 
and 4, we saw that such a cure does not really materialise on the level of the 
play’s contemporaneous present, at least not on a collective level.  
With respect to its own contemporaneous present, the play serves not only 
as an analysis of the society in which it was written and performed, it also 
serves as an intervention. In this context, the Salem witch hunt functions as an 
allegory for McCarthy’s communist hunt. However, due to the nature of 
allegory, this does not ‘resolve’ anything. In fact, as we saw, the play is both an 
analysis of the society and an intervention in it, but it also contributed to the 
production of fear that troubled it. In its allegorical re-enactment of the past, the 
play remains partly caught in its tropical metaphorical closure. As I argued, it is 
as much part of the problem as it is its solution. Yet the trope of metonymy also 
helps the play to open up history in a battle for hegemony. 
In the following chapter and conclusion, I will take a look at how this 
play from the past can be used as an analytical tool for our present, at the 
beginning of the twenty-first century. From the vantage point of its moment of 
genesis, I will therefore consider its future application, or rather: its future 
performative powers. These powers may manifest themselves when crossing 
historical and cultural borders, as is the nature of ‘world literature’ according to 
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Damrosch.312 In his view, world literature is characterized by its potential to 
become more meaningful through its historical and cultural translation. In the 
context of globalization and the transnational reach of national literature, 
Damrosch observes: ‘if world literature is defined as literature of genuinely 
global scope, whether in authorial intention or in its circulation among readers, 
then we are only just now seeing the birth of this literary form whose true 
history lies in the future rather than in the past’.313 From a thematic point of 
view, The Crucible embodies indeed a general phenomenon of the production of 
fear and it remains cross-culturally of relevance (if we keep in mind that 
‘general’ is understood, here, in the sense that the play is not bound to particular 
situations but transcends them). In some aspects the play may indeed be an 
example of world literature, and as such it is also a play ‘waiting for the 
occasion’. Here, however, I will examine it more in the context of its 
participation in a distinct culture that certainly did not and does not remain the 
same over time but that appears to be troubled by recurring patterns. The pattern 
that I am concerned with, as may be clear by now, is the socio-cultural 
production of fear in the US, a production that happens for political purposes, 
fuelled by religiously defined dichotomies of good and evil. 
In order to deal with this, I will first consider what has been a powerful 
theory to explain cultural persistency, and determine how this theory is 
problematic in relation to works of art. I will then move to the issue of why in 
the last decades the neo-liberal, or better neo-conservatives, in the US found the 
German lawyer Carl Schmitt to be a major source of inspiration and which 
persistent cultural dynamic underpinned this revival. Subsequently, I will 
concentrate on a model that can explain a culture’s persistency in terms of being 
haunted by ghosts from the past. Here I will follow and divert from a path was 
already described by Erin Graff Zivin in Figurative Inquisitions: Conversion, 
Torture and Truth in the Luso-Hispanic Atlantic, especially the chapter 
‘Allegory and Hauntology’.  
  
5.1 Long-Term Cultural Patterns in the US Socio-Cultural Environment 
In its study of persistency in culture, Geert Hofstede’s Culture’s Consequences 
has had profound influence on the development of cross-cultural studies within 
psychology, in organisation studies and in the social sciences more generally. 
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Hofstede, who was working with the multinational corporation IBM in the 
sixties as an organisation sociologist and psychologist, researched the cultural 
differences that were apparent in its 71 subsidiary locations globally where it 
had offices and factories.314 The outcome of this research, after a survey of forty 
different nations, was that Hofstede devised five dimensions that can 
characterise a culture. They include: the so-called power distance index, 
individualism, masculinity, uncertainty avoidance and long-term orientation. 
Hofstede’s takes the view, as Peter B. Smith remarks, that cultures are not 
superficial or easily changeable entities but that they are deeply embedded in 
people’s psyches, bodies, practices and organisations and, apart from certain 
exceptions, they are strongly resistant to change. According to him, we are 
programmed by our culture in early life and the various elements within a 
national culture typically serve to sustain and enhance its coherence.315  
Hofstede’s observations of cultural dimensions based upon national data 
were criticized by scholars like Rachel Baskerville and Brendan McSweeney. 
Baskerville reviews the problems in Hofstede’s model on the following points: 
‘(i) the assumption of equating nation with culture (ii) the difficulties of, and 
limitations on a quantification of culture represented by cultural dimensions and 
matrices; and (iii) the status of the observer outside the culture’.316 Baskerville 
points at Hofstede’s equating national data with the study of such an abstract 
phenomenon as culture. Secondly it is problematic for her to imagine a 
quantification of national cultures through arithmetic data and matrices as 
Hofstede does. For her, the statistical measure of culture amounts to a limiting 
analysis of an epic phenomenon called culture. Lastly, Baskerville also finds 
Hofstede’s approach lacking in the positioning of the observer, as someone who 
appears to stand outside a culture. I agree with much of this criticism, and yet 
find Hofstede’s model relevant in order to explain the persistency in culture. I 
will use his model heuristically then, not so much to confirm it as to narrow it 
down to the issue where and how cultural persistency, or cultural incoherence, 
may be involved. 
Since his retirement Hofstede’s work has been continued by his son, Gert 
Jan Hofstede, and this is how, together, they define culture on their website: 
                                                          
314 Geert Hofstede and Robert R. McCrae, ‘Personality and Culture Revisited: Linking Traits and 
Dimensions of Culture’, Cross-Cultural Research 38.1 (2004), p. 61. 
315 Peter B. Smith, ‘Culture’s Consequences: Something Old and Something New’, Human 
Relations: 55.1 (2002), p. 122. 
316 Rachel F. Baskerville, ‘Hofstede Never Studied Culture’, Accounting, Organizations and 
Society 28.1 (2003), p. 1. 
146 
 
Our shared human nature is intensely social: we are group animals. 
We use language and empathy, and practice collaboration and 
intergroup competition. But the unwritten rules of how we do these 
things differ from one human group to another. ‘Culture’ is how we 
call these unwritten rules about how to be a good member of the 
group. Culture provides moral standards about how to be an 
upstanding group member; it defines the group as a ‘moral circle’. 
It inspires symbols, heroes, rituals, laws, religions, taboos, and all 
kinds of practices – but its core is hidden in unconscious values that 
change at a far slower rate than the practices. We tend to classify 
groups other than our own as inferior or (rarely) superior. This 
applies to groups based on national, religious, or ethnic boundaries, 
but also on occupation or academic discipline, on club 
membership, adored idol, or dress style. In our globalized world 
most of us can belong to many groups at the same time.317 
 
For my analysis of The Crucible the issues that interest me the most in the above 
definition are, first of all, the moral aspect of culture, defined in terms of 
required behaviour, and the difference between the practices that may change 
over time and a ‘hidden core’ with ‘unconscious values’ that changes at a far 
slower rate but which explains the relative persistency and stability in cultures.  
In Hofstede’s analysis, cultural programming takes place with this hidden 
core as its engine, and the previously mentioned five dimensions define this 
programming. One of these dimensions is power distance, which is the ‘extent 
to which the less powerful members of institutions and organizations within a 
country expect and accept that power is distributed unequally’.318 Fundamental 
units such as family, school, places of worship, etc. represent the institutions in 
society whereas the community and organisations correspond to people’s work 
places. This definition represents inequality (more versus less), as the power 
distance is defined from below, not from above. It suggests that its followers as 
much as its leaders endorse a society’s level of inequality. This is to say, in an 
almost Foucauldian sense, that leadership is complemented by a palpable 
presence of subordination by the ruled since authority requires subservience and 
obedience to be matched with it to actualise a scene of power. In Hofstede’s 
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findings, the correlations of the PDI (Power Distance Index) with geographic, 
economic and demographic country indicators, through comparisons of 
educational systems and the consideration of historical factors, lead to the 
suggestion of some sort of causal chain regarding the origins of national 
differences. An analysis of political systems, religious life, and philosophical 
and ideological thinking in various countries shows differences in the PDI 
which are interpreted as consequences of power distance norm differences that 
feed back into the norm and support it.319  
Compared to a global average of 55, US scores 40 on the Power Distance 
Index, which indicates a greater equality between the social levels, including 
governments, socio-cultural organizations, and even within the families.320 This 
orientation, as Hofstede observes, reinforces a cooperative interaction, across 
power levels, and creates a more stable cultural environment. This does not 
immediately accord well, however, with The Crucible, in which a general 
hierarchical power system orchestrates the stream of events between the girls, 
the common people, the judiciary and the church officials. In the play, for 
instance, Ezekiel Cheever’s words to Giles Corey and the Proctors reveal an 
important power distance: 
 
You know yourself I must do as I’m told. You surely know that, 
Giles. And I’d as lief [sic] you’d not be sending me to Hell. I like 
not the sound of it, I tell you; I like not the sound of it. (He fears 
Proctor, but starts to reach inside his coat.) Now believe me, 
Proctor, how heavy be the law, all its tonnage I do carry on my 
back tonight. (He takes out a warrant.) I have a warrant for your 
wife.321 
  
The quote may illustrate how American egalitarianism not always accords well 
with the force of a certain form of law. There is a principal difference between 
‘doing what you are told’ by some sort of imperial force, say a king or a 
religious authority, or considering oneself as the subject of law. In this case, 
Cheever feels entrusted with responsibility and power to discharge his role as a 
servant and custodian of the legal system, whose legitimacy is of course 
questioned by the people who are subjected to its power, although this does not 
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change things for the better. When subordination to power is realised through 
the force and authority of the law of the land, the phenomenon of McCarthyism 
does not correspond well with Hofstede’s PDI index for the US. 
Hofstede’s second cultural dimension is individualism, which is 
contrasted with collectivism. It rests on individuals being integrated into groups 
and is found ‘in societies where the ties between individuals are loose: everyone 
is expected to look after himself or herself and his or her immediate family’.322 
Hofstede states that the relationship between the individual and the collective in 
human society is not only a matter of ways of living together, but it is intimately 
linked to societal norms (in the sense of value systems of major groups of the 
population). It therefore affects both people’s mental programming and the 
structure and functioning of many other institutions besides the family: 
educational, religious, political and utilitarian. The central element in our mental 
programming involved in this case is our concept of self. That is why any 
traditionalist would hardly think of himself as individualistic. Hofstede 
compares the Western style of thinking with, for instance, the Chinese style 
whilst pointing out that the Western concept of individual personality is distinct 
from the concept of society. In contrast, the Chinese style entails the use the 
concept of ‘human constant’ which includes the person himself in addition to 
his intimate societal and cultural environment which makes his existence 
meaningful. That is why there is tendency in Chinese culture to modify social 
and individual views more easily in terms of the environment.323 Or, to give 
another example, Hofstede also compares paradigms of religious and 
ideological conversion, generally, in Western and Chinese societies. In the West 
conversion is a highly individualistic act. According to Hofstede, in modern 
Chinese society, the ideological conversion is collectively defined on account of 
an overarching communitarian culture.  
Because they are tied to value systems shared by the majority, issues of 
collectivism versus individualism carry strong moral overtones. Americans tend 
to see their own culture as individualistic and this individualism is interpreted as 
a major contributor to the greatness and moral superiority of the United States. 
Accordingly, in Hofstede’s view, individual members of its population are self-
reliant and look after themselves and their close family members. That is why, 
generally speaking, there is a so-called ‘I’-consciousness in American culture, 
with a tendency towards self-orientation, autonomy, variety, pleasure and 
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individual financial security. Yet in terms of values, the standards are desired 
and expected to apply to all, i.e. across the board. Some trace the philosophic 
source of this American individualism to Lockean liberalism. In Luis Hartz’s 
opinion, for instance, John Locke’s ideas on individualism and the social 
contract theory anticipated the American liberal experiment and these liberal 
ideas were put into practice in American political thought, rhetoric and culture 
with reference to reconciling majority rule versus minority rights.324 Later this 
vision encountered competition from those who placed republicanism and 
American civic virtue centre stage such as, for instance, Mark E. Kann, a 
political scientist (and an expert in gender-based analysis of American 
society).325 Whichever analysis one chooses, individualism, if we follow Geert 
and Gert Jan Hofstede’s analysis, became part of America’s ‘hidden core.’  
Yet, with regard to this dimension as well, The Crucible seems to depict a 
world that is markedly different in first instance. Hale, the lone sane voice of the 
people corroborating with the legal and theological order of Salem, also 
succumbs to the rule of majority while giving credence to all the accusations in 
search of evidence: 
 
Pleading: Nurse, though our hearts break, we cannot flinch; these 
are new times, sir. There is a misty plot afoot so subtle we should 
be criminal to cling to old respects and ancient friendships. I have 
seen too many frightful proofs in court – the Devil is alive in 
Salem, and we dare not quail to follow wherever the accusing 
finger points!326 
 
Although Hale attempts to break away from the traditional culture of kinship 
and communal norms since he vowed to serve the law, he fails to use his 
individual acumen to correctly interpret the motives of the accusing girls and the 
people he serves. He is trying to be the most modern voice of the community by 
calling his times ‘new times’ and offering to divorce himself from the unwritten 
local norms of favouritism based on kinship and patronage. His stance can 
hardly be called ‘individualistic,’ however, since his personal observations and 
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assessment of the victims’ statements in court are sufficient proof in his eyes to 
give full credence to any evidence that matches the generally required picture.  
In contrast, there certainly are highly individualistic voices in the 
community like those of Proctor, Rebecca Nurse and Giles Corey. Here, The 
Crucible does fit the pattern, and Miller himself observes that the force of the 
individual can withstand almost anything.327 That being said, in modern times as 
well, individualistic voices of dissent in US political culture have either been 
deemed unpatriotic, given scant attention, or have been met with substantial 
pressure and threats. In fact, Hannah Arendt, displeased with state suppression 
of individual responsibilities in the 1960s in the States, for instance in the case 
of Daniel Ellsberg, considered this to be a fundamental threat to what the United 
States stood for.328 Accordingly, in The Crucible, any individual enquiry about 
phantoms of fear is made virtually impossible.  
Hofstede’s third dimension in national cultures is masculinity as opposed 
to femininity. He sees the duality of the sexes as a fundamental fact that 
different societies deal with in different ways. The gender-based role 
distribution prevailing in a particular society is transferred by socialisation 
through family, school and peer groups, and through the media. Generally 
speaking, in most contemporaneous societies, according to Hofstede, the 
predominant socialisation pattern is for men to be more assertive and for women 
to be more nurturing. In Hofstede’s study, anthropology, psychology and 
political science confirm the male assertiveness/female nurture pattern. In this 
context, he links his research to the McClelland’s review of U.S psychological 
literature for evidence of psychological differences between the sexes. In the US 
data, boys and men universally tend to be more assertive, whereas girls and 
women are more sensitive to social interdependence. Similarly, in his review of 
Spenner and Featherman’s study of US sociological literature, Hofstede reveals 
a strong relationship between sex and achievement ambitions and shows lower 
ambitions for women.329 In Hofstede’s analysis, the US scores 62, compared to 
a world average of 50. This indicates that the country experiences a higher 
degree of gender role differentiation. Male domination in society and its power 
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structure require a tendency in female population to grow more assertive and 
competitive in emulating the male role model. 
Regarding this dimension, Wendy Schissel has studied Miller’s depiction 
of gender in her feminist reading of the play, and she concludes that the text 
testifies of straightforward gynecophobia – a fear and distrust of women that is 
both implicit and explicit in Puritan America. Tituba, the Caribbean woman 
enslaved by Reverend Parris, is the first scapegoat and is simultaneously the 
victim of complicated gynecophobia and xenophobia. Proctor’s denigrating of 
Mary Warren on a number of occasions testifies to an androcentric morality in 
Puritan society and the household.330 Here we can see an almost one-to-one 
relationship between the play and Hofstede’s cultural dimension of gender. 
The fourth dimension in national cultures is ‘uncertainty avoidance’ and 
Hofstede observes that uncertainty about the future is a basic fact of human life. 
His research findings reveal that tolerance for uncertainty varies considerably 
among people in subsidiaries in different countries. The three indicators that are 
used in this respect are rule orientation, employment stability and stress. The 
three together produce a country’s Uncertainty Avoidance Index (UAI).331 In 
Hofstede’s opinion, knowing that there is life after death is the believer’s 
ultimate certainty which allows him to face uncertainties in this life. The line 
separating ‘defending against uncertainties’ from ‘accepting them’ is fluid; 
many of our defences aimed at creating certainty are not really doing that in an 
objective sense, but they allow us to sleep peacefully. That is why different 
societies adapt to uncertainty in different ways. The layers of difference do not 
simply alternate between traditional and modern societies but they exist in 
modern societies too. Hofstede observes that the ways of coping with 
uncertainty are part of a society’s cultural heritage and are transferred and 
reinforced through key institutions such family, school and the state. They are 
reflected in the values that are collectively held by members of a given society. 
Their roots are non-rational, and they may lead to collective behaviour which 
may seem aberrant and incomprehensible to members of other societies. In 
Hofstede’s study, US scores 46, compared to the world average of 64.  
Puritan society in 1692 was beset with uncertainty and did not merely tend 
towards control but demanded it. The best remedy to fight uncertainty, 
embodied in the threats of evil spirits, consisted in relying on the institutions of 
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the judiciary and the executive. The cultural dynamic of this New England 
society was different from that of its cultural ‘ancestor’ in England. To avoid the 
uncertainties of nature or of conflicts of faith and religion, a communitarian 
lifestyle was encouraged, dissent was discouraged and full trust was required in 
the sovereignty of law. Whereas in the history of continental Europe the concept 
of sovereignty was derived from a divine source and was institutionally 
supported as such by the Roman Catholic church, the absence of feudal nobility 
and king, or an established church, in America required the sovereignty of the 
law. Therefore maintaining the rule of law was a priority for any authority or 
statesman.332  
The Salem trials are maybe one of the most clear-cut instances of judicial 
activism in response to the agency of fear and uncertainty that would take 
American society hostage on a regular basis in the future, as described in the 
previous chapter on McCarthyism. Litigation can be seen as a persistent pattern 
in American culture, and is used to overcome uncertainties in the present for the 
future. For now, however, it forces us to think about the explanatory power of 
Hofstede’s model. Does it also deal with America’s political culture, or should 
we consider the dynamic between American culture at large and its political 
culture in terms of a form of schizophrenia? According to Hofstede, for 
instance, America should be strong in dealing with uncertainty. 
Let me try to answer this question on the basis of the fifth and the final 
dimension: a culture’s long-term orientation versus short-term orientation. This 
was the outcome of a study carried out among students in twenty-three countries 
around the world with the help of Chinese scholars who designed a 
questionnaire to this end. The core value proved to be ‘virtue’ in the context of 
so-called long-term versus short-term orientation.333 These orientations are 
characterised by: 
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High Long Term Low Long Term (i.e. Short Term) 
 
emphasis on persistence emphasis on quick results 
relationships ordered by status status not a major issue in 
relationships 
personal adaptability important personal steadfastness and stability 
important 
face considerations common but seen 
as a weakness 
protection of one’s face is important 
leisure time not too important leisure time important 
save, be thrifty spend 
invest in real estate invest in mutual funds 
relationships and market position 
important 
bottom line important 




Both the positively and the negatively rated values of this dimension can be 
found in the teachings of the most influential Chinese philosopher Confucius, 
who lived in 500 BC. And these values also apply to countries without a 
Confucian heritage. The United States was included by Hofstede in the group of 
countries that had the lowest Long Term Orientation (LTO) for the US at 29, 
compared to the world average of 45. This low LTO ranking indicates, for 
instance, society’s belief that spending is better than saving. Hofstede links this 
characteristic, surprisingly without much explanation, to a strong belief in the 
absolutes of good and evil. Regarding this dimension The Crucible evidently 
testifies of a normative society that has a fascination with establishing the truth 
and a belief in absolutes about good and evil. 
As noted at the beginning of this section, Hofstede’s observations about 
cultural dimensions were criticised by scholars, such as like Rachel Baskerville. 
However, Hofstede did not respond to Baskerville’s critique in isolation. In a 
more general way and taking into consideration five standard criticisms of his 
work, which he listed in his 2001 edition of Culture’s Consequences, he 
explains: 
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Baskerville’s comments deal primarily with point 2: Nations are 
not the best units for studying cultures, to which my answer was: 
True, but they are usually the only kind of units available for 
comparison and better than nothing. Nation states cannot be 
equated with national cultures, but does this render conclusions 
about cultural differences based on nation-level data invalid? Could 
it be that 90% of such conclusions still hold? And isn’t differences 
between nations precisely what accounting and business research 
are usually concerned with?335  
 
Hofstede thus admits that nation, or rather: nation-state, and culture cannot be 
equated but since at global level nation-state still exists as a unit to distinguish 
people from different geographies and cultures, it remains a most convenient 
and available unit to study different cultures. Geographic boundaries, of course, 
do not finely demarcate cultures across the globe but Hofstede observes that, in 
spite of local differences, the national culture of a specific nation state under 
study is always different from other states. In addition, his five cultural 
dimensions play a definitive role in defining a nation’s culture when compared 
with another nation. Hofstede further contends that most of his research and 
conclusions about cultures still hold true because the nation-state is the only 
valid and strong unit which allows him to observe the variable cultural 
dimensions statistically.  
As my comparison with The Crucible has shown, there is definitely no 
one-to-one relation between this play, or art in general, and a nation-state’s 
culture. The reason is that art is never simply the expression of a culture. On the 
other hand, on a number of points it resonated rather strongly with Hofstede’s 
analysis and, amongst these, I consider the absolutes of good and evil to be 
pivotal. They will help to see why Carl Schmitt could so easily be transposed to 
the US context between the 1990s and 2010, at a time when the production of 
fear resurfaced.  
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5.2 The Crucible as a Work of Art Operating Through Time: Pre-diction 
and the Schmittean Revival 
In The Crucible, Danforth, the main lawyer in the Salem witch trials, asserts his 
authority when he invokes the binary difference between the leagues of good 
and evil: 
 
But you must understand, sir, that a person is either with this court 
or he must be counted against it, there be no road between. This is a 
sharp time, now a precise time – we live no longer in the dusky 
afternoon when evil mixed itself with good and befuddled the 
world. Now, by God’s grace, the shining sun is up, and them that 
fear not light will surely praise it. I hope you will be one of 
those.336 
 
It is an often quoted passage, and rightly so.337 It is often quoted precisely 
because what is being said sounds, in the cultural worldview of the US, 
somehow logical, almost natural, which is the hallmark of ideology. It is evident 
from Danforth’s remarks that his worldview comprises two finely partitioned 
leagues of deific benevolence and diabolical evil.338 They may explain why the 
quote from The Crucible is similar, almost to the detail, to what George W. 
Bush said in his address to the Joint Session of Congress in 2001. After the 9/11 
attacks, he called on every nation in every region of the world to take sides with 
either good or evil in the ensuing global war on terror: ‘Either you are with us, 
or you are with the terrorists’.339 
At the end of the play, this sharp wedge between the forces of good and 
evil goes deep enough to even legitimize violent legal verdicts for the sake of 
safeguarding community unity and purity in Salem. The climax occurs when 
Danforth, in the name of absolute morality, triumphantly executes John Proctor, 
Rebecca Nurse and other innocent people. The persistence of cultural practices 
like the production of fear and the Manichean politics in America in those times, 
is a fine paradigm of Roberto Esposito’s theory, namely that the desire of 
modern societies to be healthy and pure must lead to a thanatopolitics. This 
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politics works on the principle that life defends itself and develops only through 
progressive enlargement and expansion of the circle of death.340 Stuart J. 
Murray who, with reference to Michel Foucault’s famous postmodern concept 
of biopolitics that denotes modern societies’ social and political power over 
life341, further clarifies it: 
 
Foucault marks the important shift from classical biopower to 
modern biopolitics. Classical biopower is summed up as the 
sovereign decision ‘to take life or let live,’ whereas modern 
biopolitics is conceived as ‘the power to “make” live and “let” die.’ 
The decision to kill and let live is replaced with a productive 
biopolitics that is twofold, that ‘makes live’ and ‘lets die’. Death 
becomes a consequence ─ a necessary part ─ of living. Such death 
is too easily elided and dismissed. Nobody is killed, at least not 
directly, and nobody’s hands are bloodied, at least not that we can 
see; the crimes are outsourced to penal colonies through 
‘extraordinary rendition’ become ordinary, obfuscated by state 
bureaucracy, and covered up by one media spectacle after another. 
These deaths are never caused as such; officially, they are merely 
‘allowed,’ a passive event, collateral damage. But biopolitical logic 
requires them. In order that ‘we’ may live, live well and live fully, 
‘they’ must die, the distinction between the virtuous citizen and the 
other excluded as bare life, disposable life.342  
 
As Murray expounds, Foucault analyses a remarkable shift in the concept of 
biopower to biopolitics since antiquity in Western culture. In antiquity, political 
power rested with the patriarch in the family to grant life to newborns. Later in 
European societies, after the revival of Roman law, the sovereign or the 
monarch was entitled to take the life of his subjects or to let them live. The 
sovereign, as Foucault argues, was granted the right to rule over the masses in 
order to ensure protection and continuity of their lives. Hence preservation and 
protection of life was the essence and guarantee of the social contract between 
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the classical sovereign and the people. Yet, while navigating through history, 
Foucault observes that over time sovereign power has undergone gradual 
transformations in terms of sophistication of mechanisms, techniques and 
technologies for controlling life and death of populations. He argues, for 
instance, that in the seventeenth century the nature of the exercise of power was 
disciplinary and was intended for a cost-effective use of labour through 
disciplinary control of the human body. It required spatial distribution of 
individual bodies, involving the individuals’ separation, alignment, serialisation 
but also surveillance in a hierarchical system. In the second half of the 
eighteenth century, according to Foucault, this disciplinary power underwent 
transformation and was no longer applied to man-as-body but to living man, to 
man-as-living-being or man-as-species.343 In short, modern Western culture has 
seen governments exercise biopolitical techniques in order to maintain classical 
sovereign powers to ‘make live’ and ‘let die’ without any apparent sense of 
accountability for their apathy regarding the dead. These techniques are used for 
the subjugation of bodies and for controlling populations.  
However, there is a reversal of sorts in modernity when political power 
promises to be protective, to preserve, control, prolong and strengthen life at the 
expense of permitting death elsewhere, as its consequence. Through this 
intensive conflict, which has to ensure an optimum and secure life in modern 
western societies, death is outsourced and wilfully ‘allowed’ to occur through 
co-opted violence abroad, even if it means, for instance, arbitrary arrests and the 
extrajudicial transfer of suspects to far-off localities where torture happens as a 
matter of course. Death is allowed to take place in those places without any 
formal legal accountability because it guarantees the continuation of life in other 
places. In a sense, biopolitical logic requires these deaths, as the deaths of 
‘others’ are a guarantee for ‘us’ living.  
In contrast with Geert Hofstede’s analysis that US culture would be able 
to cope with a high degree of uncertainty, I see uncertainty avoidance as a key 
cultural dimension in the context of the United States’ adaptive warfare 
strategies in modern times, that focus on a more proactive approach. Donald 
Rumsfeld, for instance, stated in a 2002 speech: 
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We must transform not only our armed forces but also the 
Department that serves them by encouraging a culture of creativity 
and intelligent risk-taking. We must promote a more 
entrepreneurial approach to developing military capabilities, one 
that encourages people, all people, to be proactive and not reactive, 
to behave somewhat less like bureaucrats and more like venture 
capitalists.344 
 
In the twenty-first century, modern Western warfare is more sophisticated and is 
conducted with an idea of risk and casualty aversion, not unlike the liberal way 
of governance that is constantly changing and adapting in the face of the 
complexity discourses, networks and information as a result of a change in the 
concept of life itself.345 The media and information networks work to the 
advantage of this biopolitics to cover these deaths up with discourse and illusory 
spectacles as the ‘other’ party’s collateral damage for preserving the lives of 
their own ‘worthy of living’ citizens. Thus modern biopolitics indeed marks a 
shift away from the sovereign’s biopower of old: from ‘taking life’ to ‘making 
live’ and from ‘letting live’ to ‘letting die.’ On this count, in modernity there is a 
corresponding radical difference in the value of life of different people.  
In the context of The Crucible, this is comparable to the distinction 
between the good that is supposed to be protected and made to live and the evil 
that has to die elsewhere, because it curbs the sovereigns’ hold on power. For 
instance, Danforth’s statement in Act 4 that he would hang a thousand people to 
uphold Biblical law but would not stumble in front of retaliation is an equivalent 
form of cognitive conviction to sustain good and eradicate evil.346 As to the 
play’s future applicability, this work of art almost predicts how the value of 
people’s lives will change with time, as Foucault’s concept of biopolitics made 
clear.  
The paradigmatic nature of The Crucible becomes chillingly evident in 
relation to the rebirth of Carl Schmitt’s thoughts on the political in neo-
conservative circles in the US. In essence, the collaboration between the 
judiciary and the executive in Salem, fuelled by a Manichean dichotomy of 
good and evil with the aim of strengthening their political grip on power, is 
theoretically reflected in the writings of Carl Schmitt, a legal scholar during the 
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Weimar Republic. In relation to Miller’s play, it is relevant to examine how 
Schmitt’s idea of the political, as Andrew Norris observes, is based on an 
emphasis on the conceptual autonomy of the political.347 Schmitt categorically 
distinguishes the political from the economic, the technological and the legal 
and also criticizes liberalism for muddying and obscuring these distinctions. He 
states: 
 
The distinction of friend and enemy denotes the utmost degree of 
intensity of a union or separation, of an association or dissociation. 
It can exist theoretically and practically, without having 
simultaneously to draw upon all those moral, aesthetic, economic, 
or other distinctions. The political enemy need not be morally evil 
or aesthetically ugly; he need not appear as an economic 
competitor, and it may even be advantageous to engage with him in 
business transaction. But he is, nevertheless, the other, the stranger; 
and it is sufficient for his nature that he is, in a specifically intense 
way, existentially something different and alien, so that in the 
extreme case conflicts with him are possible. These can neither be 
decided by a previously determined general norm nor by the 
judgment of a disinterested and therefore neutral third party.348 
  
In Carl Schmitt’s seminal work The Concept of the Political, this friend/enemy 
distinction in political decision-making and affiliations is crucial. Schmitt 
famously stated that every realm of human endeavours is structured by an 
irreducible duality. Morality rests on the dualism of good and evil, aesthetics 
reveal the antithesis between the beautiful and the ugly, and economics has a 
concern with the profitable and the unprofitable.349 In politics, he argues that the 
core distinction is one between friend and enemy. This distinguishes politics 
from any other social realm. He states that the often quoted Biblical statement 
‘love your enemies’ is perfectly appropriate for religion, but is incompatible 
with the life-or-death stakes that politics always involves as, for instance, in the 
thousand-year conflict between Christians and Muslims, the Christians never 
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surrendered Europe out of love for the Saracens or the Turks.350 Schmitt argues 
that, unlike moral philosophy, ethics and religion, the realm of the political is 
exempt from any objective to make the world just and fair for the multitude. It 
involves stakes of life and death: ‘the political is the most intense and extreme 
antagonism’.351 As a consequence, war is the most violent form that politics 
takes but, even without war, politics still requires that one’s opponent be 
considered antagonistic to everything one believes in. It is not a personal 
antagonism, there is no hatred towards the opponent or desire for bloodshed. 
The rules of the political game simply demand that one should be prepared to 
vanquish the other if necessary. Salem’s judicial-clerical political set-up 
obviously fits Schmitt’s friend/enemy distinction in letter and spirit, as is 
evident from Governor Danforth’s point of view quoted earlier.  
In The Concept of the Political, Schmitt insists on the fundamental non-
rationality of politics on account of the decision-makers’ vulnerability to the 
fluid and flamboyant nature of events. This is why he defines the critical 
moments of politics as the time when the sovereign decision of identifying the 
enemy is taken. These critical moments relate to the state of exception in which 
the decisions taken by the sovereign power are singular, absolute and final. 
Schmitt emphasises enmity between political entities as a trigger of war and 
maintains that enmity in politics makes war a real possibility in which the 
existential negation of the enemy through his physical annihilation is always a 
possibility.352 On the global political scene from recent history, liberal 
democracies rarely engage in wars with each other. The enmity between the 
cultural and ideological antagonists of liberal democracy, amongst them 
communism and fascism and other types of totalitarian political regimes, has 
nevertheless led to full-fledged wars. Schmitt’s definition of the political 
arguably explains the political nature of these conflicts in which it is mandatory 
for each party to clearly define its friends and enemies and fight them. Schmitt 
claims that being guided by a friend-enemy distinction allows ‘us’ as a 
collectivity to be clear about what ‘we’ are and what is most rational for ‘us’ to 
do.353  
It is in the public nature of the political categorisation of groups as ‘our 
friends’ and ‘our enemies’ that Schmitt sees an escape from the 
misinterpretation of the idea of universalism and the sweeping trust in 
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humanism. This is because all attempts to resolve political conflicts in the name 
of universal principles and humanity may unleash unprecedented acts of 
violence. The concept of humanity, for instance, is a useful ideological 
instrument for imperial expansionism and, when used in the form of ethical-
humanitarian, it becomes a vehicle of economic imperialism.354 Since wars in 
those circumstances may transcend the limits of political framework, Schmitt 
argues that opponents can degrade the enemy into moral and other categories 
and reduce it to the status of a monster that must not only be defeated but utterly 
destroyed.355 Tracy B. Strong observes that the rational action in politics, 
steered and informed by the happening of events without a clear distinction 
between friend and enemy, can have two repercussions for Schmitt. The first is 
that one assumes that one shares universal qualities with others, which must 
then ‘naturally’ lead to an ultimate convergence of interests attainable through 
negotiation and compromise. In this scenario, the events are most likely not only 
to prove one wrong but also to destroy a group that acts on such a false belief. 
The examples Schmitt cites are those of the ‘doomed’ Russian classes and the 
aristocratic society of pre-revolution France. The second and more relevant 
repercussion in the contemporary world is that one claims to speak in the name 
of universal humanity. In that case, which is similar to the Salem theocracy, 
those one is opposed to must perforce be viewed as speaking and acting against 
humanity and deserve extermination through the use of force or legal sanctions. 
Schmitt dwells on the relation of the concept of the enemy as a disturber or 
a destroyer with, as he calls it, the ‘asymmetrical counter-concept’ of humanity. 
He unravels the connotations of the term humanity as that which constitutes a 
single collectivity in ideal circumstances. As everyone belongs to humanity, 
there are no enemies of humanity as such. But it is the political difference within 
humanity that proves divisive and an enemy figure emerges, dehumanised to the 
extent of being declared an un-person and eligible to be destroyed. 356As soon as 
discriminations take hold amongst humanity and one person or one social group 
starts hating another on account of differences between them, destroying the 
other can become justified, both rhetorically and through action, in the greater 
interest of humanity with the excuse of destroying the destroyer. This is why the 
concept of humanity is flexible enough to be misused in politics. Similarly, the 
Salem theocracy proceeded to persecute dissidents as social pariahs by 
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considering them as pathogenic to community cohesion, thereby denying them 
the right to live. Thus they acted like a political entity, while subjecting certain 
people from their own society to the enemy status, in line with Schmitt’s ideas 
about the dangers of the concept of humanity. This is why Schmitt finds 
potentially great inequalities in the concept of human being, as ‘the human’ is a 
highly asymmetrical term, which can be manipulated for repulsive ends. In this 
respect, Schmitt no longer calls the adversary an enemy, as Tracy B. Strong 
observes. He calls him a disturber of peace, thereby designating him as an 
outlaw of humanity. He wants to remove from politics, and especially from 
international politics or internal politics of an ideological kind, any possibility of 
justifying one’s actions by invoking universal moral principles. He does so 
because he fears that otherwise any such claim will not accept any limitation of 
its scope.357 
In terms of the relation of war in the friend/enemy distinction, Schmitt 
implies that war has its own strategic, tactical and other rules and points of 
view, but that they all presuppose that the political decision has already been 
made as to who the enemy is. Therefore, Clausewitz’s familiar saying that ‘war 
is politics continued with other means’ is irrelevant in this context.358 On the 
other hand, Schmitt declares: 
 
A world in which the possibility of war is utterly eliminated, a 
completely pacified globe, would be a world without the distinction 
of friend and enemy and hence a world without politics. It is 
conceivable that such a world might contain many very interesting 
antitheses and contrasts, competitions and intrigues of every kind, 
but there would not be a meaningful antithesis whereby men could 
be required to sacrifice life, authorized to shed blood, and kill other 
human beings. For the definition of the political, it is here even 
irrelevant whether such a world without politics is desirable as an 
ideal situation. The phenomenon of the political can be understood 
only in the context of the ever present possibility of the friend-and-
enemy groupings, regardless of the aspects which this possibility 
implies for morality, aesthetics and economics.359 
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Schmitt then juxtaposes the non-political with the political and asserts that every 
religious, moral, economic, ethical or other antithesis can be used to be 
transformed into a political one if it is sufficiently strong to group human beings 
effectively into friend and enemy categories. The political does not reside in the 
battle itself, as Clausewitz claims. Battle possesses its own technical, 
psychological and military laws. The political resides in a mode of behaviour 
which clearly determines the concrete situation to distinguish between a real 
friend and a real enemy.360 He illustrates this with an example of a religious 
community. If, for instance, this community wages war against members of 
other religious communities or engages in other wars, it is already more than a 
religious community, it is a political entity. It is a political entity when it 
possesses the capacity of promoting the decisive step of declaring its adversary 
as its enemy or when, in other circumstances, it restrains its members from 
indulging in a war. Hence the power to declare war or to settle for peace 
requires a political decision of a concrete definition of one’s friend and 
enemy.361 In this sense the conservative factions of theocracy in Salem behaved 
as a political entity by waging a legal offensive against all those who questioned 
conventional norms.  
In relation to Hofstede’s analysis, there is a parallel between the absolutes 
of good and evil, which in Hofstede’s eyes are typically American, and the 
Schmittean absolutes of friend and enemy. Seen from the viewpoint of the 
1950s, Miller’s play can be seen as mirroring the Schmittean dichotomy 
proposed in the interbellum period that preceded it. Yet from this same 
viewpoint, it also pre-dicts the Schmittean revival that was manifest in the 
theories and politics of the neo-conservatives in the US in the last two decades. 
With pre-dict I mean to propose a counter-concept to preposterousness. In this 
case, my aim is not to argue that either Miller or the play was in some sense 
clairvoyant. They pre-dicted something in the sense that a script will pre-dict. 
This genre is designed to be ‘filled in,’ executed, performed, worked out. In a 
similar way, Miller’s play is a pre-diction in the socio-cultural domain.  
Pre-diction is not the only way in which the play relates to the future, 
however. There are two other ways of defining the play’s relation with the 
future in the context of persistency in culture. One way is that the play 
participates in the future, or that it depicts a culture’s persistency from the 
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vantage point of the future. The other way shows that it is chased by ghosts, or 
rather spectres, that speak both from the past and the future. This we will 
explore in our final two sections. 
 
5.3 The Crucible as a Work of Art Operating Through Time: Depicting the 
Future 
Although Miller’s play concerns a tragedy that occurred in seventeenth-century 
Salem, it is also intended to be a critique of the repressive policies of Miller’s 
contemporaries, as discussed in the previous chapter on McCarthyism in 1950s 
America. Amy D. Ronner explains that during this time of collective panic and 
hysteria, the US government hunted down innocent people, branded them 
disloyal, and denounced them as traitors. These people not only lost their friends 
and jobs, they became social outcasts. During that era, thousands of people were 
fired from positions in federal, state and local government as well as from 
private employment, including artists, university professors with leftist 
sympathies, fellow travellers and intellectuals.362 Geoffrey R. Stone is right in 
correlating Salem with the 1950s anti-Communist prosecutions in the US when 
he says: ‘like the Puritans in the Salem witch trials, the red hunters demanded 
public denunciation, purgation, humiliation and betrayal’.363 Miller himself felt 
it: he was one of the blacklisted writers who wrote a play with explicit political 
parallels between Salem and the 1950s US. 
Miller’s historical play remains a work of art of its own times, on account 
of ongoing cultural patterns, such as prosecuting people on charges of ‘guilt by 
association’, and the US government’s formulaic official response of ‘producing 
fear’ in Miller’s present. And, with so many interpretations possible in our 
present, the play also embodies an historical paradigm that supports a recurring 
cultural pattern. This paradigm can be described as a recurrent, familiar culture 
of fear, which reappears at times of national political crises like the 1950s red 
hunts or the post-9/11 antiterrorism legislation, aimed at limiting and stifling the 
basic civil liberties that US democracy takes such pride in. The post-9/11 
reality-shaping war rhetoric of president George W. Bush, in which he set apart 
certain regimes as the ‘axis of evil,’ also testifies to Carl Schmitt’s theory of the 
concept of the political in which he emphasises the sovereign’s power to define 
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the enemy on the basis of the state of exception.364 Thus this work of art echoes 
and resonates in the post-9/11 world, in which a politics of fear rules American 
democracy, and detention and torture at the behest of political oligarchs who are 
helped by modern surveillance technologies are outsourced.  
This is what Kym Thorne and Alexander Kouzmin address as a 
synchronic legislative isomorphism in response to the incidents of 9/11 in the 
US.365 US society had to forgo its cherished civil liberties in the aftermath of 
9/11 when the state responded with legislative measures such as the USA 
PATRIOT Acts 2001 and 2006, the Homeland Security Act 2002, the Detainee 
Treatment Act 2005, and the Military Commissions Act 2006.366 Frank Furedi 
sees the origin of these policy responses as a vulnerability that prevails in the 
technologically advanced democracies of the Western world at large. Their 
ultimate purpose is to reinforce resilience in these societies. However, as Furedi 
argues, paradoxically they also expose a powerful mood of insecurity in the face 
of uncertainty.367 As Gabe Mythen and Sandra Walklate argue, the security 
threats’ global character effectively democratises the distribution of risk 
everywhere. They remark that, as a consequence, the overall focus of Western 
capitalist societies has shifted from a positive impulse towards acquiring 
‘goods’ such as income, health care, housing, to avoiding ‘bad things’ such as 
environmental despoliation, AIDS and terrorism. Hence the preferred option in 
all political conflicts has now also shifted from further possession of goods and 
resources to avoidance of risk.368  
More in general, the concept of risk in modern times has ushered in an era 
of increased control, as Ulrich Beck observes:  
 
‘Risk’ inherently contains the concept of control. Pre-modern 
dangers were attributed to nature, gods and demons. Risk is a 
modern concept. It presumes decision-making. As soon as we speak 
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in terms of ‘risk’, we are talking about calculating the incalculable, 
colonizing the future.369 
 
As Beck shows, the concept of risk is a modern one. In pre-modern societies 
such as Salem, dangers were attributed to the wilderness, the supernatural and 
natural calamities. However the network societies of the modern era are always 
on the move to calculate the ‘risk’, which is an incalculable concept. This 
requires pre-emptive decision-making and a prompt and synchronic response to 
the ‘risk’ the magnitude of which is unknown. This, in other ways, is an attempt 
to change the course of history by controlling and colonising the future.  
This politics or fear, propaganda and antiterrorism hubris in a democracy 
is not similar to, but to a certain extent reminiscent of the repressive policies of 
Stalin in Russia or the politics of fear in the 1950s McCarthy era or, for that 
matter, in the US internment of Japanese citizens in the 1940s. David L. 
Altheide argues that a politics of fear rests on a discourse of fear and that this 
brand of politics mainly serves as a conceptual linkage of power, propaganda, 
news and popular culture, and intimidating symbols and experiences such as 
crime and terrorism. In order to prevent further victimisation of the social order, 
this newly defined and realised symbolic order invites protection policies and 
new interventions such as surveillance and arbitrary arrests during 
investigations.370 News media and other public information sources nourish a 
discourse that contains elements of victimisation, of heroes and villains, 
unpredictability, vulnerability and melodrama, which sustain this policy of fear. 
Beck calls it an explosion of silence after the implosion of the Twin towers.371 
Peter Stearns observes that wretched calculators of real risk now perform 
American policy because they are so easily misled and manipulated by the 
media outlets and the politicians who profit from their anxieties.372 In the 
context of the events of 9/11, the media images and the reporters’ plotlines 
conveyed the first experience of the attacks to the viewers in America and the 
rest of the world. Elizabeth Anker argues that the media reinforced the victim 
image of the country as a morally powerful victim by creating a sense of 
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countrywide empathy to revive American national identity, ideals and moral 
virtues to transform victimisation into heroic retributive action.373  
With respect to the above, Amy Ronner observes that Arthur Miller 
would in all likelihood not argue with the notion that the post-9/11 paranoia, 
along with the executive’s passion for debilitating the American Constitution 
and augmenting state power to investigate, detain and interrogate, mirrors the 
Salem hysteria and McCarthy’s project374 However, as a theatre play, The 
Crucible wants to be more than just a bland comparison between three different 
historical periods marred by the same cultural anomaly. Miller asserts that there 
is a general potential threat of violence and loss of life when irrational terror 
leads to an official sanction of moral goodness. He elaborates: ‘No man lives 
who has not got a panic button and when it is pressed by the clean white hand of 
moral duty, a certain murderous train is set in motion’.375 In addition, because of 
this general characteristic of fear, the play has survived after the Cold War, in 
countries facing imminent coups but also in countries such as Britain where 
political hysteria such as McCarthy’s has not infected society. Hence, as Jeffrey 
D. Mason argues, through his literary writing Miller exercised his right to 
advocate a contentious discursive battle in which writing would be an act of 
‘speaking out’ for an engaged public scrutiny.376  
In this respect, Miller poignantly suggests that The Crucible is a work of 
art with some sort of universal force, in the sense that it transcends time and 
space. This is particularly evident, as Robert Warshow observes, from the 
prevalence of witch hunts throughout history and from Miller’s almost 
contemptuous lack of interest in proving the reality of the Salem episode in the 
simple plot of the play and also by his refusal to limit the play’s subject to the 
timeliness of McCarthy era politics.377 Miller expands on this point as follows: 
 
I was drawn to write The Crucible not merely as a response to 
McCarthyism. It is not any more an attempt to cure witch hunts 
than Salesman is a plea for the improvement of conditions for 
travelling men, All My Sons a plea for better inspection of airplane 
parts, or A View from the Bridge an attack upon the Immigration 
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Bureau. The Crucible is, internally, Salesman’s blood brother. It is 
examining the questions I was absorbed with before ─ the conflict 
between a man’s raw deeds and his conception of himself; the 
question of whether conscience is in fact an organic part of the 
human being, and what happens when it is handed over not merely 
to the state or the mores of the time but to one’s friend or wife.378 
 
Miller’s comments quite cogently reflect that the anti-Communist witch hunts 
were not the only stimulus behind the writing of this play, with an historical 
incident as its subject. Rather, as he explains, it would be highly reductive and 
parochial if this play was read and performed only in relation to its present, as 
an allegory of its times. As a work of art, the universal subject of this play 
involves its future application. The subject of public and private guilt was first 
unearthed from history and applied to its present, when the play was written, to 
be translated to the future by means of its predictive powers, through the 
performative force of the play, predictive in a culture that has produced 
recurrent spells of politically induced fear through times.  
As Miller’s quote highlights, The Crucible seeks to include a higher 
degree of consciousness than just being limited to the walled-in interpretations 
of a work of art as another political allegory of its times. Miller celebrates 
people’s heightened awareness in his own times in the mid-twentieth century, 
compared to the generations before him when he says: ‘We are aware as no 
generation was before of the larger units that help make us and destroy us. The 
city, the nation, the world, and now the universe are never far beyond our most 
intimate sense of life’.379 Through his play Miller offers an implicit alternative 
to the paranoid politics in the shape of law and good faith, examples which he 
finds in the American Constitution and the Bill of Rights. These, he argues, ‘de-
symbolize the individual and consider him as the sum of his acts rather than his 
hidden thoughts and propensities for plotting evil’.380 Still, according to Miller, 
we as a species also inevitably ‘plot evil’ and engage in witch hunts, for 
instance, that bring us pain, death and destruction. Yet in order to confront 
systematised panic in society, even when they thrive on a grain of fact, 
individuals have to wage a battle for truth by speaking up or confronting it 
through other means like art, as Miller himself did by writing this play.  
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Proctor’s outburst at the end of Act 3 refers to this impulse, when he 
addresses Danforth and Hale: 
 
A fire, a fire is burning! I hear the boot of Lucifer; I see his filthy 
face! And it is my face, and yours, Danforth! For them that quail to 
bring men out of ignorance, as I have quailed, and as you quail now 
when you know in all your black hearts that this be fraud ─ God 
damns our kind especially, and we will burn, we will burn 
together!381 
 
Proctor’s vehement expostulation, although in the end not heeded by the 
inflexible Danforth in the play, is in tune with Miller’s who advocates speaking 
the truth to power, especially when power is affixed to irrationality, when it is 
prone to disseminating prodigious fear and tempting mistrust of every individual 
in his or her fellow citizens.  
That said, the question remains whether the play is ‘universal’ with regard 
to its future operation, or whether it is also specifically American. Miller’s 
thesis may concern the ubiquitous nature of the witch hunts generally in 
suggesting that they can break out at any time and in any place. The malevolent 
forces that propel witch hunts can be considered to be omnipresent, as Miller 
seems to imply. His views on the metaphysical dualism of all times are evident 
from his comments on the play: 
 
Like Reverend Hale and the others on this stage, we conceive the 
Devil as a necessary part of a respectable view of cosmology. Ours 
is a divided empire in which certain ideas and emotions and actions 
are of God, and their opposites are of Lucifer. It is as impossible 
for most men to conceive of a morality without sin as of an earth 
without ‘sky.’ Since 1692, a great but superficial change has wiped 
out God’s beard and the Devil’s horns, but the world is still gripped 
between two diametrically opposed absolutes. The concept of 
unity, in which positive and negative are attributes of the same 
force, in which good and evil are relative, ever-changing, and 
always joined to the same phenomenon – such a concept is still 
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reserved to the physical sciences and to the few who have grasped 
the history of ideas.382 
 
According to Miller, in contrast to the dispassionate approach followed in the 
physical sciences for the understanding of positive and negative aspects as 
relative and inalienable from each other in the whole of one cosmic force, the 
world and its political affairs are still defined by the absolutism of good and 
evil, and a quasi dualist perspective that is perilously synonymous with 
metaphysical worldviews.  
In his analysis of the religiously charged rhetoric of American presidents 
such as Andrew Jackson (1829), Ronald Reagan (1984) and George W. Bush 
(2003) Paul Fletcher has analysed how all three explicitly echo Puritan 
moralism and America’s providential mission for the sake of global justice and 
fulfilment of the divine will. This conscious mixing of piety with polity in US 
global liberal governance policies has a transcendental scope with a sacralised 
temporality and historicisation of eschatology.383 Joshua Gunn also observes 
this diabolical rhetoric in American political culture with reference to the Red 
Scare when he states:  
 
Unlike the Catholic stress on the necessity of evidence of demonic 
invasion (the dialogic character), the exorcism common in US 
political discourse is more self-sealing, evangelical, and Protestant, 
stressing the unseen and silent character itself as evidence for 
mandating a war-like intervention.384 
 
Thus, as Gunn states, a monster-creating spiritual warfare mission is embedded 
in the US political lexicon, in which good and evil are predefined to vilify and 
dehumanise the adversary. In this respect, Miller partakes in a culture as much 
as he analyses it. In other words, he reflects himself, implicitly, in the mirror of 
persistency of a specific culture. This persistency does not just relate to a past, it 
incorporates a future.  
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In the context of today’s policies, Immanuel Kant’s ideas of just and 
unjust enemies in the context of a future perpetual peace are relevant. To Kant, 
pre-emptive wars are illegitimate because they imply that, in a natural state, 
adversaries are bent on annihilating each other. However, his idea of an unjust 
enemy in a lawless culture is important for wars that are necessary to escape the 
violent state of nature and establish a legal order in society. Kant’s ideas are 
fleshed out by Philip Crone, who reads Kant through Fabio Vander: 
 
An unjust enemy for Kant is one who resists going from ‘the state 
of nature’ to ‘the juridical state’. At first sight even this is 
problematic, even redundant because ‘the state of nature is itself an 
unjust state’ and all subjects in it (including the friends and the 
enemies alike) are unjust. But the redundancy disappears when one 
considers that here Kant is dealing with another ‘border 
situation’ . . . because it is not a situation of two enemies in the 
‘state of nature’ . . . but of one who tries to overcome this 
condition, while the other opposes the restoration of legality and 
politics.385  
 
Fabio Vander is quoted here to support Crone’s argument that the precise point 
of difference between Schmitt and Kant is that of the conceptualisation of a just 
and unjust enemy. Schmitt takes a radical stance on the definition of friend and 
enemy whereas Kant goes further and sees a war between the two factions as a 
war between a primitive state of nature and the progressive political forces that 
strive for ultimate peace and legal order. Schmitt, as Fabio Vander observes, 
wrongly understands Kant’s concept of the unjust enemy as discriminatory 
because of the presupposition that one state is superior to the other. It is 
precisely because of this misunderstanding and the confusion around the 
concept of just and unjust enemy that Schmitt dismisses Kant’s idea of limits in 
military action by proposing a homogenisation of all subjects, thus cancelling all 
differences.  
However, in modern contexts the concept of a punitive, pre-emptive and 
exterminating war is increasingly considered as just on account of certain states 
which are seen as not complying with international law, the so-called ‘rogue 
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states.’ Robert Bernasconi’s argument in relation to Kant’s idea of culmination 
of human history is relevant here when he says: 
 
The Kantian belief in peace as the culmination of human history 
does not so much search for points of agreement that might allow 
nations to live together; it is capable of inventing enemies where 
none previously existed. Hence, today, the United States of 
America sometimes considers as its enemies nations that are not 
seen as democratic or committed to free trade: they are judged to 
have refused the future in which peace will be secured. The United 
States can do so because it constitutes itself as at the vanguard of 
history. It is the representative of the future in the present; it is 
tomorrow today. By declaring itself the embodiment of the future, 
this one country claims for itself the right to exercise the 
jurisdiction of history: It, thus, claims the right to judge other 
peoples and governments by what they have done to promote or 
impair cosmopolitanism; the right to impose that judgment by 
force, if necessary; and the right to be free of the judgment of 
others because it alone represents this future. This may be a long 
way from what Kant intended when he declared future generations 
will judge peoples and governments according to what they have 
done to promote or to hinder the objectives of cosmopolitanism.386 
 
Robert Bernasconi too finds in the political culture of the US adrift from Kant’s 
liberal goals of perpetual peace because amongst Western nations there is an 
ubiquitous propensity to invent new enemies in their political interactions with 
nations that do not conform with their cherished liberal democratic goals 
(including peace). Certainly, in liberalism, which has hardly leaned towards 
pacifism throughout Western history, war is seen with suspicion for fear of its 
arbitrariness in terms of power and force. Yet the compulsion to go to war to 
establish perpetual peace in the spirit of Kant’s liberal assumptions 
simultaneously becomes a reason for further violence. As Nicholas Rengger 
states, it ‘is hardly surprising that the origins of liberal thinking in modern 
Europe are closely related to a rise in more general opposition both to war and, 
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as a consequence, to those assumptions that appear to make war more likely’,387 
Ulrich Beck defines the characteristics of post-national war in a similar way 
when he states: 
 
By contrast, what characterizes post-national war? The liquefaction 
and evaporation of the basic distinction that constitutes nation-state 
wars. In the place of ‘either-or’ appears ‘both-and’: both war and 
peace, both police and military, both crime and war, both civilian 
and soldier.388 
 
Thus, in post-national warfare, the classical distinction prevalent in international 
law between war and peace, enemy and criminal, soldier and civilian has been 
blurred and an ambivalent style of warfare has taken its place in which peace 
and negotiations are interspersed with brutality and bloodshed.  
In this context, the United States is imposing its democratic values 
unilaterally on states that wish to follow their own cultural and ideological 
modes of governance. And post-national warfare is her principal instrument. 
Kant’s concept of perpetual peace and his idea of a universal history with 
cosmopolitan purpose were seen as inventive means for creating peace at all 
costs, including war. Yet if peace is defined as ‘the good’ or ‘the just’, then, 
here again, ‘evil’ needs to be destroyed, not so much with an eye on the present, 
but from the vantage point of the future. This brings me back to the absolutes 
defined by Miller as elements that are not so much universal as culture-specific 
and that may be embodied in ghosts, or rather spectres, that chase the subjects 
participating in a culture from both the past and the future. 
 
5.4 The Persistency of Spectres: From the Past and the Future 
The Crucible, in a paradoxical sense, can be considered as having contributed to 
the pool of fear that McCarthy and his affiliates created in the 1950s, by 
representing the seventeenth-century witch-craze. Through a reductive lens, the 
play may be viewed as somehow participating in the production of fear. 
Admittedly, for Miller the implicit and desired potential of the play lies in its 
power to open up history by revealing the trajectory of a culture. In The 
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Crucible, Miller elaborates on this cultural trajectory of diabolism in the US 
political space as follows:  
 
At this writing, only England has held back before the temptations 
of contemporary diabolism. In the countries of the Communist 
ideology, all resistance of any import is linked to the totally malign 
capitalist succubi, and in America any man who is not reactionary 
in his views is open to the charge of alliance with the Red hell. 
Political opposition, thereby, is given an inhuman overlay which 
then justifies the abrogation of all normally applied customs of 
civilized intercourse. A political policy is equated with moral right, 
and opposition to it with diabolical malevolence. Once such an 
equation is effectively made, society becomes a congerie of plots 
and counterplots, and the main role of government changes from 
that of the arbiter to that of the scourge of God.389 
 
Thus, Miller considers that the rhetoric of demonology and exorcism in the 
American political arena is intentionally floated, not only to fulfil America’s 
interests all over the world but also to control its population at home. Robert L. 
Ivie shares similar insights when he says that a trope of savagery, analogous to 
diabolism, though not unique to America, is certainly indigenous to the country. 
He argues that this discourse of savagery versus civilization in US war rhetoric 
has been used to quell dissent, to rally the nation along state policy and 
inoculate the public against alternative perspectives. For instance, during the 
1812 war against Britain, the colonial rulers were framed as haughty pirates, 
beasts of prey, ruthless murderers and crazed tyrants. Likewise, in the 1846 
expansionist war against Mexico, the campaign was portrayed by President Polk 
as a responsible act of national defence against an irresponsible Mexican 
aggressor and foe who was as unstable as a storm. During the late nineteenth-
century imperial campaign in the Philippines, President McKinley justified the 
act to uplift, civilise and Christianise the locals who, as he proclaimed, were 
unable to govern themselves.390 Thus this trope of savagery has literally and 
metaphorically worked in a culture to engender patriotism reflexively rather 
than thoughtfully.  
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Democracy’s political lexicon, in the US, contains religious under- and 
overtones of a dichotomous rhetoric of good and evil which is intermittently 
used to define its ‘self’ against the ‘other’ in an expanding empire, waging wars 
or doing interventions abroad. Language and rhetoric play a pivotal role, within 
a democracy. Dissent must also come from within this framework, and Ivie 
maintains that ‘language is not ideologically neutral, but it is subject to 
rhetorical critique from within. Otherwise language rigidifies and devolves into 
violence, spawning self-sustaining rituals of vilification and victimization’.391 
The political antagonism in Soviet Russia and the United States made labelling 
their political opponents as simply either capitalist or ‘red’ ineffectual in their 
respective societies. The point was to frame them as being in alliance with the 
Devil. Both societies were finely divided between the entirely good or the 
entirely wicked during the Cold War era thanks to the power of the propaganda 
machinery at work in each country. In this context, Ivie explains the 
metaphorical equation of Soviet Russia as a savage ‘other’ in America’s public 
consciousness as follows: 
 
Americans traditionally have exonerated themselves of any guilt 
for war, hot or cold, by decivilizing the image of their adversaries. 
This ‘victimage ritual,’ enacted with generic regularity, has 
sanctified the ideals of peace, freedom and democracy. It has 
legitimized total victory over a foe caricatured as irrational, 
coercive and aggressive, i.e., a foe who is totally uncivilized and 
therefore perfectly evil.392 
 
This type of antagonism, which is derived from popular notions such as 
American exceptionalism and self-veneration, appear to haunt US political 
culture and this lies at the core of Miller’s play as well. In terms of its artistic 
merit, but also of its political and ethical powers, there is much more to The 
Crucible than seventeenth-century hysteria or the 1950s ousting of Communists 
from government and the ranks of the American artistic and intellectual elite. It 
is primarily its predictive potential that makes the play in today’s post-9/11 
world as probing as it was in the 1950s. In the play, Miller transcends time and 
place, introducing us to the forces behind all irrational persecutions. As Ronner 
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states, he not only depicts the warped psyches of those who pursue such 
campaigns of terror in historically specific circumstances, but also discloses the 
results of witch hunts: death, destroyed lives, blighted communities, illegitimate 
legal systems and deified lies shrouded in patriotic rhetoric and propaganda.393 
The play works through time in terms of haunting ghosts, as spectres that will 
not disappear. 
My argument was inspired by the work of Graff Zivin, in a chapter called 
‘Allegory and Hauntology’, in which she also deals with The Crucible. Her idea 
is as follows: 
 
The present chapter builds upon my argument in previous work that 
just as the historical conversion of Jews, which violently 
assimilated the Jewish other into the imperialism of the same, left 
remainders of Jewish difference, contemporary artistic works that 
seek to figuratively absorb the other of history into the present are 
similarly disrupted by an element of alterity that makes total 
incorporation impossible … This traumatic kernel that stands at the 
heart of the aesthetic work behaves as a specter in the sense 
discussed by Derrida, a spirit-become-flesh that is neither spirit nor 
flesh.394 
 
In her dealing with The Crucible, as the odd one out in relation to South 
American works of art in particular, Graff Zivin defines the traumatic kernel, 
here, as a form of inquisition. The question, however, is whether this is truly the 
spectral point if, in the contemporary situation, forms of inquisition and torture 
are decisively real. In contrast, the spectre belongs to the metaphysical jargon, 
as Jacques Derrida defined it, when elaborating on the spectre of Marx in the 
post-Cold War age:  
 
The specter, as its name indicates, is the frequency of a certain 
visibility. But the visibility of the invisible. And visibility, by its 
essence, is not seen, which is why it remains epekiena tes ousias, 
beyond the phenomenon or beyond being. The specter is also, 
among other things, what one imagines, what one thinks, one sees 
and which one projects – on an imaginary screen where there is 
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nothing to see. Not even the screen sometimes, and a screen always 
has, at bottom, in the bottom or background that it is, a structure of 
disappearing apparition. But now, one can no longer get any shut-
eye, being so intent to watch out for the return […] the specter first 
of all sees us. From the other side of the eye, visor effect, it looks at 
us even before we see it or even before we see period. We feel 
ourselves observed, sometimes under surveillance by it even before 
any apparition. Especially – and this is the event, for the specter is 
of the event — it sees us during a visit. It (re) pays us a visit […] 
The latter does not always mark the moment of a generous 
apparition or a friendly vision; it can signify strict inspection or 
violent search, consequent persecution, implacable concatenation. 
The social mode of haunting, its original style could also be called, 
taking into account this repetition, frequentation.395 
 
Derrida, in the first part of this quote, indicates that the word ‘specter’ belongs 
to the world of charm and incantation and its meaning corresponds to the 
recurrence of a certain phenomenon which is not corporeal. Yet its visibility is 
acknowledged despite the fact that it does not exist in physical form. It can be 
an illusion, a product of one’s mind, an imaginary idea which is projected in the 
realm of the real world. This can be a hallucination, including the unknown 
apparitions and ghostly images which one’s mind can craft. One can convince, 
for instance, the crowds with one’s fervent rhetoric and intent only for a spectre 
to reappear as a result of which an entire society can be obsessed or haunted by 
its fear. This is precisely how Salem’s ‘possessed’ girls invoked spirits, witches 
and diabolism in 1692, and also how Joseph McCarthy ventured to demonise the 
communists in the US in the 1950s.  
Derrida’s argument, however, does more than allowing us to analyse 
things from the past. In a basic sense, the spectre is a force from the vantage 
point of the future in that it looks at us first, before we see it. Here, Derrida 
speaks of the spectre’s origin and birth when he says that it belongs to the 
‘event,’ and it first of all sees us in a concrete form. This means that there is an 
untoward prior event associated with the spectre that accounts for its feared 
recurrence and reception during its reappearance in different guises and this 
reappearance is something of the future. The spectre looks at us in the course of 
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a visit. Later it repays us a visit, which is the process of social haunting due to 
apparitions of the event that may infest memory with a trauma effect. It is the 
most disagreeable scenario, which brings in its wake persecution, violence and, 
as in case of the contemporary scenario, rendition and just wars. Derrida calls 
this repetitive social haunting by the spectre of the event frequentation. We are 
being frequented, with a certain frequency, i.e. repetition. In the very word 
‘frequented’ past and future are operative as well.  
When Derrida states that the spectre appears to manifest itself in a 
visitation, it is not present in a concrete and tangible form but becomes known 
through its representation by those who are haunted by it. Derrida thus speaks of 
the spectre’s non-presence and demands that its time and history be taken into 
consideration. He calls it the singularity of its temporality or of its historicity.396 
In the case of the spectre of fear, the production and reproduction of fear in 
different historical periods of the United States’ social history, it is necessary for 
these specific political events and cultural circumstances be known first, which 
in turn resurrect this spectre to haunt the people in almost isomorphic patterns. 
Derrida quotes from The Eighteenth Brumaire: 
 
Men make their own history but they do not make it just as they 
please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by 
themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given 
and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all the dead 
generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living.397 
 
In one sense, Derrida states that the ghost of tradition and of the past always 
lurks among the new generations. In the case of US history, US society prides 
itself on, and the country has enormously benefitted from, its democratic 
tradition and the sacrifices of its founding fathers. But equally the ghosts of its 
past have persistently frequented its society, as they belong to their collective 
memory. As such, however, in their frequenting they embody the future. The 
‘evil’ of Salem, for instance, has burdened the following generations through its 
phantom-like reappearance in the 1950s and also in the first decade of the 
twenty-first century. Of course, the spectres as such do not exist independently, 
they have to be made, time and again, especially in moments of crisis, as 
Derrida writes: 
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And just when they seem engaged in revolutionizing themselves 
and things, in creating something that has never yet existed, 
precisely in such periods of revolutionary crisis they anxiously 
conjure up the spirits of the past to their service and borrow from 
them names, battle-cries and costumes in order to present the new 
scene of world history in this time-honoured disguise and this 
borrowed language.398 
 
Derrida illustrates the phenomenon of conjuring up the spirits from the past 
when there is an impulse for change and transformation on a revolutionary 
scale. The spirits of evil were a convenient source, for instance, to equate with 
the red menace in the United States during the early years of the Cold War and 
to fight communism globally. This is why, as Derrida rightly points out, familiar 
tactics were applied in confronting the enemy. The post-9/11 scenario, likewise, 
promises to make history by arousing the same old spectres, ghosts and spirits. 
There is an emphasis on the positive conjuring up of the past but, Derrida adds, 
it is not clear whether the ghost or the spirit from the past will only be making a 
friendly visit. There is always a likelihood that this conjuring up is only 
seemingly welcoming and hospitable, since it arouses the dead, makes or lets 
them come alive, and is never free from anxiety and trauma. Therefore, as 
Derrida maintains, it automatically becomes a moment of repulsion but also of 
restriction.399 
 The Crucible clearly plays with the frequent recurrence of ghosts, and 
projects a spectre-like power itself, as if it were lying in wait for the moment to 
frequent its audience. Yet this is not all that can be said about the play’s role 
with regard to cultural persistency. I would like to bring my argument to an end 
by moving to my conclusion in which I will examine whether there is more than 
a culture’s future persistency, or whether there is space for renewal in the future. 
For this I will return to my initial question: Why did Miller choose a play to 
respond to the politics of McCarthyism in the 1950s. I will expand this question 
into: Why does Miller’s text, as a play, still work, and why will it still be 
working?  
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Conclusion: Written for an Occasion 
 
Since the 1970s art’s subversive potential has been the hobbyhorse of many 
academics in the humanities and social sciences. This political potential of art, 
one that has proved to be relevant and important in many cases, especially in 
countries subjected to a totalitarian or dictatorial regime, has been propagated 
by numerous movements such as Communism, feminism, operaism, 
autonomism and through a variety of approaches such as deconstruction, gender 
theory, queer theory and postcolonial theory. Subversion has often been 
addressed in relation to post-structuralism, and the name that would pop up most 
often in that context is Michel Foucault. He is one of the major theorists on the 
relation between state, culture, art and power.400 And, although at some point in 
his work subversion seemed to be nigh impossible since any subversion would 
rapidly be taken up by a power system that transcended and organised society, it 
later became a dominant theme.401 In this respect, it would be quite easy to 
argue that The Crucible ‘subverted’ McCarthyism. Still, the play has started to 
travel through time, and we will have to see whether it has passed the test of 
time.402 Its subversive potential is no longer predominant. In my reading, its 
potential for the present and the future lies in the fact that it speaks the truth, a 
dominant theme in Foucault’s later work.403 Instead of subverting powers that 
be, it confronts them, albeit not all powers. In fact, it is a play waiting for a 
specific situation.  
In the history of drama and theatre, many pre-eighteenth-century plays 
were occasion plays. Most of Shakespeare’s plays were occasion plays. Lope de 
Vega wrote hundreds of them (it is said that he wrote 1800 comedies). The irony 
is that they lost this ‘occasional’ quality and became masterpieces that have 
been considered as near universal. The occasion play as a genre was not deemed 
worthy of serious, sustained academic attention. Shakespeare has become an 
academic industry, but the genre of the occasion play is central to a single cause 
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here and there. Yet in a sense The Crucible is an occasion play, be it in reverse. 
It was written for the occasion of McCarthyism. Since then the play has 
survived, as performances in the last decade show. As a result, we could 
consider it as ‘universal,’ much like Hamlet, which has been performed for 
centuries, in many different circumstances and in many different circles and 
countries. Yet, The Crucible is different. It is a specific play in that it needs an 
occasion and has been written for an occasion where its potential can be fully 
realised. The situation it is written for is one in which a hegemonic power 
produces an atmosphere of fear and paranoia and uses this atmosphere to hunt 
down real or imagined opponents, appearing to be almost invincible, while it 
can only exist on the basis of fanatic belief. It is this type of situation The 
Crucible was aimed at and is now waiting for, an ‘appropriate time’ when it will 
become an ‘opportunity’, the two etymological roots of the term ‘occasion’. 
This is not to say, of course, that the play cannot be performed at any given 
time. It can be performed at will and, in fact, has been performed in many 
places, and on many ‘occasions’. However, if it is just a performance like any 
other, it will probably be experienced as any other play. Yet in my reading, it is 
a play that waits for not just any occasion but for the occasion, in its potential to 
speak the truth or to facilitate a truth practice. 
If we come back to the issue of subversion, the play is not really 
subversive. The kind of tyrannical or totalitarian power that I have just sketched 
is not really vulnerable in terms of subversion. It will remove subversion with 
the sweep of a hand, a knock on the door, an asylum that is able to keep all 
forms of mentally deranged within its walls. Again, the power of The Crucible 
does not lie in the fact that it is subversive. It resides in speaking the truth. Such 
truth-speaking was central in Foucault’s later work and it was highly theatrical 
in structure.  
As if to emphasize the theatrical structure of truth-speaking, Foucault 
calls it at some point a game, on the ground that the participants in the 
conversation must be willing to take on their role. Those in power will have to 
adopt the role of those willing to listen. This is to say that the one speaking the 
truth does not speak in poetic addresses. He or she does not possess truth, he or 
she speaks it, even if it is an uncomfortable truth, in some form of public space, 
or in an enclosed space where people gather (like the ecclesia). In speaking, the 
one speaking the truth takes a risk. Speaking the truth may cost him his life. The 
game is therefore not just a game. Speaking the truth can be a matter of life and 
death. This fact is sign for the fact that truth speech isn’t being a matter of 
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subversion but of confrontation. In this sense it is also useful to consider the 
situation in terms of conversation, or even dialogue. Speaking the truth does not 
resemble the Socratic dialogue, nor is truth an issue of conversation for that 
matter. The listeners’ reaction, whether they agree or not, does not concern the 
speaker of the truth. Her truth confronts. Those in power will act as they see fit. 
They may change their mind, their ways of acting, or they may kill the one 
speaking the truth.404 
The Crucible acts, as a whole, in terms of speaking the truth, regardless of 
the consequences. As a theatre play it does need a theatrical situation, however, 
in which it can come forward to confront the powers that be with its truth. 
Obviously, one can imagine situations where any play that has not been 
sanctioned beforehand is forbidden. In such situations, however, and where it is 
allowed to come forward on its own terms, The Crucible can act as a 
confrontation. This would not hold, admittedly, when the political system is 
functioning properly. However, in the circumstances that I described earlier, The 
Crucible works as a confrontation. Those willing to speak in such a situation 
will know what they are doing, and will have to accept the rules of the game 
governing speaking the truth. They have to be willing to risk their lives. 
However, as I just pointed out, it would seem that people have to decide 
to speak the truth first and then use The Crucible for that purpose. It also works 
the other way around, however. Practising the play may help individuals and 
collectives dare to speak the truth. In this respect, the play is not just a play that 
can be performed; it also has a performative quality in the sense of speech act 
theory. Its power resides not only in its ability to be performed but also in its 
theatrical potential when it is read.  
As we have seen in the previous chapter, The Crucible’s truth does not lie 
in the fact that it takes a particular stand and shows it to be the right one. The 
play mimics, represents and criticises a recurrent cultural pattern in US society. 
By working through the different positions involved, the play’s truth, in 
showing the complexity of the situation instead of simplifying it, essentially 
confronts people with the ugly truth. And it is through performativity that this 
confrontation can become much more than a simple confrontation of speaking 
the truth. On this subject, let me turn to Judith Butler’s Excitable Speech. 
In Excitable Speech, Judith Butler is both concerned with cultural 
persistency and renewal, both in relation to the subject’s formation and to 
power. At some point, she wonders how it is possible that norms produced by 
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human beings and aimed at regulation start to react with the embodied lives of 
human ‘selves’ in such a way that a ‘normative embodiment of norms’ comes 
into being. In order to explain this, Butler first considers Pierre Bourdieu’s 
option in his counter-reading of Austin’s idea of performativity. For Austin, as 
is well-known, the performative speech act is either felicitous or not. Yet, what 
determines a felicitous or infelicitous outcome? According to Bourdieu, the 
determining factor is the person who is legally empowered to speak. This of 
course creates the problem of how something new can ever come into being. 
Butler explains this with the help of Bourdieu’s example of the ritual. Rituals 
need to be performed on the basis of the correct rules and so-called 
prescriptions, otherwise they become invalid, or infelicitous. However, as Butler 
argues, the ritual that interrupts another, valid, ritual can also be the ritual of the 
future. Bourdieu’s analysis is ultimately unsatisfactory since he cannot explain 
how the non-conventional repetition of a conventional formula can nevertheless 
have formative powers. The issue of repetition, or iterability, is critical in this 
respect. Butler is clearly not dealing with ‘new’ acts that can be new as such. In 
fact she is dealing with the logic of repetition, of iterability.405  
It is this logic of iteration that is paradigmatically embodied by any 
theatrical text, since the text aims at its own repetition, in a double sense: by 
means of rehearsals and by means of a repeated performance. Moreover, on a 
level that is both more concrete and more abstract, the text is a matter of the 
performative as opposed to the theatrical performance. On a textual level, The 
Crucible demands to be carried out not merely as a theatrical performance but as 
a performative search for a context. This is where Derrida comes in with his 
reading of Austin. Derrida reckons that the power of the performative is not so 
much dependent on the context as on its breaking with previous contexts and 
abilities to work again in new contexts. Inasmuch as any performative is 
conventional and ritualistic, it is consistent repetition that keeps its power alive. 
In other words, the performative is not solely linked to one context but to 
contexts to come. Performative speech acts have the same power here as the 
written word, or any written sign. These carry a power of their own that is able 
to break a given context, not as a performative aside but as a structural 
element.406  
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Although Butler considers this to be an important improvement on 
Bourdieu’s reading of Austin, the question of historicity nevertheless puzzles 
her. If breaking the context and the subsequent possibility of reversal is 
structural, why does it only work sometimes? Derrida, in his approach of this 
question, appears to lack a social analysis of felicitous or infelicitous 
performatives. For such an analysis, Butler turns to the principal embodiedness 
of speech acts. Even when things are written down, codified or made into law, 
there has to be a body, in the end, that expresses them. The body is the place of 
social history and the instrument of the production of an almost self-evident 
realisation of this social history.407 By analogy, performative speech acts are not 
just the expression of already existing conventions and societal bodies, they also 
produce them. As such they are never self-evidently ‘covered’. On the contrary 
they may give rise to ‘renewed appropriations’.408 This is why I would like to 
consider The Crucible as a form of a scenario. A scenario is finished but needs 
to be carried out and in being done will lead to something new. Its Latin 
etymology is, literally, ‘of stage scenes’ and it is on these scenes that the text, 
from its status as sketch, needs to be actualised.  
This also the stage where speaking the truth, in this case through The 
Crucible, is confrontational. It is not saying something new, it is saying 
something that people, whether in power or not, already know. The power of 
The Crucible lies in its search for a context which it can open up, not because it 
is realising an alternative but because it repeats the language of the powers that 
defined this context in the first place. The text works paradigmatically here as a 
theatrical text. The performative, in Butler and Austin’s sense, demands that we 
do what we say, or rather that expression and action coincide. A performance of 
The Crucible in any shape and on any scale can only become a performative 
when it is brought in the open and made public, in terms of speaking the truth. 
In this context, it extends beyond the realm of mere rehearsal of the text. It 
demands a sequence of performances.  
Happy are the times that do not call for a play such as The Crucible. If the 
times are such that they engender a play by creating the occasion the play is 
waiting for, its performance would not merely be a matter of going through the 
motions, even if only as a ritual. The play’s performative powers demand that it 
be enacted with the courage of truth defined by Foucault. The game at stake, as 
Foucault calls it, comes with its own risks. As long as the ruling powers accept 
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to be told the truth, the actors enacting the play will be relatively safe. But it is 
their acting that may also provoke violent, ruthless responses. Such is the game 
of truth, such is the risk of truth-practices. In this respect, truth-practices cannot 
be a simple matter of individual responsibility. According to Foucault, the 
factors involved in truth-practices can be defined as follows: 
 
What is involved, rather, is the analysis of complex relations 
between three distinct elements none of which can be reduced to or 
absorbed by the others, but whose relations are constitutive of each 
other. These three elements are: forms of knowledge (saviors), 
studied in terms of their specific modes of veridiction; relations of 
power, not studied as an emanation of a substantial and invasive 
power, but in the procedures by which people’s conduct is 
governed; and finally the modes of formation of the subject through 
practices of self. It seems to me that by carrying out this triple 
theoretical shift – from the theme of acquired knowledge to that of 
veridiction, from the theme of domination to that of 
governmentality, and from the theme of the individual to that of the 
practices of self – we can study the relations between truth, power, 
and subject without ever reducing each of them to the others.409  
 
As may be clear from this quote, a play such as The Crucible, when not simply 
performed like any other play at any given time but on the occasion that it has 
been waiting for, will not merely involve individuals acting, although it will 
certainly always require individual courage. The actions they are engaged in, 
however, relate to the three elements mentioned above of subjectivity and 
power, of the individual and collective self. When acted out as such, performing 
the play becomes an action, in Arendt’s sense: a public, political act, in what 
Hannah Arendt called a space of appearance, a theatrical space that is, in which 
the audience takes as much part as the actors – and with unpredictable 
outcomes. 
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Theater als  waarheidspraktijk: Arthur Miller’s The Crucible – een stuk 
wachtend op de gelegenheid 
In de geschiedenis van de literatuur en het theater zijn veel werken geschreven 
voor een gelegenheid. Misschien zijn er zelfs heel veel meer stukken geschreven 
voor een gelegenheid dan dat ze ‘autonoom’ geschreven zijn, aangezien de 
autonome productie van literatuur (voor zover die werkelijk bestaat) een redelijk 
modern fenomeen is. Alle klassieke stukken uit de Griekse oudheid die nu nog 
worden gelezen en opgevoerd  zijn inderdaad niet geschreven ‘voor de 
eeuwigheid’, maar voor een specifieke, feestelijke, deels ook rituele 
gelegenheid. Ovidius boude uitspraak dat hij met zijn Metamorfosen een werk 
zou hebben geschapen dat de eeuwen ging trotseren, is een vreemde, bijna 
Romantische oprisping in een veel groter koor van stemmen dat zegt een werk 
te hebben gemaakt omdat er voor werd betaald, omdat iemand er om had 
gevraagd, omdat de gelegenheid zich voordeed. Als genre heeft het 
gelegenheidswerk bijna geen onafhankelijke aandacht gekregen. Meestal 
worden bijvoorbeeld gelegenheidsgedichten bestudeerd in de marge van de 
literatuur, omdat ze cultureel interessant zijn (maar niet literair), of omdat ze 
relevante informatie bevatten in een biografische context. Centraal in dit 
proefschrift staat niet een regulier gelegenheidsstuk, ofschoon het wel werd 
gemaakt in en voor een specifieke situatie. Arthur Miller’s The Crucible werd 
geschreven in 1952 en voor het eerst opgevoerd in 1953 als rechtstreeks 
antwoord op het zogeheten McCarthyisme, de vanuit het congres georkestreerde 
nationale jacht op communisten in de VS. Mijn vraag aangaande dit stuk is of 
het niet afwijkt van reguliere toneelstukken doordat het alleen werkelijk actief 
kan worden bij een speciale gelegenheid.  
 Met The Crucible neemt Miller ons mee terug in de tijd, naar 
gebeurtenissen die plaatsvonden in 1692, in het dorpje Salem, iets ten westen 
van het stadje met dezelfde naam. Meerdere meisjes in het huis van een 
dominee leden opeens aan merkwaardige kwalen, werden onderzocht door de 
dokter die verklaarde dat ze van de duivel bezeten waren. De meisjes en hun 
ouders raakten nu overtuigd van het feit dat ze behekst waren. Dat bracht een 
expert binnen op het gebied van de demonologie die de beschuldiging van de 
meisjes onderzocht in hoeverre sommigen in het dorp bezig waren met zwarte 
magie. Meer mensen kregen last van de duivel, de beschuldigingen namen toe, 
van eerst 49 naar de 150 die uiteindelijk werden gedaagd en van wie het 
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merendeel vrijkwam (onder andere na te hebben bekend).  Dertien vrouwen, zes 
mannen en twee honden werden gehangen; twee mensen stierven er in het 
gevang; een beklaagde die weigerde zich te verdedigen werd dood gedrukt met 
een enorme lading stenen. Maar de scepsis nam toe en de gouverneur greep in. 
Het proces werd verdaagd en toen het werd hervat, werd iedereen die nog op de 
lijst stond vrijgesproken.  
Het stuk werd in het Nederlands (niet geheel adequaat) vertaald als ‘De 
vuurproef’ en meer recent, door Kristien Hemmerechts in 2007, als 
‘Heksenjacht’ (naar aanleiding van een Duitse vertaling) voor een opvoering 
door Het Nationale Toneel. Een van de recensenten merkte toen op:  
 
Maar om het stuk, zoals het gezelschap doet, ‘een moderne klassieker’ te 
noemen ‘die in deze tijd van oplevend religieus fanatisme en angst voor 
terrorisme niets aan zeggingskracht heeft verloren’, vind ik nog veel 
raarder. Worden we hiermee voorbereid op de komst van een 
(islamitische) theocratie waarin we allemaal het haasje zijn?  
Hans Oranje, ‘Nieuwe ‘Heksenjacht’ is in ieder geval stijlvast’, Trouw 
06-03-2007. 
 
Allereerst lijkt de recensent te twijfelen aan de bestempeling van dit stuk als 
‘klassieker’, wat al veelzeggend genoeg is. Is het soms een gelegenheidsstuk? 
Wellicht in dat kader vindt hij de reden om het stuk op te voeren niet voldoende 
gemotiveerd. ‘We’ leven, in Nederland althans, immers niet in een theocratie. 
Dat geeft aan dat de recensent eigenlijk vindt dat het stuk alleen goed kan 
functioneren, of met reden kan worden opgevoerd, in een situatie die 
vergelijkbaar is met een theocratie.  
Is het inderdaad zo dat het stuk geschreven is voor zo’n specifieke situatie 
dat het alleen weer goed tot leven kan komen als een vergelijkbare situatie zich 
weer voordoet? In dat geval is het een soort omgekeerd gelegenheidsstuk; dan is 
het is niet zozeer, of niet alleen, gemaakt voor een gelegenheid maar wacht het 
sindsdien op een gelegenheid. Mijn studie aangaande The Crucible neemt dit als 
uitgangspunt en bestudeert hoe het stuk actief was en weer kan worden bij een 
gelegenheid, namelijk als een vorm van waarheidspraktijk. Mijn 




1. Waarom koos Miller een toneelstuk als medium om te reageren op het 
McCarthyism van de jaren 50 in de 20e eeuw; had eenzelfde resultaat niet 
kunnen zijn bereikt met een roman, een gedicht of een essay?  
2. Hoe heeft de manier gefunctioneerd waarop geschiedenis wordt 
gerepresenteerd in het stuk, direct en indirect; en hoe kan die dramatisch 
functioneren om geschiedenis te actualiseren (en deze term ‘actualiseren’ 
zal van belang zijn in tegenstelling tot het ‘maken’ van geschiedenis)? 
3. Hoe verhoudt zich dit alles tot verschillende vormen van waarheid? 
4. En tot slot, en meest centraal: hoe kunnen we daardoor het stuk zien als 
een stuk dat wacht op de juiste gelegenheid om waarlijk actief te worden, 
dat wil zeggen als waarheidspraktijk?  
 
Wat vraag 1 aangaat: Toneel is misschien niet de meest voor de hand 
liggende kunstvorm om als waarheidspraktijk te behandelen. Toneel staat van 
oudsher bekend vanwege het spel met illusie, met maskers, schijn en valse 
waarheden. Ons woord hypocriet is niet voor niets afkomstig van het Griekse 
hypokritès dat via het Latijnse hypocrita (een soort van mimespeler) via de 
Romaanse talen en het middeleeuwse Latijn eens steeds negatievere klank ging 
krijgen. Maar mijn behandeling van het theater als waarheidspraktijk vindt zijn 
grond in twee denkers die hebben nagedacht over de theatrale aard van politiek 
en van het menselijke zelf: Hannah Arendt en Michel Foucault.  
In Arendt’s Human Condition zit een frase verstopt die desalniettemin 
cruciaal is voor Arendts filosofie. Met betrekking tot theater stelt zij dat het de 
politieke kunst par excellence is ‘for only there is the political sphere of human 
life transposed into art’.410 Klaarblijkelijk beschouwt Arendt het theater als 
politieke kunstvorm bij uitstek omdat in deze kunstvorm de wezenlijke aard van 
de politiek wordt belichaamd. De aard van de politiek wordt immers bepaald 
door wat Arendt noemt een ‘space of appearance’, een publieke plaats waar het 
politieke handelen niet alleen zichtbaar wordt maar ook wordt voorgelegd, ter 
toetsing, aan een publiek. Dat ‘voorleggen’ gebeurt in handeling en in taal, of in 
wat Arendt noemt ‘fragiele’ vormen van spraak en handeling in de context van 
een publiek debat.411 Met dat fragiele geeft ze niet alleen aan dat politiek iets 
anders is dan uitvoering van de macht met geweld, maar ook dat politiek zich 
kenmerkt door een intrinsieke kwetsbaarheid. Wie verschijnt voor een publiek 
                                                          
410 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, 2nd ed. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1958), p. 188. 
411 Richard Halpern, ‘Theatre and Democratic Thought: Arendt to Rancière’, Critical Inquiry 37.3 
(Spring 2011), p. 548. 
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kan ook worden weggejouwd. Bij implicatie betekent het ook dat iemand die 
alsnog politiek wil opereren in totalitaire of quasi-totalitaire omstandigheden, 
een groot risico loopt. Totalitaire machten accepteren geen publieke toetsing 
maar gaan daar juist tegen tekeer. Arthur Miller handelde politiek door zijn 
toneelstuk voor te leggen in het publieke domein. Er zijn daarmee twee vormen 
van dramatisch handelen (dran = doen) in het spel. Het toneelstuk zelf bestaat 
uit dramatische handeling en met de introductie van juist dit toneelstuk in het 
publieke domein handelde Miller dramatisch. Hij maakte zich daarmee 
kwetsbaar, en dat was politiek gezien noodzakelijk.  
Die kwetsbaarheid van Millers actie met dit toneelstuk is, ten tweede, 
intrinsiek gerelateerd aan een waarheidspraktijk in de zin van Foucault wat 
politiek gezien op een andere manier van belang is, namelijk in relatie tot wat 
Foucault noemde het ‘zelf’, zowel individueel als collectief. Hij behandelde dat 
thema vooral in de latere fase van zijn werk en leven, en vooral in The Courage 
of Truth.412 In dat werk onderscheidde hij, naar aanleiding van een studie van de 
klassieken, hoe het waarheid-spreken vorm kreeg in vier varianten: profetie, 
wijsheid, onderricht en parrhêsia. Elke variant kende een figuur die daarmee 
samen hing, alsmede een wijze van spreken, en kon alleen functioneren in een 
politieke cultuur met een democratische praktijk, die in de woorden van Kerry 
Burch, functioneerde als een ‘leveller’ tussen de macht van de elite en het 
gewone volk.413 In dat kader kreeg het waarheid-spreken een zekere status, die 
afweek van de eer die viel te behalen met heroïsche daden. Vertaald naar de 
situatie van het McCarthyisme, waarin democratische principes met voeten 
werden getreden in een sfeer van collectieve angst, was The Crucible een 
poging het waarheid-spreken te herstellen. Miller deed dat niet als profeet, want 
hij sprak niet in de naam van een ander; hij was geen leraar, want hij was niet 
bezig een traditie te consolideren; hij was geen wijze, want hij beriep zich niet 
op superieur begrip; hij was, inderdaad, een parrhêsiast, die zijn leven en werk 
in de waagschaal gooide om te benoemen wat hij zag als de waarheid van wat 
aan het gebeuren was.  
Met het voorgaande is meteen een indicatie gegeven van de situatie waar 
het stuk op is gemaakt en sindsdien op wacht. Het stuk bestudeert een situatie 
waarin op basis van een manicheïs principe van goed en kwaad een algehele 
                                                          
412 Michel Foucault, The Courage of Truth (the Government of Self and Others II): Lectures at the 
Collège De France, 1983-1984, ed. by Frédéric Gros, trans. by Graham Burchell (Houndmills, 
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sfeer van angst wordt gecreëerd door machthebbers die het zoeken of uiten van 
de waarheid onmogelijk maken. Het stuk is in dat kader niet universeel maar 
cultureel specifiek. Toen Ronald Reagan zijn ‘rijk van het kwaad’-rede hield in 
1983 was dat cultureel gezien een herkenbare repetitie, en tegelijk een 
prefiguratie van wat George Bush jr. zou zeggen in zijn State of the Union 
Address op 29 januari 2002, waarin hij het had over een ‘axis of evil’.  
Dit brengt me bij vraag 2 van mijn onderzoek. Wanneer het stuk niet 
zomaar universeel is maar cultureel en historisch specifiek, hoe zet het 
geschiedenis dan in, theatraal gezien of dramatisch gezien? De beantwoording 
van deze vraag zal een belangrijk element zijn in alle hoofdstukken. In 
hoofdstuk 1 zal de vraag worden beantwoord of Miller met zijn  stuk aan 
geschiedschrijving deed in de zin van waarheidsvinding. Het antwoord daarop is 
‘ja’. Ofschoon het stuk natuurlijk niet reguliere geschiedschrijving is, verhoudt 
het zich daar wel toe. Daardoor slaagt het stuk er in zowel een historische 
situatie te beschrijven, als die historische situatie te actualiseren alsof die 
opnieuw werkelijk is, dramatisch. En het doet dat mede door een analyse te 
geven van de manier waarop bewijs kan worden ‘gefabriceerd’ door het beroep 
op ‘geesten’ die kwaadaardig aan het werk zouden zijn. Historisch onderzoek is, 
in de kern, gekant tegen dergelijke fabricatie of neemt die fabricatie als object 
van onderzoek. Dat is precies wat Miller, deels, deed.  
In hoofdstuk 2 voer ik een postmoderne lezing uit van het stuk. Dat is niet 
omdat het stuk zelf een postmodern werk is maar omdat het zich verhoudt tot 
een centrale vraag in de postmoderne literatuur die historiografisch van aard is. 
De klemmende vraag is in hoeverre historische representatie alleen mogelijk is 
door een ‘spectral illusion’ – de term is van historicus Frank Ankersmit.414 
Dergelijke fictieve, ‘geest’-achtige kracht is door het stuk op twee manieren aan 
het werk. Enerzijds werkt het stuk door zijn narratieve onderbouwing met de 
‘spectral illusion’ waar Ankersmit het over heeft en waardoor het stuk 
‘werkelijk’ lijkt. Anderzijds heeft het stuk dramatisch gezien een zekere 
archivalische kracht, alsof lichamen uit het verleden via de personages opnieuw 
tot leven komen, als spectrale, levende ‘documenten’. Aangaande het laatste 
verwerpt het stuk een strikt epistemologische houding, alsof het voldoende zou 
zijn te weten wat er toen is gebeurd. In plaats daarvan werkt het performatief: 
wat ‘daar’, ‘toen’ is gebeurd moet opnieuw worden gedaan. Alleen op die 
manier kan het stuk werken als een postmoderne parodie, die niet zeer grappig 
                                                          




is bedoeld, maar ernstig, zoals Linda Hutcheon beargumenteerde.415 Maar in 
postmodern opzicht werkt het stuk zelfs nog radicaler. Uitgaande van Mieke 
Bals idee van ‘preposterousness’ stel ik een lezing voor van het stuk die het 
McCarthyisme anachronistisch als eerste aanwezig stelt, en Salem als tweede.416 
De parodie werkt dan andersom: het is alsof McCarthyisme een parodie is 
geworden van wat er in Salem gebeurde, wat het kritisch potentieel van het stuk 
nog vergroot. 
Met hoofdstuk 1 en 2 heb ik gekeken hoe het stuk zich verhoudt tot het 
verleden. In hoofdstuk 3 en 4 bestudeer ik hoe het zich verhoudt tot het heden 
waarin het ingreep, in de jaren vijftig van de vorige eeuw, aldus een 
geschiedenis actualiserend.  
In hoofdstuk 3 bestudeer ik allereerst hoe senator Joe McCarthy gebruik 
maakte van levende angsten in de naoorlogse Verenigde Staten als een basis 
waarop meer angst kon worden gefabriceerd. Hij deed dat in de vorm van een 
media-spektakel, een vorm die ik serieus neem als generieke vorm in relatie tot 
de vraag waarom Miller daartegenin een toneelstuk schreef. Wat ik in dit 
hoofdstuk benoem als ‘the point of theatre’ is een figuurlijk perspectivisch punt. 
Waar het spektakel werkt door middel van een frame, waarin eenieder wordt 
ingevangen, en een versluiering waardoor niemand nog kan zien waar het 
werkelijk om draait, werkt het theater eerder door een perspectivische diepte. In 
dat verband werkte de allegorie die door Miller werd ingezet, op specifiek 
theatrale wijze. Waar allegorie in de geschiedenis van het Westen vooral is 
ingezet om breuken in de geschiedenis te repareren (als bijvoorbeeld tussen 
klassieke Oudheid en Christendom), om de geschiedenis zo continu te maken, 
zette Miller zijn allegorie in om juist het McCarthyisme te historiseren. Hij 
creëerde een theatraal perspectief waarmee de sluier van het spektakel kan 
worden doorbroken en het kader daarvan kon worden gezien als de projectie van 
een illusie. 
In hoofdstuk 4 ga ik nader in op wat de historische relatie is tussen de 
Salem-periode en het McCarthyisme, en hoe Miller zich daartoe verhield als 
toch ‘een kind van zijn tijd’. Hoe intervenieerde hij in zijn eigen tijd? Ik 
onderscheid daar drie vormen van interveniëntie. Ik lees de allegorie hier 
anders, niet om een geschiedenis continu te maken of daar juist een breuk in te 
forceren, maar als een manier om een alternatieve toekomst te kunnen 
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verbeelden. De allegorie werkt door een metaforische dynamiek, maar ik 
gebruik Ernesto Laclau’s tropologische analyse van geschiedenis om die 
metaforiek anders in te zetten.417 De Salem periode en McCarthyisme zijn niet 
zomaar twee verschillende periodes die door het stuk in vergelijking worden 
gebracht omwille van een gelijkenis (‘eigenlijk zijn ze hetzelfde’). De periodes 
grenzen ook aan elkaar in tijd en ruimte, en kunnen als metoniem voor elkander 
gelden, waarbij het niet gaat om een gelijkenis en de dominantie van één 
betekenis maar om een principiële heterogeniteit (‘de twee vallen onder een 
noemer maar blijven verschillend’). Voor Laclau is de metafoor een 
machtsgreep waarmee we een periode moet begrijpen in een ander licht. De 
metoniem daarentegen werkt op basis van verschil en hegemonie. Door het stuk 
eerder als metoniem in te zetten, benadrukte Miller heterogeniteit en het gevecht 
om hegemonie. De Salem-geschiedenis was immers geëindigd in een bevrijding. 
Door dit verschil in te brengen suggereerde hij ook het alternatief van een 
andere toekomst. Een tweede vorm van interventie bestond in de rol die Miller 
op zich nam als publieke intellectueel, een rol die als klassiek kan worden 
bestempeld in relatie tot democratie en dan vooral wordt ingevuld in termen van 
‘verantwoordelijkheid’. Maar zo klassiek was of is die democratie niet meer. 
Jacques Derrida volgend  in wat de rol is geworden van moderne literatuur in 
relatie tot de moderne democratie, benadruk ik tot slot in een derde vorm van 
interventie in termen van ‘onverantwoordelijkheid’.418 In dit kader ging het 
Miller niet zozeer om het redden van een bestaande democratie, maar ging het 
principiëler om wat Derrida noemt een ‘toekomende democratie’. Voor het 
voortdurend openhouden daarvan moet een auteur ‘alles’ durven zeggen, ook 
het onverantwoordelijke. Daarmee zijn we terug bij het thema van de parrhêsia: 
het waarheid-spreken onder alle omstandigheden. 
 In hoofdstuk 5 bezie ik de werking van het stuk richting de toekomst en 
ga ik feitelijk in op de verschillende waarheden die in het spel zijn (vraag 3 uit 
mijn onderzoek). Die waarheden betreffen de cultuur waaraan The Crucible 
bijdraagt en waar het in ingrijpt tegelijkertijd, en die de kracht van het stuk naar 
de toekomst bepalen. Miller heeft aangaande de cultuur waartoe hij behoort 
geen standpunt van ‘buiten’. De eerste vraag die moet worden beantwoord is in 
hoeverre The Crucible  wellicht niet zozeer een analyse is van een Amerikaanse 
cultuur maar daar aan bijdraagt. Om dat te bezien confronteer ik Miller’s stuk 
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met de cultuuranalyse van Geert en Gert-Jan Hofstede, die tot op heden het 
meest geschikt is om persistentie in culturen in beeld te brengen.419 Naar blijkt 
is The Crucible niet zomaar de reflectie van de Amerikaanse cultuur, maar is in 
het licht van The Crucible de analyse van de Hofstedes er ook niet zomaar een 
van ‘de’  Amerikaanse cultuur. Er is wel een opvallend punt van resonantie 
tussen beide: het absolute onderscheid tussen goed en kwaad dat blijkbaar een 
persistente factor is in de Amerikaanse cultuur en geschiedenis. Ik bezie het stuk 
dit aangaande in relatie tot de neo-conservatieve herlezing van het werk van 
Carl Schmitt in de jaren negentig van de 20e eeuw en het eerste decennium van 
de 21e. Het absolute onderscheid tussen goed en kwaad, wat een moreel 
onderscheid is, is via het werk van Schmitt gerelateerd aan de politieke 
categorieën van vriend en vijand, waarmee goed en kwaad dan gaan 
samenvallen. The Crucible kent feitelijk al dezelfde samensmelting van morele 
en politieke tegenstellingen en is daarmee niet alleen werkzaam naar verleden 
en het heden van de jaren vijftig van de vorige eeuw maar voor-spelt in dat 
opzicht de toekomst. Of, het beschrijft in zekere zin wat de toekomstige staat zal 
zijn waarin het stuk weer actief kan of zal worden. In dit verband heeft het stuk 
een spectrale kracht, of vormt het een voorbeeld van wat ‘hauntologie’ is gaan 
heten.420 Geschiedenis is zeker geen voorspelbaar geheel maar wordt wel 
gekenmerkt door geesten uit het verleden, die als geest zich juist 
onaangekondigd aandienen vanuit de toekomst. Millers stuk is in dit kader een 
voorbeeld van en studie naar de persistentie van krachten in een cultuur. 
Dat betekent niet dat The Crucible geen verschil kan maken. Op het 
maken van een verschil richt ik me in de conclusie, uitwerkend hoe The 
Crucible gelezen kan worden vanuit Judith Butler’s werk over performativiteit 
(wat een antwoord moet geven op vraag 4).421 Om goed te kunnen begrijpen hoe 
het stuk in het licht van Butlers analyse kan werken, is het wel noodzakelijk een 
verschil te maken tussen willekeurige opvoeringen van het stuk, en opvoeringen 
van het stuk als waarheidspraktijk. Natuurlijk kan het stuk overal worden 
opgevoerd, door allerlei groepen, in allerlei situaties en culturen. Dat is in feite 
het geval geweest in de afgelopen decennia. Elk publiek kan er, afhankelijk van 
de geslaagdheid van de voorstelling, van ‘genieten’. Maar dat is iets anders dan 
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dat het stuk werkt als waarheidspraktijk, in omstandigheden waarin het zoeken 
naar waarheid wordt bemoeilijkt of onmogelijk gemaakt in een door 
machthebbers aangejaagde sfeer van angst die alleen werkelijk kan zijn doordat 
er ook werkelijke bedreiging bestaat van de waarheidspreker. Het is die 
gelegenheid waar het stuk op wacht, en waarin het kan worden gebruikt om een 
verschil te maken. Het stuk moet dan, in die situatie, worden opgevoerd als een 
repetitie van de sfeer van angst die, als repetitie, wellicht opening kan bieden 
naar iets nieuws. In dergelijke situaties vraagt het stuk om moed, zoals Foucault 
benadrukte: de moed tot spreken. Het is een spreken dat niet zomaar het uiten 
van een mening betreft, maar dat in dienst staat van de zorg om het individuele 
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